



A case for 'European' Dictionaries¹

Summary

The author, an historian of political ideas, makes the case for multilingual, 'European' dictionaries, which should replace the current, bilingual dictionaries.

While these are the product of a 'Europe of nations', the multilingual dictionaries from a historical point of view prove that European history is a unified entity, while, from a political point of view, they aim to render more complete the consciousness of such a unity, and to create a more 'common' civilization.

In the second part of the paper a number of entries in the OED are closely scrutinized, reaching the conclusion that often they do not give due attention to Greek and Latin sources, thus abandoning, slowly but inexorably, the roots of our civilization.

Giacomo Leopardi on German translations

Let me thank the organisers of this Seventh International Symposium on Eurolinguistics for inviting me to speak here, in this splendid city of Berlin, one of the most splendid European cities, which naturally recalls to my memory the great German culture of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Winckelmann, Schiller, Goethe and, obviously for an historian of political thought as I am, the great philosophers, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, who explained the *mysteries* of human society: not to forget, obviously, Wilhelm and Alexander von Humboldt, to whom the Berlin University owes its existence.

I think we should all pay homage to what this great nation has given to the advancement of knowledge, with its universities that were the pride of nineteenth-century Europe, when almost every discovery came from Germany, both in the scientific and in the historical and philological field. And, as for myself, I want to add that I was tempted to deliver this paper in German, but the circumstance that, nowadays, English is the official language of communication, prevented the accomplishment of this desire.

On the occasion I have read with a renewed attention, and with a fresh interest, a few pages

from Giacomo Leopardi's *Zibaldone* (*Commoplace Book*, or *Loci Communes*), that the Italian Romantic poet jotted down on 29-30 June 1823, and that were brought to my attention by my distinguished colleague and friend Dr. Francis Celoria, of the university of Keele.²

The reasoning of Count Leopardi, an expert in the Greek language, who was offered by Georg Barthold Niebuhr, then ambassador at the papal court, a chair of Greek philosophy in Prussia,³ but apparently not equally expert in German language and literature, appears rather confused and illogical, since it moves from premises that lead its author to conclusions that should be logical, but that are not.⁴

Nevertheless, they are the typical reflections of a great spirit of the Romantic age, when the idea of nation, or *Nation*, was paramount, and had conquered hearts and minds. It represented, in fact, the *liberation* from the concepts of the previous century, when, in the name of the goddess Reason, the kingdoms were thought of according to principles often disrespectful of their historical development, in consequence of which local communities, and countries, and nations, had acquired their peculiar features. They used to be formed, instead, according to *abstract principles of rationality*, that considered past history as a sequel of deviations and errors, and only aimed at *enlightening* minds against superstition.

But the great German philosophers were then taking a vigorous step forward, towards the knowledge of society. Immanuel Kant, with his *Kritizismus*, the most mature fruit of Enlightenment, had taught our minds no mere *abstract rationality*, but *how to reason critically* about contemporary society and history, and his principles paved the way towards the more mature concepts of liberalism in politics.

And Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, soon after him, moving from the concept that 'the real is

the rational', so deeply penetrated into the science of history, that the historical method, we can safely assume, if considered as a mature consciousness, substantially dates back from his great works, although Giovan Battista Vico, 'the Neapolitan', as he was called, need not to be



Giacomo Leopardi

forgotten.

But Leopardi, although a great spirit, although an enlightened one, was a man of his own age, as all of us inevitably are, and had to confront himself with ideas then current, and necessarily destined to be superseded by ideas proper to subsequent ages.

The 'European' dimension

The world has been rapidly changing since then, more rapidly than ever in the past, thanks to the new means of communication, and we wonder whether the world of learning is actually confronting itself with these changes. The idea of a European constitution, in particular, has been rejected, and this proves how the Dutch feel more Dutch than we could suppose, the British more British than ever, and so on.

The problem is, whether the respective 'worlds of learning' are still merely *national*, or whether they begin to perceive the *European* dimension, and the *Western* dimension, of our civilization.

To be more explicit, the 'European' nations are substantially the product of post-medieval and modern age, and

received their emphasis with the Protestant Reformation and, later on, with Romanticism. But while, from the point of view of commercial intercourse, the world is substantially unified, in Europe and the West we still live in linguistic islands, scarcely capable of communicating and of understanding each other.

This is not only a matter of education. The roots are in fact so deep, that it will take generations to eradicate them.

If we go back to medieval and Roman times, by contrast, we find a substantial unity of European civilization and world of learning. We do not want to emphasize beyond measure the role of Latin as the common cement of our civilization, as it actually is. Nevertheless, the abandonment of Latin, the product of nationalisms, is recent. Still in 1742 Francis Hutcheson published in

Latin his *Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria* and, while lecturing at the university of Glasgow, it was the opinion of a former student that 'he wrote and spoke, at least we thought so, better in Latin than English'.⁵

Elsewhere⁶ we have spoken about the role that Latin exerts in English and German languages today, a role that is not replaceable. But, while in German the Latinate vocabulary is an evident borrowing, because it has very few roots, highly disputable this is for English, where the learned vocabulary is 90% of Latin origin, while in the daily use the vocabulary of Germanic origin, we willingly admit, occurs with more frequency. In any case, to use the words of John Toland, *nothing mysterious* in the European languages today, and the world of learning is becoming, and must become, growingly aware of this.

A language of learning

Therefore, are we proposing a language of learning? A language that, in the vocabulary of *Historicism*, as opposed to the category of *Enlightenment*, is not *natural* but *artificial*, des-

tinued, consequently, not to take roots and to perish?

It would be true were the Latinate vocabulary without roots in the European languages today, but this is not the case.

Apart from the Romance languages and English itself, Russian vocabulary, for example, is 20% of Latin origin. The Russian world of learning in the 18th century realized that the cultural history of their country must be 'European', because there was no alternative. "In 1685 wurde die berühmte Moskauer Slavo-Graeco-Lateinische Akademie begründet, die 'Academia Scientiarum Imperialis Petropolitana'; Publikationsorganen waren die *Commentarii* und *Acta*, as Karl Vossen puts it in his brilliant book *Mutter Latein und ihre Töchter. Europas Sprachen und ihre Herkunft*.⁷

Later on, in the eighteenth century, Latin was displaced by French, and the 'Academia Petropolitana' became 'Académie Impériale des Sciences de St. Petersburg'. But the reform of the educational system at the beginning of the 19th century "gab dem klaszistischen Charakter der Ausbildung erneut Auftrieb, wobei das deutsche Gymnasium als Munster diente. So war die klassische Ausbildung zu Beginn des 20sten Jahrhunderts weit verbreitet. Tatsächlich existierte der humanistische Gymnasialunterricht bis 1917. Entsprechend gehörten Latein und Altgriechisch zur Ausstattung des gebildeten Russen".⁸

In Hungary, the official language of the Diet until 1843,

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was Latin.⁹

The conclusion is that we must decide between a language of learning, that, at least, allows comprehension, and the language of the vulgar, or of the *natural* development of society: between John Milton and Shakespeare, as for English.

Advocacy for Latin

We are passing, in these international symposia, and at the eyes of the readers of our journal, 2000. *The European Journal*, as the advocates for Latin, as nostalgic people who look at a past that is irrecoverably gone, and our papers have the character of a *political manifesto*.

Nevertheless, we see no alternative to the Latinate vocabulary, if we want to understand each other, at least as for what concerns the world of learning.

The language of learning we are submitting to the attention of our colleagues is in fact the common cement of European and Western civilization. To support this idea we have descended into the arena with our little journal, that was founded for this very purpose.

In the 1950s the distinguished scholar Clive Staples Lewis (1898-1963) bemoaned the destruction at the Renaissance of 'everyday Latin in favour of a forced classicism', writing the following words:

"Utinam pestifera illa 'Renascentia' quam Humanistae effecerunt non destruxerit (dum erigere eam se jactabant) Latinam adhuc possemus toti Europae scribere" ("if only that plaguey Renaissance which the Humanists brought about had not destroyed Latin- and destroyed it just when they were pluming themselves that they were advancing it! We should then still be able to correspond with the whole of Europe").¹⁰

Lewis substantially mourned for a language that could be used for scholarly exchanges across Europe. But, if his own was the dream of something impossible to achieve, the project of the five-language dictionaries that we have been campaigning for in these Symposia, by contrast, has a deeply historical and political aim.

Historical, in the sense of showing *how* history and philology prove the unified entity of the European tradition.

Political, in the sense that it *aims at boosting* the consciousness of this tradition.

While, in fact, politicians represent local communities, and substantially *separate society into parts*, the task of the intellectuals is that of re-unifying it, is that of a superior consciousness, of a synthesis that apprehends no more the *particular*, but the *whole*, in the Hegelian sense. The world of learning must have consciousness of this, and act accordingly.

Multilingual Dictionaries

Until now most of the dictionaries have been bilingual,¹¹ simply because they reflected the concept, still current but on the wane, of *nation* and of *national*

languages and, consequently, that of the relations *between* nations. But now we are facing the concept of Europe and of the *European* world of learning, that we must consider as a unified entity, with a common history and tradition.

Therefore, the current bilingual dictionaries will soon be superseded, at least in Europe, less in America, by multilingual dictionaries.

In the past, and more numerous recently, there have been attempts, on the part of publishers, towards multilingual dictionaries: attempts at a very rudimentary level, indeed. Their compilers do not seem to have any idea of what the European world of learning was, and is. The result of their work is no more than a mere bringing near of words, without a soul, without an organic programme.

Among these dictionaries I wish to cite in particular, in the editions which I have come across: 1) *Polyglot Dictionaries based on the 'One-Language-System'*, Otto Holtzmann Hg., vol. 1 'General Technical Terms' (Oldenbourg, München und Berlin, 1937);

2) *Elsevier's Nautical Dictionary*, Third completely revised edition English/American, French, Spanish, Dutch, German (1994); in the editions 1965-6 and 1978 Italian was comprised, but it disappeared in the 1994 edition, to be replaced by English/American;

3) *Harrap's 5-Language Dictionary, English-French-German-Italian-Spanish* (Harrap's Books Ltd, Bromley, Kent, 1991);

4) *Größes Euro Wörterbuch, Grund-Wortschaz Deutsch, English, Französisch, Italienisch, Spanisch*, in 5 Sprachen (Buch und Zeit Verlagsgesellschaft MbH Köln);

5) *Europa Wörterbuch Simultan Dictionary, Deutsch English Französisch Spanish Italienisch*, (Eurobooks by Lechner, Geneva);

6) *Visual 5-Language Dictionary, English, French, German, Spanish, Italian* (Dorling Kindersley Ltd, London 2006);

7) *Visual Five-Language Dictionary, English French German Italian Spanish* (Oxford UP, 2006);

8) Last, Harper-Collins have put on the internet an online *English to French-Italian-Spanish Dictionary*, that seems to be the most advanced attempt towards a multilingual dictionary, although still missing the concept of an organic project. It is, in fact, *the product of technology, not of culture*.

Could this mean that we are winning our battle? We are confident that we will win it, or that somebody else will, *because the cultural necessity of thinking European' is now in the air that we breathe*.

Nevertheless, for this ambitious project the help of the world of

politics is necessary, because we are no more in the age in which the capitalists or, if one prefers, the Smithian 'merchant and manufacturer', used to modify society, and were averse to State-intervention. Nowadays many tasks are proper to the State, i.e. of politicians, who are certainly clever in devising the means of emptying the pockets of the taxpayer, not equally wise in the way of spending the money they administer.

Etymological dictionaries and classics

In the last few years dictionaries, at least the ones in the principal European languages, have re-discovered etymologies.

This further proves, we believe, that we are right in our campaign towards the *multi-lingual dictionaries, and that etymologies will be, we assume, the next step*. Nevertheless, if this is true in general, it is less so for the Oxford dictionaries.

For example, the *Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology*, edited by C. T. Onions, with the assistance of G. S. Friedrichsen and R. W. Burchfield (1966), does not have Greek type. This is astonishing for a *dictionary of etymology*, and means no more and no less than vulgarising learning.

The *Shorter Oxford Dictionary*



Robert Burchfield

(first ed. 1933, repr. 1985) correctly had Greek type, that unfortunately was replaced, in the subsequent edition (1993, repr. 2002), with Roman type. *This means cutting the links with our past, means knowing less and less who we are, and from where we come. In the long run, this will not pay.*

When opening Eric Partridge, *A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1958, fourth ed. 1966), when checking the entry *abbot*, one finds Greek type in the corresponding Greek word. When going on, and checking the entries under *church*, *cinder*, *catharsis*, Greek type disappears, to be replaced with Latin type. A true barbarity!

The *Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology*, the pride of American philology, does not use Greek type, nor does so *Le Robert de la Langue Française*. But, if in the case of *The Barnhart* this is in some measure, in little measure, indeed,

understandable, it is less so in the case of *Le Robert*. This probably helps to sell, in the intentions of the publisher, *mais ça signifie, en même temps, vulgarisation de la culture*.

By contrast, the splendid *Diccionario de la Real Academia Española*, in two vols, that one can find in the principal bookshops all around the world, does retain Greek type. This is highly gratifying for the world of learning.

The Oxford English Dictionary

The Oxford English Dictionary is obviously a major undertaking, the second edition having taken its origin from the *Supplement* edited by Robert Burchfield between 1957 and 1986.¹²

In *Unlocking the English Language*, Burchfield narrates how his ancestors, who were of Scottish and English descent, had settled in New Zealand.

In the 1920s and 1930s the boy "acquired the typical day-to-day vocabulary used by all the New-Zealanders words like *bach* (beach cottage), *booay* (back country), *heka* (Maori war dance), *kowhai* (a shrub).... remain firmly in my mind some forty years after changing places..."¹³

Furthermore, the 'ingredients' of the *OED* "have turned out to be the etymology or derivation of each word to its earliest form in English, and the establishment of its cognates in other Germanic languages or, if it is a loan-word, of its form in the borrowed-from language".¹⁴

In these lines we are probably reading more than their author actually meant, but they are certainly revealing of a cultural background, and explain several things. As is well known, and as I said above,¹⁵ the English vocabulary is mostly of Latin and Greek origin.

In my solitary work of compilation of the *European Dictionary*, vol. 1, with English as *langue de départ*, according to the premises of my methodology, I try to identify first of all the etymologies. Obviously, as the ultimate authority, I consult the etymologies as given in the *OED*, that I have in a CD-Rom, it being difficult either to buy the printed copy or to subscribe to the on-line edition.

In this work I have come across a number of difficulties, until I have decided to annotate them, beginning with the word *cabaret*.

cabaret: the *OED* writes the following words: 'F: of unknown origin: see Littré and Scheler'; according to *The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology* (1988) it is 'a borrowing of French *cabaret*, Old Picard *camberete*, L *camera*';

camp: according to the *OED* Kluge claims the word as "native Teutonic but gives no satisfactory answer for this". *Der Kluge*, 24 Auflage, writes the following words: "Camp.

Entlehnt aus ne. *camp*, dieses aus frz. (nordfrz.) *camp* m, aus l. *campus* m". *Der Kluge*, therefore, does not claim the word as 'native Teutonic', in any case much less than the *OED* does.

Furthermore the *OED* does not mention the Greek cognate *καμπή*, that occurs in *The Barnhart*, while Skeat¹⁶ emphasizes that the word is 'certainly non-Teutonic, and borrowed from L *campus*';

caries: L *caries* but does not mention the Greek cognates *κήρ* death *ακήρατος*" inviolate intact, which is cited by *The Barnhart* and other dictionaries; **cathedral** goes back to L *cathedra*, not to Greek *καθέδρα*, that nevertheless occurs under *cathe-dra*;

cède: does not record the Greek cognate *ἐξοδος*, which occurs in *The Barnhart* and other dictionaries;

cerebrum: does not go back to the Greek cognate *κέφα*, recorded by Skeat with the following words: "The former part of cerebrum is allied to Gr *κέφα* the head", and by *The Barnhart*;

cerise: does not give the Greek *κερασός* cherry-tree, which nevertheless occurs under *cherry*, to which there is no cross-reference;

chalk, gives L *calx* but not Greek *χαλξ* which does not occur in Skeat; it occurs in *The Barnhart*, instead;

chamois: does not record LL *camōx*, that is recorded in *Barnhart*, nor does Skeat record *camōx*; *OED* writes: "but the relations between the Teutonic and Romanic words have not been ascertained, and no etym. is known either in L. or Teutonic. See Kluge".

Der Kluge, 24 Auflage, writes the following words: "chamois ist die Gemse (aus spl. *camōx*)". Therefore, Kluge has no doubts about the Late Latin origin of the word.

charcoal: according to *OED* "the first element is of uncertain origin; but from the earliest instances it appears to be *char*, *charke*, *cherke*, found from beg. of 16thc, being app. due to erroneous analysis of the spoken word A current suggestion is that *-char* is an application of *chare* v. or n., as if *turn-coal*, i.e. wood turned or converted into coal; but for this no actual evidence has been found"; the probable derivation from Old and Middle French *charbon*, L *carbōnem*, given by *The Barnhart* and other dictionaries, is ignored at all by the *OED*, unclear whether because it is considered as less, or not at all probable, or because of lack of interest for the classics on the part of the etymologist;

chart: gives L *carta*, but not the Greek *χάρτης*, which is recorded in Skeat, instead;

cheap: On the word *cheap* Skeat writes: "Curtius holds that all these words, however widely spread into the Teutonic tongues, must be borrowed from Latin; so that OHG *choufo*, a huckster, is merely the L *caupō*, a huckster. But this is now held to be unlikely (Kluge,

Political education and the challenge of modernization - I

Summary

Schmitt's well-known answer to the question what is politics is the distinction between friend and foe. This classical definition of politics has become obsolete under the pressure of modernization. The author counters it with the answer that it is the mediation between business partners. The pressure of modernization makes the control of its unintended effects our first priority. Achieving this control is an almost impossible task because humans must learn to become rational beings in the true Kantian sense.

Der Begriff des Politischen

"The specific political distinction to which all political actions and motives can be reduced, is that

between friend and foe.¹"

This was Schmitt's definition of politics in 1932 and reading it I wondered why I thought it wrongheaded. His was a Darwinist outlook grafted on a Catholic philosophy. His philosophy made him a supporter of strong government to stave off the chaos that would occur if individuals were left to their own devices. Darwinism, in his case, means that man in order to secure his survival must choose his friends to fight his enemies with. This dark vision can account for all the things that go wrong in this world as a result of our weakness and viciousness and politics thus becomes the practice of controlling and

exploiting man's nature. I am not going to appeal to the goodness in man and his capacity for perfection. In countering Schmitt's definition I will maintain that man is captive to a process of change – I shall call it modernization – which forces him to cooperate with his fellow human beings. In our world it is not the distinction between friend and foe that constitutes the essence of political practice, but the mediation between a person and his business partner.

Writing a study on 19th century political theories it struck me that in this century the concept of politics has become blurred.² The best minds of the 19th century were looking for historical,

economic and sociological laws and politics – with some notable exceptions – was left to the constitutional lawyers. Since then political philosophy has increasingly become the science of studying the nuts and bolts of democracy.

Schmitt was one of the notable exceptions. In his *Politics of Friendship* Jacques Derrida deconstructs Schmitt's definition of politics most effectively.³ Schmitt gives a phony clarity to the definition of politics, for who are our friends and who are our enemies? Only if we know who our friends are we will know who our enemies may be and only if we know our enemies can we seek our friends and ask them to

support us. The specificity of Schmitt's politics derives from the specificity of the relations between friend and foe and this very specificity may turn our enemies into our friends and vice versa. Leaving Derrida's playful dialectics aside this means in blunt terms that Schmitt's definition is inherently xenophobic. The interesting aspect of this definition is that it is not an ideological statement of this spokesman for the Nazis; Schmitt came close to reviving the Classical conception of politics.

Aristotle, the father of Western constitutionalism

We remember Aristotle as the father of Western constitutionalism and tend to forget that his view of politics was extremely parochial. For him political philosophy had to serve two purposes. In the first place it must help to educate the citizen to be a just person and a courageous soldier. The second purpose, no less important than the first one, conveyed Aristotle's militaristic vision of politics. Aristotle responded to the culture of the Greeks for whom the noble game of war was a bloody version of the Olympic games. It took Roman stoicism and centuries of Christianity to kill the notion that politics is a mere game. Some philosophers, such as Machiavelli, continued to savour politics in this fashion, but they could not turn the tide of history, which favoured the alternative vision that politics must be an instrument for the promotion of general wellbeing.

As political philosophy developed in the West its major concerns were the rule of law, and the protection of rights. Harold Berman in his *Law and Revolution* describes how fundamental the "formation of the western legal tradition" was for the development against a cruel illness of Western civilization and he maintains that popes and their legal advisers in the 12th and 13th century played a crucial role in establishing this tradition.⁴ Perhaps the most important contribution of the popes to western legal tradition was their universalist message. According to the Church the rule of law transcends the boundaries between states and as such it gave a major impetus to natural jurisprudence which in the course of Early Modern History became the dominant paradigm of political philosophy. Not the rivalry between friend and foe, but the co-operation between differing interests became the input of this paradigm.

The dominance of natural jurisprudence was secured by the process of modernization which some might say fundamentally altered Western society and

Franck)".

Following Skeat, the *OED* has no doubt about the 'Teutonic' nature of the word: "the coincidence of the stem kaup-, and esp. the identity of the WGer agent-n. *kaupo, -on trader, merchant, dealer, with L *caup-ōnem* petty tradesman, huckster, tavern keeper, has suggested that the Teut. word and its family are of Latin origin. But there are serious difficulties".

Nevertheless the *OED* does not mention the 'serious difficulties'. *The Barnhart*, after citing the Germanic forms, writes: "The noun forms probably represent an early Germanic borrowing from L *caupō* petty tradesman, ... which is perhaps from the same foreign source as the Greek *κάπελο* retail dealer, huckster, innkeeper".

chime: *OED* gives L *cymbalum*, but not Gr *κύμβαλον*, which occurs nevertheless under the entry *cymbal*;

chimney: does not record Gr *κάμινος*, which occurs in *The Barnhart* and in other dictionaries;

chip: the *OED* makes of it a Teutonic word, and ignores at all L *cippus*, correctly referred to by *The Barnhart*, and the assumed Late Latin **cippare*;

churl: does not mention that it is cognate with Gr *γέρων*, an old man, that occurs in Skeat, instead, and in *The Barnhart*;

cinder: it is undoubtedly a Germanic word, but Gr *κόνις* "dust is probably cognate; it is ignored by the *OED*;

cinematography: correctly *OED* gives the Greek etymology *κίνημα* movement, adds that it derives from *κινεῖν* set in motion, but does not add, as *The Barnhart* does, that *κινεῖν* is cognate with L *ciēre* to stir up;

cite: does not add that L *ciēre* is cognate with Gr *κίω*, *κινέω*, *κινεῖν* set in motion, that occurs in Skeat, instead, and in *The Barnhart*;

coerce: refers to L *arcēre*,

ignores Gr *ἀρκεῖν*.

These are certainly minor flaws (*aliquando dormitat Homerus*), if they actually are, in a work so complex, the product of a long tradition and of the collaboration of distinguished scholars, but they are worth examining. I hazard here, at my own risk, a judgment. In fact, as you know, and as I repeat, I am not a linguist, but an historian of political thought, and what I do in the field of linguistics is a function of my specific field of studies. I do not presume to add anything to the science of linguistics. By contrast, my efforts aim at influencing the European civilization, rendering easier the mutual understanding, and helping overcome the separation between nations. This is my social, cultural, political aim. From this point of view my research work must be judged.

For the etymologists of the OED Skeat is the supreme authority, as was obvious. Not only they fear to depart from it, but sometimes they do not give due attention to Latin and, more often, to Greek etymologies. In sum, they seem to be 'modernizing' Skeat, thus abandoning, slowly but inexorably, the origins of our civilization.

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¹ This paper was delivered on 6 October 2006 at the 'Humboldt Universität zu Berlin', Nordeuropa Institut, for the 7th International Symposium on EuroLinguistics.

² G. Leopardi, *Zibaldone*, G. Pacella ed., in two vols (Milano, 1992), & 2845-60, pp. 1508-15.

³ See A. Ranieri, 'Notizie intorno agli Scritti, alla Vita ed ai Costumi di G. Leopardi', in Leopardi, *Zibaldone*, I, 15.

⁴ Leopardi substantially concludes, unflatteringly, that the then celebrated translations of

the principal literary masterpieces into German 'meritano poca lode' (deserve little praise), *ibid.*, p. 1513 & 2856, but the reasons he gives for this conclusion are confused and contradictory.

⁵ See James Moore in *Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford 2004), p. 999.

In Edinburgh, in Professor's Stevenson class of Logic, in which prize essays were submitted from 1737 to 1751, about half were written in Latin, and the other half in English. Latin survived longest in the Faculty of Medicine, where theses were composed solely in that language until 1833: see D. B. Horn, *A Short History of the University of Edinburgh 1556-1889* (Edinburgh, 1967), 47. Similarly, in Germany, "in die Hörsäle der Universitäten drang das Deutsche erst seit 1687 durch Christian Thomasius in Leipzig. Noch bis in 19. Jh. mußten in einigen Fächern Doktordissertationen lateinisch verfaßt werden": see P. von Polenz, *Geschichte der Deutschen Sprache* (Berlin-New York, 1978), 93.

⁶ See 'On the Difficulties of founding a European Journal', in *Studies on EuroLinguistics* (Logos Verlag, Berlin 2005), reprinted in 2000. *The European Journal*, no. 2, Dec. 2005, and 'Europe as a linguistic unity. The legacy of Latin', paper delivered at the univ. of Tsadar on 19 Sept. 2002, now in 2000. *The European Journal*, no. 2, Dec. 2006, forthcoming.

⁷ Stern Verlag Jaunssen & co, (14 Auflage, 1999), 'Moskau, das dritte Rom', p. 207.

⁸ Vossen, *ibid.*

⁹ In the Cathedral of Uppsala, that I visited in September 2005, I observed that the names of the Archbishops are recorded in Latin to the end of the 18th century, and only afterwards they began to be recorded in modern Swedish language. Furthermore the inscriptions in

Latin on the sepulchral stones on the pavement are unprotected, people walk above them, and are progressively erasing them. This is barbarity.

¹⁰ See *Letters*, C. S. Lewis, *Don Giovanni Calabria. A Study in Friendship*, translated and edited by Martin Moynihan (Servant Books, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1988), pp. 9-10. This letter has been brought to my attention by Francis Celoria. Dr. Celoria, an active bibliophile, also offered for my attention a satire by Alfred Edward Housman (1859-1936) entitled *The Eleventh Eclogue*, where the fun is that the Oxford classical scholars converse in an 'absurd Latinate English'. According to Archie Burnett, the source of Housman is in *Æstivation. An Unpublished Poem, by My Late Latin Tutor*, by Oliver Wendell Holmes, written in Anglo-Latin macaronics (see *Notes and Queries*, vol. 247 of the continuous series [New Series, vol. 49], no. 4, Dec. 2002, p. 493).

¹¹ Merely erudite is the Calepino, or *Ambrosii Calepini Dictionarium Undecim Linguarum*, first edition 1502, last edition by Jacopo Facciolati, 1772.

¹² The *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed. 1989, has in p.1: "combined with *A Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary* edited by R. W. Burchfield".

¹³ *Unlocking* (London, 1989), chap. 4, pp. 61-2. By contrast, in his boyhood the author of this paper attended the Classical Lyceum at Arpino, the ancient Arpinum, in South-Latium, the town where Cicero was born, becoming familiar with Cicero and Greek authors, translating Thucydides and Homer.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, chap. 6, p. 168.

¹⁵ See above, text corresponding with n. 6, and n. 6.


¹⁶ W. Skeat, *Etymological Dictionary of the English Language* (Oxford, 1910).

according to others even formed it. Although I cannot try to describe the process of modernization with scholastic precision for reasons of space I would like to discuss two characteristics of the process. The first is that it is not the product of a premeditated policy. It obviously is the outcome of human activities, but nevertheless creates unintended effects that continuously tend to destroy the *status quo* within society.

Modernization

With the progression of time, modernization started to dictate the pace of change. In this way it now challenges political practice to find an answer to the problems that the unintended effects do cause. The second aspect of modernization is that groups, nations and states can only succeed in benefiting from this pace of change, if they can guarantee their members and citizens justice, security, liberty and democracy. The reason for this is obvious. If modernization is indeed a blind process it means that no one can control it and that the political community has to rely on the co-operation of its members to profit from the challenge of change. Modernization has promoted a politics of co-operation within and between political communities and the outdated politics of friend and foe can only damage the achievements of modernization, and – judging from history – can only stop the process temporarily.

In a recent book three American authors provide a graphic illustration of how cooperation between individuals who do not know each other, but who share a common interest in selling and buying goods and services, can give an enormous push to the creation of wealth.⁵ They argue



that Internet based business webs have created fast growing organizations, which sometimes remain “virtual” in the sense that they only exist by virtue of the transactions completed on the Internet. They mention four types of business webs:

The *agora* (an auction-company such as Ebay),

The *aggregation* (such as a digital grocer, where you can order your groceries by way of the Internet and have them delivered on your doorstep),

The *value chain* (like the web of the Ford Motor Company, where you can order your customized car and haggle about the price)

And finally the *alliance*, where individuals and business firms cooperate via the Internet on a voluntary basis. They represent these four types of business webs

by the following diagram:

Alliances are the most interesting products of cooperation. Take the example of Linux and Microsoft to explain why they are so. Linux was developed by a Finnish engineer, who could not afford to pay for the server software of Unix.⁶ He offered Linux free of charge to other Internet users and invited them to correct, refine and develop his software. His offer worked like magic. Voluntary association in what the three authors call a “gift-economy” created the most sophisticated software available at present. It is as if the dreams of utopian socialists, such as Fourier and Proudhon, have come true. Microsoft is an example of a “context-leader”:

If a Value Chain (Business Corporation) is like a marching band, an Alliance is like a jazz ensemble. A Value Chain’s context leader, like a conductor chooses the music and directs the performance. A context leader of an Alliance sets the direction, but each player contributes independently to a total value experience. An orchestra player simply follows a score; a jazz musician improvises within the group’s musical style.⁷

Microsoft keeps the secrets of its NT server system and its Windows program and invites others to adapt their applications to their software systems. So it directs the *alliance*. It is interesting to compare Linux and Microsoft and the success of their *alliances*. Linux is a system that appeals to programmers and, although some companies have written applications for it, it cannot match the worldwide success of Windows. If a particular *alliance* is to succeed, it seems to require a certain type of leadership.

Microsoft – as we know – is involved in litigation with the American Federal government about its alleged unfair business practices. The court case illustrates that voluntary cooperation cannot work on its own. Particularly in the case of a product that by way of its tremendous success

has almost become a public good, we need a watchdog – call it the state – to monitor contracts, ensure fair competition and protect customers against fraud. A problematic yet exciting aspect of voluntary cooperation is that it is global in nature. The problematic aspect is that national states cannot control this type of cooperation without stunting it. The exciting aspect is that the Internet as a means of communication has not only given rise to business webs, but that global pressure groups – such as Amnesty and Greenpeace – are making use of it as well. They, and many other non-government organizations, seem to have more political clout than intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations.

I have now come to the dialectic

cal counterpoint in my argument. If I stopped here, I could conclude with Fukuyama that we have reached the end of history and that we should leave solutions to liberalism and the functioning of the market. Why is it that a very sharp intellect and devout Catholic such as Carl Schmitt formulated such a grim definition of politics? Was it the atavistic attitude of a man who, pining for the old political game, refused to see the sweetness and light of reason? The answer must be that there is no reason to feel complacent. We live in a world of oppression, regional wars and ecological destruction on a global scale. So even if we intend to make ours a better world we had better listen to a broad range of advice on how to reach a realistic conception of political practice. Perhaps we should define politics only in the negative sense, more or less as Marx did, as a way to describe the destructive tendencies in man.

Need of a constructive philosophy

However, this negative definition of politics, is less than helpful. It engenders a kind of nihilism that will make us go round in circles. Finding a realistic answer involves a constructive philosophy that can deal with change. In using natural jurisprudence the lawyers of Early Modern Time were very conservative in their views of reform, but their philosophy contained a theodicy which did not make reform an impossibility. Its handicap is that it is not really a *political* philosophy, because as philosophy and certainly as theodicy it projects a world beyond politics. It uses the language of rights and duties and only refers to power as a means to maintain rights and to exact duties. It enriches political philosophy with the notion of legitimacy, but the responsible use of power requires an extra element. In Machiavellian language the statesman needs *virtù*, a term which can perhaps best be defined as the political courage to face the unknown. As we know, in the republic of the *Discorsi* citizens need *virtù* as well. Political courage remains an important facet of any definition of politics. It is the achievement of republicanism in Early Modern Europe that it adapted the virtues of patriotism and citizenship to the nation state.

Samuel Finer in his regrettably unfinished *The History of Government* points out the following dilemma of expertise. Only successful democracies can handle the effects of modernization, but why are there so few of them? The history of political theory in the 19th century is bewildering. The paradigms of natural jurisprudence and republicanism lost their prescriptive value. Legitimacy, patriotism and citizenship remained important notions, but how can they be applied in a world in which both the centripetal accumulation of state power and the centrifugal tendencies of market forces determine people’s lives?

Tocqueville wrote about this phenomenon:

“Il faut une science politique nouvelle à un monde tout nouveau.”⁸

According to Tocqueville political liberty can only be guaranteed, if civil society controls the state and in turn empowers the state to give guidance to civil society. He saw local government as the school for democracy that would nurture the patriotic attitude necessary for the maintenance of liberty. Whether this appeal to patriotism can effect this working relationship between the state and civil society will work, is a moot point.

The final outcome of modernization is highly problematic. The



Alexis de Tocqueville

process of modernization is structurally flawed in that it divides the world into winners and losers, within and between nations. Robert Kaplan recently questioned whether the American nation state still has a future. In his *Empire Wilderness* he describes the chaos of American life during a journey through the South West of the United States. In a situation where problems are constantly getting out of hand the solidarity between those who can afford a middle class life and those who cannot, is absent. It is a dark vision that is not redeemed by the last sentence in the book:

“The next passage will be our most difficult as a nation, and it will be our last.”⁹

He expresses a vague hope that America will discover itself again as a nation, but at the end of *Empire Wilderness* he seems to have come to the conclusion that the nation state will disappear. While discussing the problem of water resources in Arizona, he observes:

“What fascinates me about America’s future is that the gradual, ongoing increase in both the size and complexity of the population ... will require regulatory tyranny – governing everything from water use to credit card fraud – or else there can be no justice for anyone. But such a development is bound to cause an even greater backlash by unreconstructed individualists.”¹⁰

The myth of individualism

Indeed the myth of individualism and the need for regulation aggravates the chaos of American life and a lack of national purpose destroys the solidarity between the smart and the stolid, the rich and the poor. The American underclass, which we now associ-

ate with the blacks, will in future include the middle class. That class has always been regarded as the backbone of American society, but now it will be left behind in the rat race of innovation. The problem of this division between the smart and the stolid, between innovative and conventional minds is of course a problem in all successful modernizing countries, but in America this problem is particularly glaring, because the official national doctrine is that the market must do its work without the mitigating intervention of the state. Hegel’s maxim, that there can be no rational order without the exercise of the legitimate authority of the state, is still true and European democracies still obey this maxim. At least it helps them to control or mitigate the short-term negative effects of modernization. The United States does not try to mitigate these effects, though it cannot afford not to do so.

On an international scale the effects of modernization are even more disturbing. On the one hand the developed nations profit from closer cooperation, on the other hand there are certain developing countries which are in fact becoming poorer all the time.

Here Schmitt’s definition of politics still seems to apply. We may regard the developing countries as our poor relations, but they could turn into foes that will destroy the existence of the developed countries. Trying to prepare for that situation by organizing defense strategies will not help the developed countries very much, however. The bridging of the gap due to the impact of modernization may become a question of survival for the whole of mankind.

Why then don’t we do anything about modernization? Why do we not make a greater effort to control the process itself? This question brings us to the core of what politics is about. I derive my view of modernization from Max Weber. According to this ardent German nationalist at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century world history is the venue of a process of rationalization in which magical norms are replaced by formal rules, which operate in manmade rational systems. Men are the captives of this process as Weber so graphically demonstrated in the case of the puritan who as the bookkeeper of God creates a godless world. The chief casualty of this process is culture. As Weber puts it in a famous aside (*Zwischenbetrachtung*) in his essays on the sociology of religion: at a certain moment in history culture dies away.¹¹ Weber viewed this result with a deep sense of resignation. After World War One he even gave up nationalism as the last remnant of what he considered the charmed world. Now he taught his students that as scholars they should prove themselves to be good social and political technicians. That they could be the guardians of culture had proven to be an illusion.

Man, a playing animal

But can man live without culture? Of course not. In fact we are creating culture all the time. 'Man is a playing animal' wrote Huizinga in his *Homo Ludens* and man keeps on playing and creating cultural artifacts and practices notwithstanding the onslaught of modernization. However the nature of culture



Thomas Jefferson

has changed. Formerly culture was instrumental in creating group identities; it provided symbols, which represented these groups. Culture also played an important role between groups. The agonistic impulse, Huizinga wrote, is the main creative cultural force. Formerly that agonism found its expression in the political game of warfare and rivalry, now culture has become the domain of the individual artist and his public. There are certain words that are supposed to provoke warm feelings of bonding but that in reality harbour sinister destinies. 'Culture' is one of these words. Let us face it, excessive emphasis on group identities often turns individuals into bigots who are ready to destroy their "foes". It seems to be a fact that you cannot have friends without having foes. The observation that war has become self-destructive is undoubtedly pertinent, but does it help? Will it detain people from being destructive? Human beings have an instinct to kill; Freud called this the *Thanatos* motive. Do people make war, only because they are poor and deprived, or also because they are bored?

That last question is relevant, because Weber's rationalized world is a very boring one that does not satisfy our inner existential needs. At best it caters for our pleasures, but the pursuit of pleasure is not the pursuit of happiness. And there is more, for Weber's world is not only boring but also oppressive. It forces us to accept a certain discipline that runs counter to our inner impulses. Norbert Elias, leaning on Weber and Freud, has described in graphic detail the process of civilization that has subjected us to this new discipline. It has forced us to become peace-loving and tolerant creatures while what excites us is conflict and what exalts us is to stress our group identity at the expense of other groups. A rather facile criticism of Elias' analysis has been that his theory of the internalization of this discipline hardly seems to work. We might counter this criticism by pointing

out that the very fact that people revolt against the civilizing discipline and like children smash the toys that modernization offers them, proves the oppressive nature of this discipline.

Schmitt's definition, a counsel of despair

It is very tempting to apply Schmitt's definition of politics to the current situation in which we are effectively being out-manuevered by modernization, but his definition remains a counsel of despair. As soon as we have finished destroying bridges, houses, and people, we have to pick up the threads of modernization again and build new bridges materially and metaphorically. We cannot survive under the present conditions of change unless we obey the rules of modernization, the first one of which is that we must co-operate with people we do not like and may even hate.

What then should we do to restore the link between political culture and the technical world we are creating? Postmodernist critics seem to think that we can bring back political gamesmanship by appealing to the semblance of politics. My colleague Ankersmit has written a brilliant book on *Aesthetic Politics* in which he argues that an emphasis on strong images of representation will restore the vitality of democracy.¹² To me this is a recipe that will not work. Politics is about substantive issues, it is not a form of shadow-boxing. The substantive issue of our time is the control over the process of modernization. That is a daunting task for two reasons. The process of modernization itself is the last refuge of man's irrational impulses and control means that we subject these to a higher form of rationality than the one prevailing in common economic activities. Secondly, it is almost an inconceivable task to contemplate, because we would have to transcend our natural impulses and transform our loyalty to certain group cultures or at best national symbols into a message of universal brotherhood. In the political essays that Kant wrote as an old man, he sketched the programmatic points of such a message. Whether we can turn this message into an effective political program remains to be seen. If Huizinga's diagnosis is correct we must tame the agonistic impulse in our souls. We must start to think of culture as the cultivation of Reason. We can play innocent games and exercise in sports as much as we want, but will this slake our thirst for agonism? And can we manage a *culture* of Reason?

Jefferson and representative democracy

So what is politics? Jefferson wrote to one his friends in 1816: "The introduction of this new principle of representative democracy has rendered useless almost everything written before on the structure of government."¹³

With these bold words Jefferson cast off a tradition of political philosophy that started with Plato and Aristotle and ended with Montesquieu and Hume. Yet his statement was right for its time. The teaching of traditional philosophy tended to obscure the unpalatable fact that representative democracy is the only

option. Pragmatism in the form of modern political science took this lesson to heart towards the end of the 19th century. However, the expertise of how we can control the process of modernization to suit our ends, is not within the competence of political science as it is taught in our schools. If we consider the

cultivation of reason as a way out of our predicament the teaching of classical political philosophy may help us. In our situation it is as important to acquire wisdom as it is to have expertise. And as classical political philosophy is a branch of moral philosophy, it may even help us to discover our potentiality as moral beings.

Political education and the challenge of modernization - II

Summary

What we need to teach is simple. These are the values of democracy, liberty, justice and security. For this teaching we must turn to the political philosophers. The author uses the example of an influential teacher of political philosophers, Michael Oakeshott, to indicate that many in the intellectual community have a disdain for technical knowledge, which is available to all and which is used in managing modern societies. There is a case for wisdom going beyond technical knowledge, but to think that wisdom can replace technical knowledge is a counsel for disaster. Wisdom and technical knowledge must be interwoven, if we can teach a future generation of political philosophers and they can teach the public.

Political Education

Politics is the mediation between business partners. The implication of this definition for political education is simple. Citizens must be able to defend their own interests (because as Bentham wrote no one else will do so) and so they must know about the nuts and bolts of democracy. To be able to defend themselves they must know about rules and institutions in order to find their way in the corridors of the state and its bureaucracy. Although the implication is straightforward there are two problems the teacher has to cope with that spoil the simplicity of this educational program. Teaching the nuts and bolts of democracy is to educate people to use a system that is defective. In order to meet the standards of liberty, justice, security and democracy we need something more. We need to find a way to manage modernization in such a way that the negative effects of this process are brought under control.


To set our priorities we have to turn to the political philosophers of the past, but the history of political thought is not an open book that we can read to the public in a straightforward fashion. We cannot accept Aristotle's notion of democracy nor, as I have explained, his idea of the function of war. So in order to teach the history of political thought we must be able to distill those interests and aspirations that we want to teach. The second problem is that those who dedicate themselves to the study of political

philosophy as a subject of our intellectual legacy often have contempt for the nuts and bolts of democracy and so become ineffectual teachers.

Michael Oakeshott's essay

For an illustration of this second problem I will turn to Michael Oakeshott's essay *Rationalism in Politics* and his inaugural *Political Education*. I will maintain that there is an element of obscurantism in Oakeshott's criticism of "rationalism" and his plea for a certain type of university education.

Oakeshott's influence on his



students (many of whom have become political scientists¹⁴) has been immense. He did not necessarily convert them to his brand of conservatism, but his teaching struck a cord that intellectuals of different political persuasions (and beyond the anglophone world) listened to. "Rationalism in politics" he defined as the approach of those who believe in certain, abstract solutions to political problems that can be universally applied. The "rationalist" makes use of technical knowledge that "can be learned from a book ... Moreover, much of it can be learned by heart, repeated by rote, and applied mechanically."¹⁵ Oakeshott confronted his opponent the "rationalist" with "practical knowledge" that is superior to technical knowledge and indispensable, if the latter can be applied with profit. Practical knowledge "exists only in use, is not reflective and (unlike technique) cannot be formulated in rules."¹⁶ It can neither be taught nor learned, but only imparted and acquired. It exists only in practice, and the only way to acquire it is by apprenticeship to a master – not because the master can teach it (he cannot),

but because it can be acquired only by continuous contact with one who is practicing it.¹⁷ I suggest that this distinction between "technical" and "practical knowledge" is a form of obscurantism. Oakeshott has contempt for technical knowledge and the rationalism that it represents. However, we cannot organize modern life without the application of "technical knowledge". Furthermore in order to master the rules of "technical knowledge" we need highly sophisticated skills and intelligence. And it should be the prime duty of the teacher to create the conditions for learning this type of knowledge. Can we do without the insights derived from "practical knowledge" in learning and applying "technical knowledge"? Probably not, but Oakeshott's idea of the status of practical knowledge appears to be rather arrogant. It is generated by the exclusive relationship between master and apprentice and has to be learnt in isolation from any form of technical or vocational training.

Vocational training imparts the "literature" of a certain body of (technical) knowledge. Oakeshott writes about it as something easy to learn and to apply, but we know that it is not. Teachers in medical, law and business schools, teachers of economics and the social sciences know that the application of their type of knowledge is difficult and often unrewarding. Oakeshott describes "empirical" activities as doing whatever one likes and finding an ideological justification for it afterwards. His ideal of political education is not to teach the abstract tenets of an ideology, but to cultivate the kind of knowledge that enables us to plan political activities that reflect the tradition of our communities. In splendid Burkean language Oakeshott writes:

"In political activity, then, men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place nor appointed destination. The enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel: the sea is both friend and enemy; and the seamanship consists in using the resources of a traditional manner of behaviour in order to make a friend of every hostile occasion."¹⁸

We know that authentic and immediate insights do not come to us in a mechanical and bureaucratic fashion and often slip away, when we try to formulate them in writing. Versed in the best writing of centuries we will often feel irritated by the silly jargon of Internet communication. Yet if we want to leave our closets and try to make our insights usable for political education, how can we do so without seeking an alliance with “technical knowledge”. Oakeshott’s metaphor is quite revealing in this respect. How can we sail the seas without modern navigational instruments? We learn by experience how to handle a sailing vessel and how to calculate the hazards of certain seas, but our experience is useless, if we do not know how to handle modern navigational devices.

Most troublesome is Oakeshott’s appeal to the traditions of a certain community in the name of “practical knowledge”. How does he know that his insights represent the traditions of that community? It seems to me that –like so many of us who prefer the insights acquired in our closets – he is the victim of a *fata morgana*. What he takes to be part of a national tradition is an intellectual heritage that is mostly cherished by his fellow intellectuals. How vague is his justification for “practical knowledge” and how overbearing his claim for its sovereign authority!

The difficulty with Oakeshott’s skeptical political philosophy is not that we should disregard it, but that its problem is how to teach it. If we agree that the “technical knowledge” is an essential part of political education it is not enough to add “higher” and more refined insights to it. The technical and the refined must be interwoven in order to guarantee effective political education. Oakeshott appeals to an “imagined community”¹⁹. He reduces societal (*gesellschaftliche*) to communal (*gemeinschaftliche*) relations in order to give them a more personal and friendly character. This mental switch tends to reflect the relationship of the person making the switch with the community he cherishes. In Oakeshott’s case this is the community of scholars to which he belonged.

This conclusion is important and should, in my view, be turned into a statement, because Oakeshott’s community is a select, but by no means small one. In fact it encompasses all scholars who are serious about studying human nature and who – in the case of the application of this study to politics – draw comfort and insight from the canon of political thought, produced by their philosophical ancestors. Oakeshott’s appeal to his imagined community is so powerful, because it strikes a familiar cord in all scholars, whatever their


differences. If our subject is political education the fact of Oakeshott’s influence raises two questions:

How are we to educate a future generation of scholars?

What are these scholars going to teach the public?

The teachers of the past

The great teachers of the past have instructed us to respect civilized standards of conduct and have inspired us to believe that human beings can reach and maintain these standards. On reflection, however, their instruction remains inconclusive unless we keep updating these civilized standards according to constantly changing circumstances. Keith Baker has



Jacques Derrida

distinguished two elements in intellectual history. In the first place it contains the history of intellectuals and of their struggle to create and shape ideas. As important is the history of meaning. What do their ideas mean within a certain context?²⁰ The meaning of democracy, for example, has changed according to its historical context. In 1750 it represented a political reality that did not match the situation in 1850. Scholars should evaluate and monitor the meaning of democracy according to context.

The study of contexts means that even those scholars, who wish to study the past, who have no inclination to meddle with the present, and who take no interest in political education in any form, must have sufficient knowledge of the present. We cannot understand the past without knowledge of the present. Those, who regard the history of political thought as their ivory tower and study the past without any relation to the changing contexts, in which ideas were produced, deprive themselves of a very important interpretative tool. Even for them a study of the technical is necessary to prevent a futile form of solipsism.

Derrida’s Politics of Friendship

The teacher who wishes to persuade the public to adopt the values he cherishes must of course be able to intertwine the technical and higher ideals. In no other way he can appeal to the aspirations and interests of his public. This form of teaching presupposes a form of solidarity between the teacher and his public that is

far from obvious. Michael Tremblay of Concordia University suggested to me to read Derrida’s *Politics of Friendship*. The title appealed to me, because I expected to find in his study a key to the pressing problem of modernity. In the modern world we tend to cooperate as business partners, but we know that this type of cooperation is not enough to solve our difficulties. Is there a way to change a society (*Gesellschaft*) of business partners into an (imagined) community of friends? We have seen that Derrida is quite effective in deconstructing Schmitt’s definition of politics. However, as to the politics of friendship he proposes, I derived little comfort and no enlightenment from reading his book. “Friends, there are no friends”. This sentence ascribed to Aristotle runs through his text as a Poltergeist. Presumably it means that if you want friendship, you should rather give than expect friendship. Yet given his ultimate sentence I am not sure this is what this means: When will we be ready for an experience of freedom and equality that is capable of respectfully experiencing the friendship, which would at last be just, just beyond the law, and measured up against its measurelessness?

O my democratic friends ...²¹ How should we end this sentence? “Oh my democratic friends, there are no friends”? A rather disheartening bit of advice for those not skilled in a form of dialectics that out Hegels Hegel. Or should it be “Oh my democratic friends, we are friends”? It is hard to imagine that Derrida would end pages of the most abstruse mental gymnastics with such a platitude. It is essential to learn what Derrida understands by democracy. Is it the freedom and equality of scholars he is talking about or does he include the general public in his ideal of friendship? His predilection for Nietzsche (he often uses a collage of quotations from Nietzsche to make his argument) is a bad sign.

Nietzsche’s thought, a narcotic for all scholars

Nietzsche’s thought is a narcotic for all scholars. In penetrating prose he voiced their revulsion against mass society and the unwholesome mix of vulgarity, *naïveté* and hysteria it often manifests. And more than any other 19th century writer Nietzsche has created the image of an intense experience that liberates the sophisticated and the erudite from his humdrum existence in mass society. As any narcotic Nietzsche’s message creates illusions. The most powerful is that as part of an elite the intellectual as Superman can manipulate the masses for his own purposes. Nietzsche is not responsible for the Nazi ideology, but there is a systematic relation between the fascism of

a great number of intellectuals during the Interbellum and their admiration for Nietzsche as writer and prophet. I am, of course, not accusing Derrida of being a Nazi or indeed of anything, but I do not understand his sympathy for Nietzsche and I am puzzled how he combines this sympathy with admiration for Kant’s rational idealism. To think that you can talk down to the masses and yet achieve your own goals (whatever they are) is an illusion. Mass society is the product of modernization. One could argue that it lacks guidance, but it certainly does not lack force. A teacher can only persuade when taking the permanent interests of his public into account. Security, liberty, justice and democracy are the very virtues that keep modernization going: political education should aim to demonstrate how these permanent interests could be pursued in the present world. From a Nietzschean point of view this educational goal may seem terribly banal, but in the present circumstances it takes all our mental and moral resources to deliver this form of education. If I am right in thinking that modernization in its present form opens the divide between the rich and the poor, and that it saps the foundations of human survival, we must conclude that international solidarity is not just an optional ideal but a necessity. We must be able to serve the permanent interests of all human beings and in order to do so we must find ways and means to control the disruptive effects of modernization by bringing the process itself under control. The role of the scholar in finding out how we can live and should live is crucial and the disdain of scholars looking down from

their ivory towers is not just ludicrous, but also disastrous. In order to bring the modernization process under control the expertise of the scholar is essential and the public needs to be persuaded that this control will serve its long-term interests.

Ernst Bloch, the greatest utopian of the 20th century

The ideal of a global imagined community should be the ultimate goal of political education. For those who consider this to be an unrealistic and “utopian” idea it is worthwhile to quote Ernst Bloch, the greatest utopian of the 20th century. He writes:

“To cling to things, or to fly over them is both wrong. ... Where the prospective horizon is constantly kept in the picture, reality manifests itself as what it is *in concreto*: an intermixture of dialectical processes, which happen in an unfinished world, in a world that anyway could not be altered without the gigantic future: the real potentiality within it.”²²

Bloch presents the vista of utopian thinking as a higher form of realism. And perhaps we can draw comfort from his vision and mark this moment in time as an opportunity for the politics of utopian pragmatism. In the face of large-scale pollution, global warming and regional but yet global conflicts there is an ever growing need for long term policies. It is an exciting time for those teaching politics. At the end of the first part of this essay I pointed out that the history of political thought may not be relevant in solving current political problems, but that it can still help us to acquire wisdom and detachment. To that extent Oakeshott’s teaching is vindicated. But we will continue to

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Aesthetics in the Lecture Lists of the Universities of Halle, Leipzig, Würzburg, and Prague, 1785–1805

The introduction of the teaching of fine arts and sciences (*schöne Künste und Wissenschaften*) into the programmes at faculties of arts (*Philosophische Fakultäten*) was, as early as the reign of Empress Maria Theresa, an important part of the reforms aiming to secularize Austrian universities, which had hitherto been controlled by the Jesuits. The teaching of fine arts and sciences gained further importance in the reforms of her son Joseph II. The Josephinian regulations renamed the existing chairs of *schöne Wissenschaften* chairs of aesthetics and classical literature, and included them among the five ordinary chairs (the others being philosophy, mathematics, physics, and general history) at the universities throughout the Habsburg

lands. In the third year, aesthetics was taught every day, and examinations in the subject were obligatory for all students who wanted to graduate properly from the faculty of arts and open the way for themselves to further study at the so-called 'higher' faculties of theology, medicine or law.

The Vienna reforms
The great importance that the Vienna reforms ascribed to aesthetics, a discipline that emerged at the university in the Protestant town of Halle in the late 1730s and early 1740s, begs the question whether

in the German-language area in this period basic differences existed between the aesthetics taught at Roman Catholic universities in the Habsburg lands, Roman Catholic universities outside the Habsburg lands, and universities in Protestant

countries. My paper provides a partial answer to that question. It summarizes the conclusions of research comparing information relating to aesthetics, which appears in the lecture lists of the universities of Halle, Leipzig, Würzburg and Prague



Prague, the Klementinum

in the academic years from 1785/86 to 1804/05.

Analysis of the accessible lecture lists demonstrates that at Halle the term 'aesthetics' became fully established as the name of independent *collegia* when the *Ordinarius* of philosophy Johann August

Eberhard began to teach in the late Seventies. In the earlier period, apart from the name 'aesthetics', the name 'Theorie der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften' or variations of it appeared regularly. Together with Eberhard, other Halle teachers offered lecture courses in aesthetics in this period. The number of all their *collegia* did not, however, equal the number given by Eberhard, who offered aesthetics eighteen times, whereas Johann Gebhard Ehrenreich Maaß and Ludwig Heinrich Jakob six times, Rudolph Gotthold Rath three times, and Christoph Gottfried Everbeck (or Ewerbeck) and Samuel Friedrich Günther Wahl once. The Halle lecturers on aesthetics were the *Privatdozenten*, *Extraordinaria* and *Ordinaria*. With the exception of Wahl, the professors who lectured on aesthetics were professors of philosophy; Wahl was an *Extraordinarius* of oriental languages. The Halle *Ordinaria*, Eberhard, Jakob and Maaß, lectured on aesthetics from their own books and notes. Other teachers used various textbooks, most often those by Eberhard, Johann Joachim Eschenburg (*Entwurf einer Theorie und Literatur der schönen Wissenschaften*, 1783) and Christian Wilhelm Snell (*Lehrbuch der Kritik des Geschmacks, mit beständiger Rücksicht auf die Kantische Kritik der ästhetischen Urtheilskraft*, 1795). It was precisely the use of these works, which made the period under discussion different from what preceded it, when Charles Batteux, Friedrich Justus Riedel and Georg Friedrich Meier dominated at Halle.

Leipzig

In the German lecture lists at Leipzig the name *schöne Wissenschaften* was maintained throughout the period not, however, as a term competing with the term 'aesthetics', but only as the name of one section of lecture courses at the Faculty of Arts. In this section, aesthetics was an independent subsection, which was, throughout the period, separated from all related subjects, including the theory of literature and rhetoric. At Leipzig, the term 'aesthetics' was first used as the name of a lecture course at the latest in the mid-Seventies. The only Leipzig teacher who regularly offered aesthetics throughout the period was Ernst Platner, *Extraordinarius*, later *Ordinarius* of medicine. Nevertheless, he did not dominate aesthetics here. This is testified to by the work both of the large group of authors who offered aesthetics only sporadically (Christian August Heinrich Clodius, Johann Gottfried Grohmann, Johann Gotthilf Samuel Leuchte, Karl Adolph Cäsar, Johann Georg Eck the Younger, Christian Weiss and Karl Heinrich Ludwig Pölitz) and, in particular, four who systematically devoted themselves to it – *Ordinarius* of morals and politics Johann Georg Eck, *Extraordinarius* of philosophy Karl Gottfried Schreiter, *Ordinarius* of philosophy Karl Heinrich Heydenreich and *Privatdozent* Christian Friedrich Michaelis. Similarly to those at Halle, aestheticians at Leipzig did not base themselves on only one textbook. Sporadically they turned to Alexander Pope, Karl Wilhelm Ramler and Johann August Eberhard, most often basing themselves on Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, the kantian textbooks of the Snell brothers and their own texts. Eschenburg's *Entwurf* was not used in the *collegia* on aesthetics at Leipzig.

Schöne Wissenschaften

From the mid-Eighties onwards the name 'aesthetics' began to be used regularly in the lecture lists at the Roman Catholic University of Würzburg. Bonaventura Andres, who, till the summer semester of the 1803/04 year was the only Würzburg teacher of aesthetics, announced to alternate with the *collegia* on aesthetics *collegia* on the theory of the fine arts and sciences as well. In the announcements of Andres's lecture courses the term *schöne Wissenschaften* appeared for the



Max Weber

need reason and some measure of what he called rationalism in politics. For if it is the case that a considerable part of our current predicament is the challenge of modernization, as I have argued in this paper, we must cultivate our capacity for reason. We need reason to help us understand what we must do, what sacrifices we must make to meet successfully the global exigencies that confront us. And we will continue to need reason in politics to persuade ourselves and others to accept these sacrifices. It seems to me that this is the challenge of political education in an age of modernization.

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¹ C. Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen, Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien*, (Berlin, 1963: Duncker & Humblot) 26, see *The Concept of the Political*

(Chicago, 1996: Chicago UP), G. Schwab ed., 26; Schwab has "enemy" instead of "foe"

² F. L. van Holthoon, *State and Civil Society, Theories, Illusions, Realities, A Survey of Political Theories in the 19th Century Western World* (Maastricht, 2003: Shaker).

³ Translated by G. Collins (London, 1997: Verso).

⁴ H. J. Berman, *Law and Revolution. The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition* (Cambridge Mass., 1983: Harvard UP).

⁵ D. Tapscott, D. Ticoll, A. Lowy, *Digital Capital, Harnessing the Power of Business Webs* (Boston, 2000: Harvard Business School Press).

⁶ D. Tapscott e.a., *Digital Capital*, 119

⁷ Ibidem, 121

⁸ A. de Tocqueville, *De la Démocratie en Amérique* (Geneva, 1990: Vrin), vol. 1, E. Nolla ed., 9.

⁹ R. D. Kaplan. *Empire Wilderness, Travel into America's Future* (New York, 1998: Random House). Kaplan also pays a visit to Vancouver and is struck by the paradox that Canadians who complain about their lack of national identity, seem to manage the challenges of modern development so much better.

¹⁰ Ibidem, 177.

¹¹ M. Weber, *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen, Konfuzianismus und Taoismus*, H. Schmidt-

Glinker ed., mit P. Kolonko, *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung 1, Band 19, Schriften 1915-1920* (Tübingen, 1989: Mohr), 519-520.

¹² F. R. Ankersmit, *Aesthetic Politics, Political Philosophy Between Fact and Value* (Stanford, 1996: Stanford UP).

¹³ G. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic* (New York, 1972: Norton), 565.

¹⁴ Which is ironical given Oakeshott's low opinion of political science as a version of rationalism in politics

¹⁵ M. Oakeshott, "Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays", T. Fuller ed., (Indianapolis, 1991: Liberty Classics), 15.

¹⁶ Ibidem, 12.

¹⁷ Ibidem, 15.

¹⁸ "Political Education", 60.

¹⁹ B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983: Verso).

²⁰ K.M. Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution*, (Cambridge 1990: CUP), 13.

²¹ Ibidem, 306.

²² E. Bloch, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* (Frankfurt a. M., 1974: Suhrkamp), vol.1, 256-257. "An den Dingen zu kleben, sie zu überfliegen, beides ist falsch. ... Wo der prospektive Horizont durchgehends mit visiert wird, erscheint das Wirkliche als das, was es in concreto ist: als Wegegeflecht von dialektischen Prozessen, die in einer unfertigen Welt geschehen, in einer Welt, die überhaupt nicht veränderbar wäre ohne die riesige Zukunft: reale Möglichkeit in ihr."

last time in the winter semester of 1792/93 in connection with Eschenburg's *Entwurf*. Andres, *Ordinarius* of homiletics and classical literature, offered aesthetics based on various authors, in particular Eschenburg, Gotthilf Samuel Steinbart, Christoph Meiners, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Carl Theodor von Dalberg and especially Immanuel Kant. Kant's *Critique of Judgement* provided the basis of his lecture courses eight times in the years 1791/92 to 1803/04. After university reform began in 1803/04, Würzburg aesthetics and related fields reached their peak in the following year, 1804/05. *Collegia* on aesthetics were at this time offered not only by Andres, but also by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and eventually by Johann Jakob Wagner.

It is the diversity of textbooks (obvious at the level of the lecture lists) which makes it possible to analyze aesthetics at Halle, Leipzig and Würzburg in the years 1785 to 1805 both synchronically and diachronically. From the synchronic point of view Halle aesthetics was characterized by its simultaneous offering of aesthetics by various teachers in one academic year, taught on the basis of various works and even different philosophic-aesthetic systems – for example, Jakob's kantian *collegia* and Eberhard's *collegia* based on Leibniz and Wolff. From the diachronic point of view one can distinguish three phases: the first was dominated by Eberhard; the second, from the beginning of the Nineties, was marked by the competition between Eberhard and Jakob's conceptions of aesthetics; the third, from the summer semester of 1801, was when these two last-mentioned scholars were joined by the *Ordinarius* Maaß.

Again Leipzig

In Leipzig aesthetics, one can single out four phases: in the first, the leading aesthetician was Platner; in the second, beginning in 1788/89, he was joined by Heydenreich; in the third, from 1794, it was Michaelis, who, together with Platner, also dominated the fourth phase, which began with Heydenreich's departure from the university in 1797/98. From

the synchronic point of view, the vast number of *collegia* and also the large number of teachers are characteristic of Leipzig aesthetics. In terms of what was offered there, Leipzig aesthetics came to a peak in the years 1795/96 to 1800/01. In this period at least two *collegia* in aesthetics were offered in each semester. In the winter semester of 1798/99 four *collegia* in aesthetics were announced, and in the summer semester of the following year there were even five. The teaching of aesthetics at Würzburg was fundamentally different from that taught at the Protestant universities of Halle and Leipzig. In keeping with the nature of the Faculty of Arts as the place to prepare for further study in theology, medicine or law, only one lecture course was offered here for almost the whole period we are considering – Andres's. Nevertheless, one can distinguish, even during Andres's period teaching there, two phases from the diachronic point of view. The first was characterized by Andres's lecture courses, which took up the thread from the pre-kantian authors; the second phase, after 1792, was dominated by Kant's *Critique of Judgement*. The third, final phase in the development of aesthetics at Würzburg began in the summer semester of 1804, when *collegia* on aesthetics were offered by Andres, Schelling and Wagner. From the synchronic point of view one does not see in Würzburg aesthetics of this period, unlike those at Leipzig and Halle, concurrent offerings of variously orientated *collegia* on aesthetics until 1804/05 onwards. Aesthetics, despite its great growth and variety, which is evident from the offering in the lists, was – and this is symptomatic – not institutionalized at any of these universities. At Halle no chair of aesthetics was established (the lecturers were most often professors of philosophy, so that aesthetics was also included in the Philosophy section), *collegia* on aesthetics here did not become permanently public (aesthetics was most often taught privately twice a week), and was not even one of

the core subjects of the individual teachers who taught aesthetics. Nor at Leipzig, where the frequency and regularity of teaching testifies to its extraordinary popularity among students, was aesthetics ever ranked among the key disciplines. No chair of aesthetics was established here, and, indeed, aesthetics did not become the most important *collegium* for any of the lecturers. It was for the most part taught privately, often unpaid, two to four times a week. At Würzburg, aesthetics may have been a fixed part of the curriculum of the Faculty of Arts, but no chair was established for it here either. Andres was an *Ordinarius* of homiletics and classical literature, later of



A.G. Meissner

homiletics and pedagogics; the other lecturers, Schelling and Wagner, were *Ordinaria* of philosophy. Aesthetics appears not to have represented the most important lecture course for any of them. Even Andres, who offered it most often, did so, with rare exception, only privately.

Prague

Aesthetics at the University of Prague was considerably different from what was taught elsewhere. Considering the centralizing efforts of Joseph II, it is safe to assume that the description of Prague University can safely be applied also to other institutions of higher learning in the Habsburg monarchy. It was characterized by two anti-theoretical tendencies. The first is the important change in the conception of aesthetics com-

pared to the preceding, Theresian period, in which *schöne Wissenschaften* was taught here by Carl Heinrich Seibt. This change, linked directly with August Gottlieb Meißner's appointment to the post of *Ordinarius* of aesthetics and classical literature, is testified to by the new name of the chair, which disregarded the term *schöne Wissenschaften*, and also by the requirement to base the teaching of aesthetics not on earlier authors such as Christian Fürchtegott Gellert, Johann Christoph Gottsched, Charles Rollin, and Charles Batteux, but on the new Eschenburg textbook (1786/87). A comparison of Prague aesthetics with Halle, Leipzig, and Würzburg aesthetics reveals that the decision (prepared by Gottfried van Swieten, president of the study committee at the court in Vienna) to teach the discipline according to Eschenburg raised aesthetics at Prague in the second half of the Eighties to a level comparable to the top universities outside the Habsburg monarchy; there, too, Eschenburg's *Entwurf* was often used in this period. Also, with the neglect of the term *schöne Wissenschaften* and the emphasis on the term 'aesthetics', Meißner's *collegium* was following on from usage common in the North-German-language area.

The Early 1790s

Beginning in the early 1790s, in the reigns of Leopold II and Francis II, a further, slow tendency set itself against this dynamic, modernizing one, because, after the changes, aesthetics was always presented in the lecture lists in the same way throughout the rest of the period: aesthetics was taught by only one person (Meißner) based on a single work (Eschenburg's) for an hour every day. Judging from the lists it is safe to say that the Prague endorsement of Eschenburg seems, unlike aesthetics at Halle, Leipzig and Würzburg, to have been lasting rather than fleeting. In general it is clear that at Halle, Leipzig and even Würzburg, teachers of aesthetics were freely and regularly

changing the textbooks of their lecture courses. They often did so immediately after inspirational new texts were published. The *Ordinaria* lecturing on aesthetics, moreover, often announced *collegia* based on their own writings or even published treatises. By contrast, under the pressure of the curriculum regulations coming from Vienna, Meißner, in the announcement of his lecture courses, neither offered the teaching of his own aesthetics system nor ever even declared his intention to teach aesthetics based on any text other than Eschenburg's. In the lecture lists at Prague one sees no change in the teaching of aesthetics during the twenty years we are considering, from either the synchronic or diachronic point of view.

The unique rigidity of aesthetics at Prague clearly stands out in lecture lists in comparison with the ways the most influential discussion on aesthetics of the late eighteenth century – Kant's *Critique of Judgement* – was being promoted at the other universities. The *Critique of Judgement* began to be used in the teaching of aesthetics at all non-Austrian universities almost immediately after its publication in 1790. At Würzburg, aesthetics was taught according to Kant even back in 1791/92, at Leipzig in 1793/94, and at Halle beginning in 1795/96 at the latest. By contrast, the Prague lecture lists make no mention of the *Critique of Judgement*. Prague aesthetics – unlike its counterparts outside the Habsburg monarchy – may thus have been fully institutionalized by the court at Vienna: it was included among the required courses, represented a key lecture course of the teachers, and a chair was even set up for it; yet, as is clear from the lecture lists, it was hindered in its development because the top Protestant and Roman Catholic universities in the German-language area in the last third of the eighteenth century and in the early nineteenth century first reflected the intellectual diversity of aesthetic thought during the Enlightenment and, later, its orientation to philosophical idealism.

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