Donald Trump President of the US

Donald Trump is the new President-elect of the United States, after a fierce electoral contest. The result of the American elections, needless to say, is quite surprising, at least from the observatory of Old Europe. Many had in fact failed to realize how American society has been changing in the last ten years, while the intellectuals of New York and of the East Coast represented, in the reality, only a part of the Americans.

In particular, the New York Times has been defeated, in its obsessive campaign against the Republican candidate. From that newspaper we expected more problems and less propaganda. The point is that Trump will certainly be restrained by the American system, because, happily, the Congress and the Senate have enough power to bridle an unpredictable President, who promises to become quite soon a lame duck, unless he becomes wise, and avoids errors. Therefore, his populist recipes will achieve only a part, and a minor one, of what he has promised. ‘Make America great again’ is a slogan that cannot go against history, at least in the sense that many give it. America is great because it is the oldest democratic republic in the world, and helped the rest of the world, -us Europeans, first of all-, to achieve the concept of democracy, through tumultuous centuries and

The charms of Rome/Arpino

On 23-24 September the first symposium on ‘Ciceronianism, European Studies, Eurolinguistics’, took place at the University RomaTre, and at Arpino on the second day. The symposium was sponsored jointly by the Linguistischer Arbeitskreis Mannheim and by 2000. The European Journal, and saw participants from Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France and Italy. The organizers aimed at resuming the series of symposia which took place, in the previous fifteen years, on eight occasions, from 2005 onwards, at the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’, with the collaboration of ‘RomaTre’ and ’Tor Vergata’ Universities. While the first series focused on Euro-Linguistics, the new series will consider a wider range of themes, with the overall aim being the exploration, from a general point of view, of the concept of European civilization.

In the words of Walter Rüegg, commenting on Dilthey, Cicero’s writings “appear as having exerted the strongest influence in the shaping of the European spiritual world, along with the Bible”. Cicero’s political ideas, his republicanism in particular, haven’t been sufficiently emphasized, and even scarcely understood, in historical literature. Hence the relevance of Ciceronianism, in this first symposium and, hopefully, in those which will follow. Let us add that, in Via dei Fori Imperiali, in Rome, just in front of the Curia, there is a statue to ‘Julius Caesar the tyrant’, not to Cicero, the champion of the mixed constitution and of republican ideals. Similarly, the hall in which the Council of the City of Rome gathers, is called ‘Aula Giulio Cesare’, ‘Julius Caesar Hall’. Needless to say, that hall exhibits an imposing statue of Caesar, the founder of tyranny in the West.

These points were made by Vincenzo Merolle, following his book Mommsen and Cicero (Logos Verlag, Berlin 2015), which offers a refutation of the severe criticism that Mommsen, the German royalist historian, leveled against Cicero. The papers of other participants focused mainly on the history of Ciceronianism. So, for example, Franck Colotte, with his ‘Theodor Mommsen lecteur du De Officiis’, or Marco Buonocore, with his paper on the forthcoming edition of the ‘Lettere di Mommsen agli Italiani’, scheduled
for 2017, the second centenary of the historian's birth. The book, in two volumes, will appear in the Biblioteca Vaticana, in the series Studi e Testi, and will clarify the complex problem of the relations between the German and Italian worlds of learning in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The section on Euro-Linguistics was coordinated by P. Sture Ureland, who made a short history of the symposiums on 'Euro-Linguistics' and 'Language Contact' which, apart from the ones at 'La Sapienza', were held on 23 occasions, from 1997 onwards, in European Universities. The last one took place at the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, in September 2014. Following these symposiums, ten volumes were published, under the editorship of P. S. Ureland, c/o Logos Verlag in Berlin.

P. Sture Ureland introduced the papers more strictly literary, such as the one by Andreas Golob, Words and Things in Context, by Francesco Laurenti, European Literary Tradition and Translation, by Maria Ana Tupan, Europe and the Legacy of the Alexandria Library. V. Merolle, on his part, commenting on the paper by Davide Astori, The search for a common Language in European Culture: 'prophesies from the Italian 1800s in the frame of some 1900s provocations', emphasized the need for a European Dictionary. Such a dictionary, he observed, is nowadays needed by the European Union. From a purely historical point of view, it demonstrates the substantial unity of European and

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X. Back to the Enlightenment?

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Essay no. 1 has been published in no. 2 Dec. 2013, essays nos. 2 and 3 in no. 1 June 2014, nos. 4 and 5 in no. 2 Dec. 2014, nos. 6 and 7 in no. 1 June 2015, no. 8 in no. 2 Dec. 2015, no. 9 in no. 1 June 2016

The Enlightenment became a label in the nineteenth century because of its association with technical progress. The Enlightenment became an agenda for the demands of man in the modern world. The ideas of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment in their new setting lost the charm of their original formulation and gave a false idea of what the philosophers of the Enlightenment were after. We cannot pretend to become eighteenth-century philosophers again, but a reflection on their ideas in their original setting may help us to cope with our own problems.

1. Introduction

The historian must try to present as authentic a picture of the past he is studying as he can. In the history of ideas that is a particularly difficult task. We use more or less the same words as our eighteenth-century ancestors, but they often don't mean the same thing, not quite. This is because these words refer to different realities.

lieve in people who speak well, because they easily turn into demagogues. And Obama speaks very well for people who dream, while a sound politician should invite people to listen to the harsh lesson of reality.

It is true that unemployment in America is at its lowest level, but public debt has been raising, while it should have been contained. Funding economic growth with more debt, is more than an error, because public debt will be paid by future generations. Telling Mr Renzi, the Italian Prime Minister - an irresponsible young man who, hopefully, will soon be toppled - words against the politics of 'German' austerity, is difficult to justify. In foreign policy the legacy of the American President has been half a disaster. Too much appeasement has emboldened the little tyrant of the Kremlin and of his gang who, being sure of their impunity, have assaulted Ukraine, whose people are guilty of claiming their own independence, along with the right of better commercial relations with the West. The Ukrainians have seen for years the Poles rapidly developing, thanks to their sharing the benefits of the European system of liberty of commerce, and have claimed the same for themselves. Obviously, the little tyrant could not accept a diminution of the influence of Russia, because tyrants reason along old-fashioned patterns. In democracy, by contrast, political reform comes from the below of society, not from the top of it, while authoritarianism prevents the natural course of society and its settlement along lines which are themselves natural, not artificial, as the philosophers used to call them in the eighteenth century. And all that is artificial in the long run is doomed to failure, under the breakers of history, because authoritarian, or limited democracy, means a limitation of liberty, where not the many, but a majority, often an artificial one, rules against a minority, preventing them from expressing their own potentiality. That form of government raises tensions, instead of escalating them down. This is one of the many lessons that its supporters should have learned, both from past history and from our contemporary world.

Obama's policy was not that of ending wars but that of abandoning the field to enemies who were just expecting the moment of the abandonment. It is certainly true that the Americans had enough of wars, but it is not less true that there are duties inherent in presidency, even against public opinion, when necessary. He may have been popular in America, but did not serve well the cause of the Western world and of freedom.

Obama gave no weapons to the Ukrainians, and no weapons to the Iraqis, who had to fight against foreign fighters, often European and American citizens. If he had given weapons to the Ukrainians, public opinion, in Russia -that is in the reality far from being favorable to the little Tsar- would have protested, and the little Tsar would have had to pay a high price, that he could not afford. And so, in its turn, if sufficiently helped, the Iraqi army would have strangled the ISIS on its first appearance. Finally, in margin to the G20, early in September, after meeting Putin, Obama admitted that he does not trust him. It has taken him much effort indeed to realize the true nature of the little tyrant, well known in Eastern Europe as 'the liar', as 'the man who stars people in order to build weapons'.

Many are not happy with the Iran deal, but we believe that one should think of the nature of Iranian society, mostly made of young people who have enough of the old periphery. In our contemporary world societies do not stay inert, and make the greatest revolutions, the durable ones, we mean, when they stay peaceful. The Romans used to say quiesca non movetere, do not move things that are quiet. This was their own wisdom, but this saying has acquired a quite different meaning in contemporary society, where the real progress is made in times of quiet, not in times of turmoil. The 'open society', after all, dissolves the closed systems, and this is the principal lesson that we learn from history.

Spectator
to a social context, which is not ours anymore. What the historian must do is to turn the familiar into the unfamiliar. This is the case with the ideas of the Enlightenment.

The Enlightenment was not the age of reason, if we mean by it that science tells us how to conduct our lives. It should rather be considered the age of reasonableness and as reasonableness is a passion – at least if Hume is right – that explains why the philosophers of the Enlightenment paid so much attention to sentiment. The study of sentiment was part of their scientific outlook. Those who ignore the fact that the Enlightenment is also the age of sentiment will not be able to understand it.

The philosophers of the Enlightenment have the reputation of being anti-religious and anti-church. However, I hope to have made it clear that, though in Catholic countries they usually were anti-church, nowhere were they anti-religious. The conflict between philosophers and the clergy was rather that the former advocated a purely secular morality that did not depend on the prescription of the churches. That conflict was about power and it made the philosophers circumspect in bringing their message, because they knew that the clergy had control over the common people and they had not. Though they did not believe in the miracles, the churches taught they respected the authority of these institutions, even if not for their own persons. It was given to nineteenth-century rationalists, such as Auguste Comte, to insist on the unconditional authority of reason, even to the extent that he erected a new religion on the basis of it.

The philosophers of the Enlightenment believed in freedom of thought and expression, though they accepted certain, conventional, conditions of restraints. Political freedom was another matter. Liberty of the press? Certainly, but even in Britain those in favour of this freedom accepted certain limitations to what the press could publish. Voting rights? Universal suffrage for men, let alone for women, was beyond the mental horizon of any eighteenth-century literate person. The heart of the matter is that these philosophers accepted the society of orders as their point of departure for any of the reforms they had in mind. And that fact alone explains the watershed that exists between the Enlightenment and the century that followed. Can we turn back to the Enlightenment? Of course we cannot. To mention only one thing: the common people, marginalized in the Ancien Régime, have become part of civil society and want to be heard. Their incorporation within society is no mean achievement and it precludes any reference to the society of orders, that the philosophers of the Enlightenment took for granted. So we could not get back to the eighteenth-century, even if we wished and of course we don’t want to. It was in many ways a cruel century. It stank, literally. For emotional and material reasons we would not feel comfortable in that century.

The nineteenth century is the era of great change and that change has affected the reception of the Enlightenment in that century. The Enlightenment became a label for advocates and critics. Those who argued for it saw enlightenment values as the only way to cope with the great change. Those who were against that change rejected these values as a matter of course. An early enemy of the Enlightenment was Isaac da Costa, in his Bezwaren tegen de Geest der Eeuw (“Objections against the Spirit of the Century”). Interestingly da Costa called his age (the early nineteenth-century) ‘the age of enlightenment’, and so it was equivalent to the age of slavery and superstition, in which “every raw and uncooked plan for improvement” is launched.1 Da Costa defended the traditional Christian faith. So he was a man from the right. However, there have also been critics of the Enlightenment on the left. The most peculiar example of this criticism is Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s Dialektik der Aufklärung. In this joint publication, published in Amsterdam in 1947, they regard fascism as the corrupted product of the Enlightenment, but the corruption does not stop with the defeat of fascism, as becomes clear from the first sentence of their book:

Seit je hat Aufklärung im umfassendsten Sinn fortschreitende Denkens das Ziel verfolgt, von den Menschen die Furcht zu nehmen und sie als Herren einzusetzen. Aber die vollends aufgeklärte Erde strahlt im Zeichen triumphalen Unheils. Das Programm der Aufklärung war die Entzauberung der Welt.2

This quotation refers to the future. Evidently fascism was only one step on the road to ruin.

What was their objection to the Enlightenment? According to them the slogan of the Enlightenment for knowledge insists on applied, instrumental knowledge, and that creates a one-dimensional reality of business and cheap recreation.3 Applied science, furthermore, creates endless possibilities for manipulation, which the fascists were great in exploiting. Horkheimer and Adorno’s complaint is that the Enlightenment has created a flattened reality in which means and not purpose prevails. So in their view the Enlightenment has become the ally of the Industrial Revolution and of the world it has created. So for critics from the right and the left as well as for advocates of the Enlightenment in the nineteenth century (and after) the concept got a dynamic character and so could create the suggestion that the

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3 It was Herbert Marcuse, as them a member of the Frankfurter School, who invented the term one-dimensional man. See H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (London 1968: Sphere books).
eighteenth-century philosophers of the Enlightenment were the pathfinders of the social, economic and political changes in the centuries to come.

Discussing Gibbon’s *History* I quoted Ranke’s dictum “Jede Epoche ist unmittelbar zu Gott”. The French Revolution closed the period of the Enlightenment in a Rankian sense, and the fascinating and peculiar fact is that we have not reached a new period, because the Industrial Revolution is still a story without ending.

2. The Ideology of Planning Society

The ideas of the French Revolution had a great influence on the nineteenth-century debate, and that was remarkable because the quality of these ideas was poor. There was no match between constitutional proposals and political reality. William Sewell writes about Siéyès:

However desirable the wholesale abolition of privilege [on 4 August 1789] may have seemed to him in retrospect, it was an unanticipated consequence of *What is the Third Estate?* and not the fulfilment of a conscious plan.\(^4\)

Indeed, Siéyès wrote constitutions without having an idea of how they could fit the present political situation. When asked what he had done during the period of the Terror, he replied: I survived. That was his most sensible remark. Robespierre joined the Revolution coming from Arras as a supporter of the monarchy, and he was against the death penalty. He became the architect of the Terror and the hangman (or rather the headman) during that period. He evidently was a prisoner of events, and his growing paranoia motivated him to instigate the great cleanup of all the persons and factions who were against the Revolution. Revolution to the revolutionaries meant spring cleaning starting with abolishing history, and that attempt was enough to alarm Edmund Burke and justly so. For, abolishing history also means eliminating the rule of law by way of improvisation.

Many plans for the reconstruction of society were produced in the nineteenth-century. Comte, Marx and Spencer made them, and their plans had a willful disregard in common for the political measures and the political philosophy that were needed to put them into practice. Reading Lenin’s *State and Revolution* I was bothered by his solution to the problem the revolution would create.\(^5\) How is it that an intelligent man like Lenin could maintain that you could run Russia as a post office? This must have been propaganda, you are inclined to think, but there may have been a worse explanation and this is that Lenin believed what he wrote. In that case the Russians paid a heavy price for Lenin’s naivety.

Revolutionary thinking is the ideology of planning a frictionless society, so that the state is not needed anymore, except for locking up criminals. The sad thing, of course, is that planning can never be frictionless and that you need democracy to repair the mistakes. The political reality of Soviet Russia was that Stalin and a small elite of communist officials forced through ‘solutions’ with a total disregard for human lives.

However, not only the communists were the victim of the ideology of planning society. Liberals (including reformist socialists for the sake of the argument) trusted that the equilibrium of supply and demand would solve most of their economic problems, and that the margin which economic growth created could be used for social reforms. Liberals and, certainly, socialists, believed in the role of the state, but in a curious way they relied on economic forces to make their policies possible. However, in this way they underestimated the unpredictable outcome of these economic forces, which in fact reduced their planning to damage control.

In the fifties of the twentieth century, policy makers thought they had discovered the magic formula: economic growth. With Keynes they said that it does not matter whether we divide the cake in equal parts as long as the growing size of the cake allows us to give everyone a larger share than he had before. Economic growth will undoubtedly create inflation, but as long as that inflation is moderate and wages will exceed prices, everyone can be happy, including officials and politicians, because the real value of the debt of the state will diminish. This magic formula worked more or less until the credit crisis of 2008. That crisis shattered the belief that in principle the economies of the world would grow by a gradual process, and commentators were shocked to learn that economic growth since the very beginning of economic expansion had created a highly unstable global economy. Since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the liberal and socialist pragmatists had the final say, and they scorned the Russians who had made a mess of things. But are the pragmatists doing so much better? If we look back to the crisis of 2008 the most disconcerting fact of that crisis is that none of the experts saw it coming. And the second disconcerting fact is that they still talk about economic growth as a remedy for the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. And yet they should know that economic growth, whatever its short term merits, is not the solution for creating a more stable global economy.

In the meantime we have got another problem. We almost literally are consuming mother earth. The depletion of our resources together with the global warming created by the exhaust of CO\(_2\) may threaten humankind in the foreseeable future. The unintended

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effects of the sum total of our activities are so dangerous, because they are not captured within our schemes of control. We need long term strategies to deal with these externalities. In the meantime we are well advised to follow Stuart Mill’s advice and concentrate on the division of the cake we have and not on the one we plan to create.

3. The Great Change: Modernization

Who would draw the conclusion that modern humans are a collection of bunglers is wrong, of course. Human achievements in building the world we know have been colossal in technical, social and economic terms. Not so much in political terms, I am afraid. One might think that war as a solution to conflict would become an obsolete measure since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, because that Revolution thrives by cooperation not conflict. Enlightenment, we might say, means closing the gap between political decision making and the reality of human cooperation. But how? In fact we are incapable of doing so, and perhaps it is not so strange that we don’t know how to deal with the world we ourselves are creating. The great change unleashed by the Industrial Revolution has created what Jan Romein has called ‘the deviation from the universal human pattern’ [“de afwijking van het Algemeen Menselijk Patroon”]. Whether such a universal pattern ever existed is a matter for debate, but that everyone everywhere has been and is being confronted by an emerging world which in no way matches their life, experiences and customs, is a fact. Furthermore the great change prevents us, citizens of the world, from getting accustomed to our present situation, because the future is always full of surprises.

The world is in a state of constant flux, because of what we might call the process of modernization. To be modern means that we keep up to date and view everything, even from our immediate past, with suspicion. New car models and articles of fashion are modern, but the term also applies to bureaucratic and customs, is a fact. Furthermore the process of modernization in six points.

a. Technical Inventions

In the beginning technical change became visible in canals, paved roads, textile machines, Watt’s steam engine, and factories. Now it manifests itself in new means of communication and the electronic innovation which backs it up. The classical economists explained the growth of the economy by the interplay of soil, labour and capital, the classical factors of production. Now they are no longer the main causes of economic growth, as Schumpeter has argued with forceful arguments. Innovations push the economy forward. The economy constantly has the tendency to reach equilibrium and, as a consequence, profits tend to diminish to the rate of interest. That tendency is interrupted by innovations which, during a certain period, tend to raise profits to a spectacular height for those who control these inventions. For those who view uncontrollable modernization with some concern inventions may be regarded as a mixed blessing.

b. Economic Growth

In the sixties of the last century Walt Rostow published his Stage of Economic Growth. He took the Industrial Revolution in England as his model to explain how the economy took off at a certain moment, broke through the ceiling of the traditional economy, to reach eventually a stage of maturity, in which economic growth became a self-propelling force, and in which growth would generate new growth. Rostow maintained that the British example was repeated on the continent. After the publication of the book, there occurred a lively debate on patterns of growth and about the question whether all regions outside Europe and America could participate in the process. No one questioned the fact of what Rostow called sustained growth: at least until the Club of Rome published its Limits of Growth, a report in which they predicted that the scarcity of fossil fuel would bring the economy to a standstill. They were wrong. In the past two hundred and fifty years the economies of the Western world have grown at an exponential rate and


8 Schumpeter wrote a lot on this subject; the essential text is Business Cycles (1939) (Philadelphia 1982: Porcupine Press).


10 D. Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth (London 1972: Earth Island) and D. Meadows, Limits to the Growth, the 30 Year Update (London 2005: Earthscan).
more recently countries in Asia, South America and Africa have joined the club. And notwithstanding the present crisis there are no reasons to expect the ending of economic growth on a global scale. The question rather is at what cost we are creating this economic growth. Economic growth is measured by comparing gross national products of this year to those of a former year. The problem with this measurement is that it includes polluting activities as earnings adding to the national income, and that it disregards externalities. To name but one: all the peoples of the world have become richer than they were (statistically not necessarily as individuals), but the number of human beings is still increasing at a rate which makes us ask how long mother earth can sustain this growing population.

c. The Rationalization of Norms
A modern organization needs formal rules to be able to function. Human transactions have become more frequent and complicated, and with them the role of government has grown. Bureaucratization is, as Max Weber has explained, the other face of rationalization. Rules should be predictable and acceptable to human groups with different beliefs and lifestyles. So, we have to introduce rules which can mediate between these different beliefs and lifestyles, and rationalization tries to introduce a neutral element in the way we judge actions. In doing so it has transformed our public morality. We tend to judge actions by their consequences rather than by the intentions of the actors. If consequences add to the sum of happiness we approve them, if they diminish the sum we condemn them.

However, as individuals our personal happiness also relies on our motives for undertaking a certain action, and so there may occur a conflict between our intentions and the way the consequences of our actions are judged in society (and particularly by policy makers). Now, one may argue that the conflict between intentions and consequences is always present, but the conflict becomes serious when only consequences are acceptable as the norm of judging actions. That will mean the frustration of personal happiness. Adam Smith and David Hume did not know this conflict, because they argued that only the quality of intentions can decide whether an action is moral or not.

d. From an Ascribed to an Achieved Status
On this subject I can be brief. Modern society has a demand for well-educated persons, who manage to perform complicated tasks. So family origin and ascribed status no longer are the deciding factors in making careers, but merit is. And so status is largely based on merit in modern society, or at least on perceived merit.

e. The Widening Scale of Human Relations
It is an expression I used in a book on social history to describe the modern situation of mankind. It means that no one is locked up anymore in his local situation, and can now communicate and do business with the world, and today even from his home. This is undoubtedly a positive thing. Yet we are also part of what David Riesman called the lonely crowd. As individuals, we are alone in a mass of people which we do not know on a face to face relationship. More than a century before Riesman, Tocqueville used the fact that we are losing out on the intermediate relations between the state and the individual, to describe the state

the West think they want) and which forces moslems to be tolerant to non-believers. And how sincere are those in the West who accept that homosexuals should be able to lead normal lives? Do they really believe that homosexual behaviour is none of their business or are they being politically correct, secretly thinking that homosexuality is abhorrent? The point is that public morality in its utilitarian version forces them to be tolerant even if they are not.

These five points describe modernization in its tendencies and outcomes and the overall point of modernization is that it forces us to do things and to accept things whether we like them or not.

**4. Eros and Thanatos**

A few years ago I wrote a survey of political theories in the nineteenth-century Western world. Its subtitle was *Theories, Illusions, Realities*. My conclusions were that there are no political theories anymore, but that political science dealt with the nuts and bolts of politics. A common illusion was that we can do without the state or at most the state will only need to function as Carlyle’s famous night-watch. And the reality has been that the state as an institution became more powerful than ever before. An interesting aspect of this survey was that the most original theories did not deal with politics proper, but with human fate in a situation of change. The names of Marx, Durkheim, Max Weber and Freud were associated with these theories. Their perspective on the fate of modern man was gloomy. H. Stuart Hughes wrote a magnificent book on their ideas, *Consciousness and Society*, and its subtitle *The Reorientation of European Thought* is revealing. These four thinkers became the founders of the new discipline of sociology, and the new discipline was meant to teach individuals how to survive under the conditions of modernity.

According to the young Marx, individuals have become alienated in the course of economic development. In an argument which echoes Rousseau’s notion that civilization corrupts man, human beings are the victims of the division of labour. In the course of that process individuals lose their identity and become subjected to the economic machinery. The mature Marx introduces the notion that bourgeois capitalism is creating an unstable economic structure. Adam Smith is wrong. Instead of equilibrium economic development leads us up a spiral staircase which has an explosion at an end, the big *Kladderadatsch*, as Marx called it. In the long run the communist utopia will present permanent bliss, but in the meantime human beings in capitalist society are the prisoners of their drive for change.15

The Calvinist who, according to Max Weber, is the prototype of modern man, builds an iron cage for himself. He wants to serve God by his work and creates a Godless world. That is a world of bureaucratic rules in which rationalization reigns supreme and the world as it was known has lost its magic charm. Weber’s way out of boredom was dedication to the German nation. During World War one, when he noticed the pipe-dreams of German hegemony, he became disabused. In the lecture *Politik als Beruf* delivered in München in 1919 for a student audience he held a funeral oration on German nationalism. It was a grim message. Politics could only mean a responsible way on how to deal with evil.15

Durkheim’s idea of *anomie* is not so easy to understand. It means that a curious lawless state of mind occurs because people have too many options. They do no longer know what to choose and so lose their sense for the limits of things, because they think they can have everything they want. This *embarras du choix* does not turn individuals into criminals, but they lose their moral sense, and utility becomes a matter of policy rather than of motives. The equation is that more wealth means that it becomes more difficult for the individual to make responsible choices. This paragraph carries the title of two concepts, which Freud developed in his essay *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*, better known in its English translation *Civilisation and its Discontents*. Modern development creates a state of permanent discontent in individuals. Freud writes:

How has it happened that so many people have come to take up this strange attitude of hostility to civilization? I believe that the basis of it was a deep and long-standing dissatisfaction with the then existing state of civilization, and that on that basis a condemnation of it was built up, occasioned by certain specific events.

Modern science presents us with luxury and comfort, but otherwise is not helpful:

The fulfilment of a longing that goes back thousands of years, has not increased the amount ofurable satisfaction which they may expect from life, and has not made them feel happier.16

Freud spent his last years as a refugee in London and had time to reflect on the horrors of World War One and the new horrors Nazism was creating. Why is it that man has this senseless urge to annihilate his fellow human beings? Freud answered that man is discontented and bored under the conditions of the modern world. He has two basic drives. *Eros* does make him seek friendship and love, but when he is deeply frustrated he switches to *Thanatos*, his second drive. *Thanatos* is the drive to annihilate others, particularly those over whom he has absolute power. It seems to me that the terrorist who blows himself up is the ultimate

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15 Talcott Parsons distilled from these gloomy analyses a much more optimistic view of modern society. His voluntaristic theory sketches a structure based on functional relations, which need little intervention by the state. See Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (Glencoe 1949: Free Press); also F.L. van Holthoon, *State and Civil Society*, 334 ff.

example of someone motivated by \textit{thanatos}. He not only wants to destroy others, but demonstrates that he does not want to be on this earth any more. Perhaps the most disturbing thought we can associate with Freud’s analysis is that the terrorist is lurking in all of us. In this sense the German title is better than the English one. Modernisation causes a faint sense of discomfort in our souls. Few of us will be willing to adopt extreme measures on the basis of this \textit{Unbehagen}; some may be willing to act as the shield without which terrorists cannot act.

5. The Privileged Moment

Marvin Becker used the term ‘a privileged moment’ to indicate the emergence of civil society in Scotland, England and France.\textsuperscript{17} That is a well-chosen term, which could be applied to the Enlightenment as a whole. The philosophers of the Enlightenment were expecting a world of peaceful cooperation in which enlightenment would induce the civilized behaviour necessary for the purpose. Their privilege was that they could think about civilized behaviour without taking into account the common people and the industrial change which would promote their cause.

Their common purpose was what Siep Stuurman has called the meta-concept of common humanity, and they were the first to claim that they could adapt the social order to the reforms they had in mind.\textsuperscript{18} We cannot have their privilege of composure, because our social order is constantly under the pressure caused by modernisation, and we have to find novel ways to deal with this pressure. In many countries of this world common humanity is a problem, not a reality and not even an ideal. Powerful movements in the world of Islam preach the jihad against modernity and the jihad is based on the concept of us against them, and so for many Moslims there can be no common humanity. Perhaps we in the West should be less doctrinaire in our claims for human rights, but our discretion will not help us in reaching a common ground with the jihadists, because they do not only want to destroy modernity, but us with it. Our only hope in creating a more peaceful world is that eventually men and women in the world of Islam will want to decide their own fate and will take action against the radicals within Islam.

It is of interest to note what will happen to China in this respect. It seems to be that the mix of an authoritarian regime and economic freedom is a recipe for disaster. The present success of China’s economic performance seems to belie this conclusion and perhaps it does. However this success is bought at the cost of enormous pollution. It seems to be the lesson of any authoritarian regime that they are incapable of controlling the excesses of industrial production. Perhaps pollution presents a greater danger to China and the world than an open revolt of Chinese citizens against the state.

The point of this litany of problems is that mankind can only survive by solving them, whether they are problems of violence and war or of pollution. At present there is little hope that we can solve them by peaceful cooperation, and that is the only way we can.

Perhaps the Enlightenment could inspire us to create a new privileged moment. Horkheimer and Adorno were right. We miss the culture to give dignity and elegance to our existence. Their definition of culture, however, will not help us. They refer to culture as the domain of our higher aspirations—a type of cultivation which in German is called \textit{Bildung}—which must function as an antidote against the vulgarity of the world of business in which we spend our daily lives. The effect of this definition of culture is that we escape from the world in which we have to live. Instead, we should try to cultivate the norms of that world of business and no longer regard them as traffic rules we need for negotiating our existence.

Cultivation in this argument takes stock of the values of democracy, justice and freedom. How can we learn the lesson of cultivating them from the philosophers of the Enlightenment? Democracy as we know it, is a nineteenth-century invention. Democracy is necessary on a global scale, I have recently written.\textsuperscript{19} Only when every citizen of the world can have a say in the way we create a global community, that attempt can be successful. That lesson we will have to teach ourselves.

Justice and freedom are values cherished in the Enlightenment. How can the essays I have written so far enlighten us? Essay number two on the networking of the Enlightenment can help us to understand how important it is that—as in the Republic of Letters— we adopt a civilized style of debate as an alternative to the often acrimonious polemics we encounter in the public sphere. Hume was right. Our manners and customs must be able to induce a friendly intercourse and cooperation between individuals. With Lessing (see essay three) we can add to this that a secular morality can go well together with a belief in God. Buffon (essay four) has an important message for us. Man filled the niche in the order of nature and got the task to guide and fashion that order in a responsible manner.\textsuperscript{20} The leading theme of Rousseau’s writings (essay five) was that man

\begin{itemize}
\item In her plea for a responsible use of the earth Louise Fresco regards domestication and crop cultivation as an evolution created by man causing new species to exist. L. Fresco, \textit{Hamburgers in het Paradijs, Voedsel in Tijden van Schaarste en Overvloed} (Amsterdam 2012: Bert Bakker), 76.
\end{itemize}
Free Trade and New Philosophy: Tucker, Dangeul and Hamann *

Abstract
This paper examines a book that helped to disseminate throughout Prussia and the other German states a series of British, French, and Spanish considerations regarding economic policy and free trade, and which also marked the embryonic development of certain German ideas related with this field, not only in terms of theoretical support for commercial practices, but also planting the seed for a new way of understanding politics and philosophy. The book was a translation by Johann Georg Hamann of works by Ulloa, Tucker and Dangeul, with the addition of his own essay about economics, politics and the philosophy of history.

Key Words
Ulloa, Tucker, Dangeul, Hamann, political economics, consumption, free trade, new philosophy, Enlightenment, metacriticism of the Enlightenment, Germany, monopolies of power, monopolies of knowledge.

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Bernardo de Ulloa
In 1740, the Spanish economist Bernardo de Ulloa (1682-1740) published Restablecimiento de las fábricas y comercio español in Madrid. This book analysed the causes for Spanish decline...

1 The full exact title was Restablecimiento de las Fabrícias y Comercio español: Errores que se padecen en las causales de su decadencia, quales son los legitimos obstáculos que le destruyen, y los medios eficaces de que florezca. Published by the editor Antonio Marín, it comprised two volumes, the first of which was 231 pages long and which contained the Parte Primera: Que trata que sea comercio, quales sus partes, y diferencias: qual el que goza España, y el que necesita mantener con las Naciones para el restablecimiento de las Fabrícias, y Trafico terrestre: con un Extracto del Libro de Don Gerónimo Ustäriz, Teorica, y Practica de Comercio, y Marina, published in 1740. The second volume was published the following year, 264 pages in length, and the main title was slightly modified (Restablecimiento de las Fabrícias, Trafico y Comercio Marítimo de España), clarifying that this volume contained the Segunda Parte: Que trata del Comercio y Trafico Marítimo, que tiene España con las Naciones, y en la America: causales de su decadencia, y medios con que se debe aumentar, y estender para beneficios de estos Reynos, y aumento de las fuerzas and proposed measures to improve the nation’s economy within the framework of mercantilist theories. In fact, it contained an excerpt of close to a hundred pages from a previous book by another Spanish mercantilist, Jerónimo de Ustáriz (1670-1732), the once Minister of the Board of Trade and Currency.

Ustáriz
Ustáriz, an internationally renowned author in the 18th Century, had already highlighted the importance not so much of avoiding the drain of capital in precious metals by means of restrictions and protectionist measures, but rather of working to secure a favourable trade balance by fostering manufacturing with State support and reorganising active trade. In this work, based on the observations and studies made during his travels, he compares...
impoverishment of the people. The metropolis resulting from the increasing circulation of domestic products more expensive than foreign ones; and the depopulation of the Peninsula as a result of emigration to the Americas, or in the lack of an adequate strategy to protect the economy, but rather in the inexistence of a free economic fabric (not subject to the terrible abuse of duties and tariffs), deeply rooted in society and linked to trade.

Similarly, in his 1740 book, Bernardo de Ulloa, following the theses of Ustáriz, attributed the weaknesses of Spain to the fragmentation of the internal market and the proliferation of sales taxes; the imbalance between exports and imports owing to the abandonment of manufacturing and the overriding need to buy manufactured products from elsewhere; the excessive duties and taxes paid on domestic trade and at customs, which made Spanish products more expensive than foreign ones; and the depopulation of the metropolis resulting from the increasing impoverishment of the people.

This diagnosis was accompanied by a comprehensive analysis of the Spanish economy and trade with its colonies and other nations, emphasising the need for a spontaneous social economic fabric, promoted by the State but not stilted by its control, a notion that sparked great interest elsewhere in Europe. Twelve years later, in 1752, Louis-Joseph Plumard de Dangeul (1722-1777), French economist from the circle of Gournay and Mairte in the Chambre de Comptes de sa Majesté, wrote out a translation of this work into French for the King, which was eventually published as a book the following year. That same year, the translation drafted by his cousin, François Véron Duverger de Forbonnais, of Teórica y práctica de comercio y de marina by Ustáriz, also came to light.

Meanwhile, in 1749, another economist, in this case British, published a book in London that analysed the strengths and weaknesses of the British economy in comparison with France, offering proposals to improve his country’s economic standing: the author was Josiah Tucker (1712-1799), and his work was entitled A Brief Essay on the Advantages and Disadvantages Which respectively attend France and Great Britain, With Regard to Trade. With some Proposals For removing the Principal Disadvantages of Great Britain. Dangeul made haste to translate this work into French, although it was in fact much more than that. In this French edition, it became clear from the start that he had only translated a fragment of Tucker’s book, whilst the remainder of the economic analysis – the majority of the book – was original.

Plumard de Dangeul turned the premise of Tucker’s book around and published his own comparative diagnosis between France and Great Britain, examining this issue from the French perspective. He also used an ingenious artifice with a view to enhancing the appearance of objectivity of this new diagnosis and dissimulating the patriotic interest of its counter-argumentative character: he attributed the book to...
(translation and economic essay) to an Englishman who had supposedly lived in France for two years, John Nickolls, which was nothing more than a pseudonym. However, the whole of Europe knew who the real author of the French book was, and in its translation into German, Dangeul is cited on the front cover as the author.

Hamann
In 1756, in Mitau and Leipzig, a book was published, translated by the philosopher J.G. Hamann: Des Herrn von Dangeuil (sic) Anmerkungen über die Vorteile und Nachtheile von Frankreich und Großbritannien in Ansehung des Handels und der übrigen Quellen von der Macht der Staaten11. This book was, once again, much more than a translation of Dangeul’s Remarques, the self-analysis of the French economy with the introductory section taken from Josiah Tucker. In addition to Hamann’s translation of Dangeul into German, which takes up the first 254 pages, it also contained three additional pieces, two of which are detailed on the front cover: the first, an extensive summary in German of the aforementioned work by Bernardo de Ustáriz, on the basis of Dangeul’s French translation, entitled Auszug eines Werkes über die Wiederherstellung der Manufacturen und des Handels in Spanien (pp. 255-358); the second piece was entitled Beylage (pp. 359-401), an essay of his own about political economics; and finally, the translated excerpt, is not due in any way to Dangeul’s work, but that this was raised by him in German; Tucker, in the excerpt of his work An Essay on the Advantages and Disadvantages… translated by Dangeul; Dangeul himself, as the translator of Tucker’s work but also as an economist himself, author of the new work Remarques sur les Avantages et les Desadvantages… and of a speech he gave in Stockholm; and finally, Hamann himself, as translator of the whole set and author of an essay known by the experts13 as the Beylage in the text, detailing them, and saying that the author’s handwriting was difficult to decipher (“illegible”). Another work by Hamann, Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten, would once again appear later on with errata, perhaps for the same reason.

11 The first edition was published in 1756 in Mitau and Leipzig, edited by Johann Friedrich Petersen; the second, in 1757, was printed in Königsberg by Johann Friedrich Driet, and edited by Johann Christian Schuster, from Danzig and Leipzig. I have worked with a copy of this latter edition belonging to the Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbüttel: Wolfenbuttel Bibliothek, http://digilib.hab.de/drucke/ob-394/start.htm. This edition is cited here: Beylage, followed by the page number and, in the case of a textual citation, the line number or numbers.

12 The book also contains, at the end, one final page with Erinnerung des Herausgebers. This is interesting because the printer apologises for any errata that might appear zu Dangueil14 which marked the start of his career as an author15. The works of the economists cited previously constitute, therefore, the immediate and material context of Hamann’s essay. But his reflections are not due exclusively to their stimulus, since the Beylage contains references to other authors, and we know from the philosopher’s correspondence that he had read many other books on the subject of economics. We also know from the observations he makes at the end of his own essay that he was unable, in spite of his efforts to obtain it, to read Tucker’s original work16, the aforementioned An Essay on the Advantages and Disadvantages Which respectively attend France and Great Britain, With regard to Trade. With some Proposals For removing the Principal Disadvantages of Great Britain.

Hamann is aware, as he states17, that Dangeul must have adopted in his Remarques… an intermediate point between a commitment to improving his country and apposite submission to his king; he imagines that objectivity cannot always have been as desired, and that patriotism must have certainly played an important role in the analyses that refute Tucker’s perspective (clearly, the pretence of simulating a more balanced perspective by adopting the nom de plume of an English author); finally, he recognises that, had he been able to read Tucker’s complete original work, he would have been able to judge and better understand the plan behind Dangeul’s work, but that this was not possible. Therefore, any similarity or relationship between Hamann’s and Tucker’s way of thinking during this period of time, beyond the brief translated excerpt, is not due in any (Eds.): Johann Georg Hamann. Religion und Gesellschaft. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2012, pp. 46-71.

15 Hamann considered that the work that had marked the start of his own career as an author was the subsequent Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten (1759). The reason for this, as he explains at the start of the Beylage, was that in this earlier work he had capitalised on his task as a translator to include his own ideas in an annex that would perhaps not have been read outside of such a favourable context. This does not prevent us from considering it differently today (Beylage, p. 361).

16 Beylage, p. 398.

17 Beylage, pp. 397 and ss.
they are filled with abuse and prejudice. The inalienable rights of human beings, the North, true misanthropes, to such conceal, according to the Magician of philanthropy, these powerful people egotism and cruelty. Beneath the mask of interest in the common good, their scorned the common people, their lack who emulate the nobility, for example, and the upper class (comprising those possession as a tutor enabled him to come Hamann observed them carefully, he tion as a tutor enabled him to come into close contact with the nobility and the upper class (comprising those who emulate the nobility, for example, the military) and he saw the way they scorned the common people, their lack of interest in the common good, their egotism and cruelty. Beneath the mask of philanthropy, these powerful people conceal, according to the Magician of the North, true misanthropes, to such an extent that instead of recognising the inalienable rights of human beings, they are filled with abuse and prejudice. Hamann observed them carefully, he

18 The similarities between Hamann and Tucker regarding the anticipation of ideas set out by Adam Smith, or, for example, relating to their insistence on the abolition of any type of monopoly (economic, power, or knowledge), did not originate in a rewriting by Hamann of Tucker’s ideas, among other reasons because Tucker set down many of them in works written after this date. They were independent developments. Tucker did, however, arouse great curiosity, to the extent that he brought all of Tucker’s works with him on his subsequent trip to England.

19 Beylage, 361-362.

20 I shall refer to it as “German”, although the experiences correspond to Prussia, because over the course of his writing, Hamann himself attributes his social, intellectual, and political reflections to Germany, using that term: “Deutschland”. Cf. J.G. Hamann: Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten. Amsterdam (Königsberg), M.C. Hartung, 1759, page 9, line 6; J.G. Hamann: Evocación de Sócrates, ed. and trans., by C. Canterla. Huelva, Consulcom, 2015, page 24 line 7.


22 Beylage, p. 364.

23 Beylage, p. 365.

24 Beylage, p. 367.

25 Beylage, p. 367.

26 Beylage, p. 368 l. 21-23.

27 Beylage, pp. 368-369.
a different philosophy, not in abstract reason, but rather in practical reason, in order to immerse themselves in the torrent of life. The object of the philosopher should be “... the grand theatre of nature and its events, the art of living and its instruments, social occupations and their means.” Finally, the philosopher should become a closer observer of the peasant farmers, an apprentice to the artisans, and a confidante of the merchants, and be useful to them also as an assistant and teacher, to contribute through his wisdom to the revitalisation of the civil community.

Just like Mandeville, whom he quotes, Hamann highlights in the Beylage the surprising fact that it is the common people, families of workers, who keep the spirit of solidarity and community conscience alive, while the aristocracy is lacking the civic sense of true patriotism, given that their concept of the mother country is purely one that coincides with their interests. Political Economics should be, therefore, not an instrument that serves the production of wealth for the elite, but rather a tool to promote, preserve, and guide the spontaneous economic activity of the common people, thereby restoring dignity and freedom to the fabric of the nation, preserving it from vampirisation (theft) by means of taxation, different forms of concealed slavery, and a whole host of humiliations. Hence, the common man should become an issue and a subject of importance for the State, and the nation could then embark on a path to regeneration that should be followed right through to its ultimate consequences.

The principle of community

In the opinion of Hamann, the basic principle of community is freedom. That is the “inestimable good” without which man can neither think nor act, and the loss of which dehumanises man by taking all his privileges (which are none other than this “ancient and natural rights”) as a human being. However, political corruption and decadence leads nations to replace freedom and rights with abuse, oppression, and prejudice, which sickens and disintegrates the fabric of civil society, causing the nation and the State to spiral into decline.

Through his reading of different sources (citing, among others, Montaigne, the Swedish economist Anders Bersch, the French author Melon, etc.), Hamann reaches the conclusion that the best way of regenerating a nation is through free trade, since freedom in commercial exchange would revive the entire social fabric, activating the spirit of a nation and consequently its way of thinking, its projects, and its material executions. Not only because that free exchange would generate and distribute wealth, thereby contributing to the levelling of the social classes, but because this freedom would bring about the unstoppable recognition of all freedoms.

Hamann considers that, although farmers and artisans contribute to the improvement of the nation, merchants play the essential role in the fabric of civil society. True commercial spirit reconciles economics with wastefulness, stimulates the arts with abundance, turns luxury into an activity that generates employment, supplies weapons whilst at the same time guaranteeing peace, and mobilises people’s courage, their virtues, vices and desires. The economic spirit that is based on knowledge of the scientific laws of commerce, on the shrewdness, credibility, honour and credit of merchants, can undoubtedly give rise to noble impulses and accelerate the return of freedom for all men. As long as it is purged of the greed of mere robbery into which it has been turned in the hands of those few who would seek to monopolise it.

And hence a large part of Hamann’s essay is geared towards advocating the commercial bourgeoisie as the creator, through its network of families, of a civic mesh and fabric for the republic, the community, the city. Commerce is, in his opinion, the hope of a transformation from absolute States into fairer governments in which civic virtues are elevated to their ancient splendour, thereby restoring the spirit of public utility. He is convinced that the end of commercial monopolies would be accompanied by the end of monopolies of power and knowledge, a question that re-emerges in his subsequent work.

For Hamann, the political and economic elites were bolstered by privileges that intellectuals endorsed instead of denouncing the abuses that legitimised them by means of philosophical reasoning. A new critical philosophy was required, therefore, that would steer clear of the dominating Spanish metaphysical castles and instead seek out other models and practices. A philosophy that would not be limited to an antiquarian history of philosophy with its cult of the dead philosophers, but one that would instead unmask the abuses of the powerful and their accomplices, and would provide a radical defence of freedom in all areas. New philosophers were needed who would dare to censure the monopolies on knowledge constituted by universities, academies, and the salons of the powerful, and who would restore the common people to their leading role; teachers who would no longer practice education for politesse and social reproduction, and who would set themselves the goal of achieving Bildung. A new philosophy that would not seek to impose its civilising models and would allow the spirit of the people and their cultures to grow and flourish, and with this, a new kind of Humanism.

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Mommsen and Cicero

Cicero’s relevance to us is highlighted by Professor Vincenzo Merolle, from “La Sapienza” University in Rome, who is also the Editor of The European Journal, published in five languages. The discursive manner matches that of the great orator in his book, Mommsen and Cicero (Logos Verlag, Berlin, 2015), which is a refutatio of the negatively assessed portrait lavishly jotted on many pages by the celebrated German historian in his Roman History. Defence in the polemical way, in which Cicero excelled, is felt to have a greater impact than commendatory comment.

Merolle writes as a political philosopher, born in Arpino, in the shadow of his great forerunner, and therefore destined to defend him from vilification. He turns in anger against other detractors as well, such as Wilhelm Drunn and Georg Barthold Niebuhr, Theodor Mommsen’s precursors in the sad work of “character assassination” (the systematic blacking of someone’s image). The passion pouring into the book is part of its charm, but the inculcation of all the German commentators seems to us a bit exaggerated. There is no reason why we should see a symptom of guilty conscience in the fact that present commentators leave Mommsen out. We are more inclined to see, for instance, an objective and detached politologist such as Karl-Heinz Mullag (Phänomene des politischen Menschen im 17. Jahrhundert, Hamburg 1973) putting down one knee while sketching on the other, in typically German fashion, a table on invariants capable to untie the most tangled knot. The relationship between power and value, for instance, implies the ancient principle of its grounding in ethics (Thucydides), in virtue (Plato and Cicero), unlike the modern shift to instrumental rationality (Morus: power should be pragmatic, but with rules of the game, while Machiavelli reduces the exertion of power to utility), etc.

The study of Cicero’s works, as well as the coverage of the exegetic corpus dedicated to him make this book a model of erudition and a reference which no one will afford to ignore in the future. The most important aspect seems to us to be the new positioning of Cicero in the history of ideas and the exploration of the present potential inherent in Ciceronianism to serve the philosophy of history and of politics. Following suggestions from Tadeusz Zielinski, a Ukrainian of Polish descent, Merolle documents Cicero’s priority in the genealogy of Deism and of Newton’s cosmogonic model in De natura deorum and De divinatione.

As defender of the republican ideal and of consensual government at the time of the collapse of the Roman Republic, Cicero was confirmed in his political option by two other catastrophes which reversed the progress of civilization: the defeat of the Girondins in France and of Kerensky in Russia. Whereas the first sinned by the onset of a tyrant’s arbitrary power, the last two justified Cicero’s fear of the multitude, especially of the mob. It is only equality before the law that is justified, not the imposition of the principle of equality in social organization, because human beings are not equal. To honour the uppermost and the lowest indiscriminately is quite unfair, he thought. Merolle sees no virtue either in the alternating access to power or in the imposition of the majority’s will, opting for the Ciceronian model which meant the participation in the act of government of all social layers and classes - what we understand today by “participatory democracy”. Inbetween the arbitrary rule of a single man and the unwitty mob, Cicero wanted to interpose the aristocrats characterised by moderation.

After the fall of the ancien regime this mediating role was taken up by the professional elites. English Romantic T.S. Coleridge calls the alliance of Church and intelligentsia “clerisy”. Antonio Gramsci – here is an exemplary peninsular continuity – ascribes this role to civil society. Hence the tragedy wrought upon the whole nation by the failure of this class. La trahison des clercs (Julien Benda); “The Treason of the Intelligentsia” (Nicolaie Breban). Are our professionals consulted when it comes to the drafting of laws? Vincenzo Merolle is an authority in this field but before publishing this book he asked the opinion of historians from thirteen odd universities from all over the world to make sure he would be free from shallowness of errors. The unanimously acknowledged models of politicians are intellectuals who come in the name of peace and moderation, such as Mahatma Gandhi or Nelson Mandela. President Obama is another peace-maker supported not only by the American democrats but also by the American academics.

Maria-Ana Tupan

1 From Revistei Contemporanul. Idea Europeana, no. 9, September 2015, with permission of the Editor. English translation by Author.
A Morality that Does Not Make Sense

It’s about being good, we were told, when teachers in the mass media urged us to endorse contraception, casual sex, abortion and same-sex marriage; to write Ms instead of Mrs or Miss, first-name everyone and avoid new evil isms with American names. Add these practices of compassion and equality, we were told, to the OK elements of the old European morality and you will be enlightened, liberal, progressive, in short, good people. Such was and is the new hybrid morality that we have been adopting since the 1970s when American left-liberalism spread its wings, imperially, across the West. Those left-liberal idealists (they were to become neo-liberals and to call themselves plain “liberals”) were animated, like their Russian communist counterparts, by moral disapproval of European civilisation and a vision of its just amendment and replacement.

The American state and business corporations, mass media included, had noted the profit that could be made from these new rules of behaviour, thought and language. So the new ‘liberal agenda’ obtained their backing, and automatically that of the states and big business of Western Europe. Thus this neo-liberalism (the classical kind that partly shapes the Irish Constitution buried) supplied the ethic of the consumerist decades leading up to the Crash. That same alliance of social idealism with money-making by states and business is trying now, led by the mass media, to revive those halcyon days.

Human beings inherit from their millennial experience an intuitive ability to assess the presence or absence of sense in the morality the framework for life that is prescribed for them by their rulers. This is an assessment of the coherence of its rules with each other, and with human needs and the felt general nature of things. Such coherence is one necessary characteristic for the morality to make sense. Another is suggested by those historical societies that we call ‘civilisations’.

That these perceived and felt sense in their respective moralities is attested by the fact that, unless destroyed by outside force, they lasted for hundreds or more of years. And we note that in each instance the morality’s coherence being a given – it also had a venerated source, supernatural or human. So it seems reasonable to conclude that for a morality to make sense to people as a framework for life, it needs to have both coherence and a venerated source, supernatural or human. If it lacks these characteristics, it presents, rather than a framework that makes sense, senselessness.

The American neo-liberal morality, while advancing over the past 50 years, has lacked those characteristics: basic coherence by being a hybrid of old and new; a venerated source, quite obviously. And the signs are that those to whom the correct zeal of the neo-liberal idealists has been principally directed white Westerners have been finding, consciously or subconsciously, the resulting life senseless. Most fundamentally, their desire to reproduce such a life has flagged.

The white populations of Western Europe face steep falls in the next ten years. The plight of the Native Americans is instructive. It mirrors the well-known phenomenon of all so-called ‘primitive tribes’ after European colonisers had made them insert elements of European morality into their systems of moral rules derived from some venerated source. The result for the consequently hybrid system was the absence of such a source and an incoherence that by way of senselessness produced anomie or normlessness.

Small wonder, then, that the West’s senseless reigning morality has had effects on Westerners similar to those which European colonialism had on those ‘primitive tribes’. Witness the more sensitive of us, particularly if young, feeling a pain of soul that issues in recurrent attempts to annihilate consciousness: temporarily by binge-drinking or drugs or at a rising rate in the last 50 years permanently; the sharp-eyed types who, reading the senselessness as normlessness, have grown rich by supplying the drugs or, if bankers, by cutting corners; if statesmen by spying on citizens or if angry by making murder.

In two key respects, the consumerist-liberal morality has been particularly bad for Western women. Since the 1970s the spaces and times in which a woman can move safely alone have been diminishing. Only in the aftermaths of great wars have so many mothers had to rear their children alone.

That a society of human beings faced with senselessness cannot last stands to reason. After a few decades disintegration sets in and ultimately as the fate of the Russian communist experiment shows completes itself. When the West’s turn comes, and signs of it are there, it will be time for Ameroeans to get serious. Indeed, that time is already here and advance thinking about what we will do then is in order. This time round, no anti-human utopia, but with an eye to how China transits culturally from old to a new civilisation. Our European ancestors began to build an enduring one a thousand years ago.

Desmond Fennell