

## 2000

The European Journal/ Die Europäische Zeitschrift/ La Revue Européenne/ Revista Europea/ Rivista Europea



Dear Colleagues,  
Some of you congratulate us on the conduct of our journal, and we are grateful for this; but some also ask us what our political *credo* is. First of all, our *credo* is not so much political, as philosophical. We believe in civilization, in the advancement of learning, in the importance of education, and in a concept of truth as 'problematic' – that is, as questionable, not definitive. We believe in the scientific explanation of problems, but 'culture' means for us something more: it involves an 'understanding', or *apprehension*, of the 'secrets' of the world around us, which in no case we aim at 'modifying'. Therefore, it emphatically does not imply the imposition of our own principles to the points of view of others, whether in the name of 'enlightened' ideas, or of anything else. Our readers will understand us, if

we say that we are not 'men of system', and that, if we read Voltaire with much interest, we learn no less from Erasmus. This could be judged as 'non committal', but it is our *professio fidei* (as long as the 'supreme values' are not at stake). Add to this, please, the concept of the 'liberation' of mankind, with all its implications. When we try to 'bring philosophy from heaven to earth', as Cicero said that Socrates did, we feel, nevertheless, an unrestrained disgust at vulgarity in all its aspects. Finally, we aim at raising the cultural standard of the world of politics. But often, when we watch TV, in *all* the European countries, and hear politicians speaking, we fear that all we do is in vain.

Chers Collègues,  
Certains d'entre vous nous félicitent de la tenue de notre revue et

nous les en remercions; d'autres cependant nous questionnent sur notre *credo* politique. Tout d'abord, notre *credo* est moins politique que philosophique. Nous avons foi en la civilisation, le progrès des connaissances, le rôle de l'enseignement et un concept de vérité 'problématique', dans le sens qu'elle peut être remise en cause, et non pas définitive. Nous croyons à l'explication scientifique des problèmes, mais la 'culture' ne se limite pas à cela: elle implique la 'compréhension' ou l'*apprehension* des 'secrets' du monde qui nous entoure, que nous n'avons aucunement l'intention de 'modifier'. Par conséquent il ne saurait être question d'imposer nos propres principes à quiconque, que ce soit au nom d'idées 'éclairées' ou autres. Nos lecteurs comprendront si nous affirmons que nous ne sommes pas des 'hommes de système', et que, si

nous lisons Voltaire avec beaucoup d'intérêt, nous n'apprenons pas moins d'Erasmus. On pourrait croire que nous cherchons à éluder la question, mais c'est notre *profession de foi* (tant que les 'valeurs suprêmes' ne sont pas en jeu). Il faut y ajouter le concept de 'libération' de l'humanité et tout ce qu'il implique. Lorsque nous essayons de 'faire descendre la philosophie du ciel vers la terre', comme ce fut le cas de Socrate, selon Cicéron, nous rejetons vigoureusement toute espèce de vulgarité. Enfin, notre but est d'élever le niveau culturel du monde politique. Mais souvent, quand nous regardons la télévision, dans *tous* les pays d'Europe, et entendons parler les hommes politiques, nous craignons que notre démarche ne soit vaine.

V. M.

# Fortuna, Occasione, Virtù and the European Convention

## SUMMARY

The argument of this paper is that modernization should have prompted the delegates at the European Convention to choose a more drastic solution for governing the future European Union of 25 members. The admittance of 10 new members could have been an excellent occasion for making a clean sheet and in the end one must conclude that the delegates lacked the political courage and the foresight (or as Machiavelli called it the *virtù*) to draft a proper constitution.



THE STATUE OF MINERVA, THE GODDESS OF WISDOM, IN THE CAMPUS OF THE UNIVERSITY "LA SAPIENZA" IN ROME

Introduction<sup>1</sup>

My dear colleagues, most honoured students, all members of 'La Sapienza', a university that carries wisdom as its emblem, Ladies and Gentlemen

"Et, esaminando le azioni e vita loro, non si vede che quelli avessino altro dalla fortuna che la occasione, la quale dette loro materia a potere introdurvi dentro quella forma parse loro; e senza quella occasione la virtù dello animo loro si sarebbe spenta, e senza quella virtù la occasione sarebbe venuta invano".<sup>2</sup>

Our colleague Vincenzo Merolle has asked me to report to you on the work of the European Convention that prepared the draft of a new constitution

for the European Union. It took the Convention a year to deliberate before they sent their draft in June/July 2003 to the 15 member states of the European Union. Their work reminded me of Machiavelli's observation on *virtù* in *Il Principe*, if in a negative way.

The draft in its Dutch version counts 253 pages and its mere size is a first occasion for criticism. The draft is minute on petty details, but opaque on the major issues. It includes for instance a charter of human rights of 54 articles. By comparison the American Bill of Rights has ten. Article 29 of the charter stipulates that any European citizen has the right of free labour mediation. Indeed a worthy aim, but should it be part of a charter that tries to de-

clare the most fundamental rights of Europe's citizens? On the main issues the draft remains vague and imprecise. Let me substantiate this remark with four observations.

## Four Observations

The first observation deals with the respective competences of the European Union and the Member States. In part I, articles 9 to 17, the distinction is drawn between competences that belong to the Union exclusively and those that are shared with the Member States according to the famous principle of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity means that the Union has the right to interfere when member states are unwilling or passive in executing common policies. On the other hand, the principle of

proportionality will keep the right of the Union to interfere within bounds. I could spend hours in reaching all kinds of ironic conclusions while discussing articles 9 to 17, but let me keep it short. What these articles mean to express is that there is no clear division of competences between the European Union and the Member States. As in the past fifty years, decisions will be reached according to a very complicated system of negotiations. In principle the Union can interfere in any field of interest, but the Member States have ample opportunity to obstruct this interference. The American Constitution makes a sharp division between the competences belonging to the federation and the separate States, because the framers of the constitution were very anxious to settle the question of sovereignty in a clear and distinct manner. So they chose to split the sovereignty in two. In some fields such as defense and foreign policy the federation was the sovereign power. In other fields such as education and poor relief the States remained so. The sovereign power of the American States is no trifling thing. As we all know each State can decide for itself whether it wants to introduce and preserve capital punishment. The European Conven-

tion decided not to face the question of sovereignty. In fact they denied that there was any question of sovereignty. Mistakenly so, as we will see.

My second observation deals with the aims of the Union. They range from the grandiose to the mundane. In the Preamble of the draft we read that a united Europe must be a society open to justice, culture, science, peace and solidarity. It must

## INDEX

F. L. van Holthoorn  
*Fortuna, Occasione,  
Virtù*, p. 1

Robert Spaethling  
*Mozart as Revealed*, p. 3

Marc Belissa  
Florence Gauthier  
*Kant, le Droit  
Cosmopolitique*, p. 5

Th. Anfält  
*Charles Bonnet*, p. 7

unite the European nations in a common destiny. Further on we read about the need for a common foreign policy and defence. It emphasizes that Europe must be a democracy, clear and transparent, subject to the rule of law, and when we descend into the thicket of articles we get rulings on fishery, fair trade and the labour market. What is striking about this enumeration is that articles about political aims such as a common foreign policy only formulate good intentions, while bureaucratic rulings on how to fish, make your cheese and inoculate (or rather not) your animals are precise and demanding.

My third observation deals with the kind of European government we will get according to the draft. On the one hand we should get a European Commission, which will be responsible to the European Parliament. Advocates of the draft heralded this as a major step towards democracy within the European Union, but wait a moment. Next we have a European Council (of Prime Ministers) and a Council of Ministers. They will take the initiative in raising new issues, which is Aesopian language use for saying that they will decide the important *political* issues. These councils are in no way responsible to the European Parliament. So the so-called democratic part of the European government will deal with routine matters, and new policies will be decided in the corridors of power in Brussels. Of course these prime ministers are responsible to their national governments, but these are at a long distance from the decision-making process. The only solace for the democrats is that a president chosen for two and a half years and a foreign minister of the Union – both to be chosen by the European Council – will act as a go-between; between, that is to say, the councils and the parliament. What their role will be within the new government nobody knows, except that the president will need his or her own staff, as the foreign minister will insist on his own diplomatic corps. So they will cost the taxpayer money. Will the democracy of the European Union be clear and transparent? It cannot be. The simple rule of a European democracy must be that in European issues a European government will need a direct mandate from European voters. Instead of such a democratic government we keep a Europe of negotiators who derive their mandate from their national parliaments. This is my fourth observation.

#### A Utopian Proposal?

It has struck me that European federalists have applauded the draft as a great achievement. Those who have grown old in the service of Europe have listened with disbelief to my argument that for decisions on European issues we need a European government under proper control by a European parliament. Listen, they have said to me, your proposal is utopian.

You cannot force the process of unification. It took us fifty years to get this far. My answer always is that, well, we did not get very far. As to the draft they are likely to be disappointed. There is, as you know, no consensus on the draft. In the end the 25 leaders will probably reach some uneasy compromise and the eventual product will be even more opaque and indirect than the enthusiast for the draft has bargained for. As a product of lengthy and intense negotiations it will create jobs for future negotiators. Is my simple proposal really utopian or does it suggest the kind of realism that looks to the future rather than to the past? In the university I taught American history and I can tell you that the Founding Fathers managed to draft a constitution in four and a half months. That constitution stood the test of time for two hundred years, while the United States grew from a rustic colony to a world power. There may be merit in taking a quick and drastic decision while facing the future.

The Founding Fathers had two major problems on their agenda. How could the new fledgling American republic maintain its position between the warring parties of France and Great Britain? Secondly, how could they raise enough taxes in order to pay their soldiers? To solve these problems they argued that they needed a strong federal state, whose duties are strictly circumscribed. In this way it could conduct an independent foreign policy and demand taxes directly from American citizens. The logic of the European Convention is different. At the back of the mind of the delegates were questions as how we can prevent Italy from producing too much milk, how we can support the network of international trains and how we can guarantee that the future member Poland will produce meat in a safe and sanitary way.

Do we need to take a bold and drastic decision? Have we as Europeans done so badly in the past fifty years? Europe within the borders of the Union is at peace. First as the six and then as the fifteen member states we have created a common market, which has produced jobs and prosperity. The European Union has helped Spain and Portugal to become equal members among the fifteen. So indeed, in terms of economic cooperation within the Union we have done rather well and we can expect to repeat this performance with a union of 25 members. But is economic cooperation enough? Will it solve the *political* problems of the European Union? I have underlined the word *political* in my text. What do I mean by this? Let me start by giving you an example of a political issue. Who, on the eve of America's invasion of Iraq, backed the Americans who wanted to go to war? The Dutch were divided and their government sat on the fence. The Belgians, French, and Ger-

mans were against and their governments told the Americans so in no uncertain terms. The Poles backed the Americans, so did the British, the Spanish and the Italian governments, but loud protests were heard in these three countries against this policy of their governments. Suppose we would have had a European government that needed to get a mandate from voters in 25 member states. I believe that government could do nothing else than voice a powerful protest to the Americans, which would perhaps have prevented America going to war with Iraq. I am not taking sides in this matter (at least in this talk). As matters stood on the eve of the intervention there were powerful reasons for intervening, as there were powerful reasons not to intervene. Exactly because the outcome of intervention was not clear we needed a firm deci-



MACHIAVELLI  
RACCOLTA GIOVIANA, COMO

sion, that is a political decision. You know the hazards of your decision, you know you have to take it one way or another and you have the *virtù* to do so. We may say that the European people of the Union had *virtù*, but we had no way to organize it and the Americans could claim that the Germans were naïve, the French hypocritical and the British their most loyal friends. I think that the aim of a common foreign policy under the conditions of the draft is utopian and I appeal to Machiavelli's key concepts *fortuna*, *occasione* and *virtù* to suggest why my view may look quite realistic in the eye of the beholder. Perhaps it is even more realistic than the arguments of those who drafted the new constitution.

#### Fortuna

*Fortuna* defines the unpredictability as well as the force of circumstances. The force, we as Europeans have to react to, is modernization. As a process it has had and it has far reaching social and economic effects, which we cannot foresee, but can only react to. To put it bluntly it forces us to cooperate as Europeans. Already in 1914 we had reached the stage that war had become an obsolete instrument to solve our problems. It took those who lived through the 20<sup>th</sup> century until 1945 to accept the fact that cooperation is the only alternative to spreading death and destruction. If I

say that we have been successful in implementing this cooperation the danger is that we exaggerate our success, because the force of modernization did a great deal to push us in the right direction. However we did nothing to build a system that could produce political decisions.

We all agree that we need a European foreign policy and the delegates of the European Convention expressed this need in their draft. However we will not get this policy, if we have the opportunity to hide behind the walls of our national democracies. What we need to realize is that our common destiny as Europeans is becoming more important than our national destinies. This is not only true when we have to challenge the United States, but also applies to our role in the world at large. Remember what the draft formulates, we must be an open and democratic society that accepts its task of solidarity to the less fortunate on our globe. But how are we to maintain an open society as a host to the world, if our European political system forces us to look at our national interests first? To be an open European society we must believe in a common destiny and moral purpose. As negotiators for our member states we run the risk of creating a narrow-minded Europe ridden by anxieties about a hostile world outside the European Union. In this respect we have a bad track record. Our Common Market is walled in by protective tariffs and if we look at

the emerging European policy towards immigration it seems that we are trying to create the fortress Europe and not an open society. It is questionable whether we can keep the problems of the Third World outside our gates, but it is clear that our aim of solidarity, as formulated by the draft, is at risk if we implement this policy.

Political control is not only important for taking a reasonable stand on foreign policy; it is also needed to curb the vast and tutelary power of the European bureaucracy. Civil servants are a necessary element in any modern government, but they should not be allowed to set the agenda. Think of de Tocqueville and what he wrote on that tutelary power:

“Au-dessus de ceux-là s'élève un pouvoir immense et tutélaire, qui se charge seul d'assurer leur jouissance et de veiller sur leur sort.. Il est absolu, détaillé, régulier, prévoyant et doux. Il ressemblerait à la puissance paternelle si, comme elle, il avait pour objet de préparer les hommes à l'âge viril; mais il ne cherche, au contraire, qu'à les fixer irrévocablement dans l'enfance; il aime que les citoyens se réjouissent, pourvu qu'ils ne songent qu'à se réjouir.”<sup>3</sup>

The answer to that tutelary power, according to de Tocqueville, is the commitment of the citizens to democracy. Now

we all know that the European Union is held in incredibly low esteem by its citizens and how can it be else? They are confronted with rules issued by the European Commission over which they have no control, but which affect their lives. We should not forget that modernization puts a strain on all of us. It forces us constantly to accept changes although we do not like change and it forces us to disregard our traditions, which are dear to us. Citizens that disrespect their government have an easy way out: they will not obey its rules but try- usually with success – to bend them for serving their own purposes or they will simply commit fraud.

So what is the challenge of *fortuna* Machiavelli was referring to? What should the European Convention have done? Obviously devise ways and means to assert the political control of a European government on democratic principles and to create a system that can deal with our common destiny as European citizens. What did it propose? To fix the European Commission in its bureaucratic role and make the European parliament an accessory to it.

Did they have the *occasione* to create a European government with a direct mandate from the European electorate? I think the fact that ten new member states join the Union is an excellent occasion. Most of these new member states have had painful experiences with tyrannical regimes. If the existing fifteen member states had desired to provide a moral lead, what better lead than to present them with a plan for a European democracy? Of course I am not blind to the fact that we have to protect national interests, but may I point out again that the Americans have provided a perfect and simple way of protecting these interests by a clear division of competences? However, a democratic mandate is as the Americans also discovered in 1787 a powerful instrument for providing the political clout you need to take unpopular decisions. Political clout is an American term meaning the force of persuasion, which is an essential element in what we call sovereign power.

Jean Bodin in the 16<sup>th</sup> century introduced the term to allow the French king to put an end to the terrible religious wars between Catholics and Protestants that were ruining France. Sovereignty in his definition is the arbitral power to end a conflict that cannot be solved by mediation. Hobbes added an important element to Bodin's definition. Power on paper, sovereignty as a prerogative, is not enough. The sovereign as a person or an institution must have the actual power to enforce its rulings. In this respect the world has not changed since Hobbes. The definition of what is political has changed. Politics, as I said before, must be focused on cooperation, not war, but it remains true that we still need sovereign power to enforce unpopular, but necessary decisions. In our situation we of course need democratic support for this enforcement, but Hobbes' point remains that

# Mozart as Revealed in his Letters

## A Translator's View

**Introduction. Perfect music and vulgar letters, a contradiction?**

Reading Mozart's letters for the first time can be a surprising if not bewildering experience. His prose shows none of the clarity, elegance, and logic that we associate with his music; what we find instead is a highly creative vocabulary, an individualistic approach to spelling and sentence structure, and a sense of humor that is, at times, quite down to earth. The reader who knows Mozart only from his music can be rightfully puzzled: how can it be that this universally admired creator of perfect sound, the composer of such exquisite musical treasures as the "Letter Duet" in *Figaro* or the "Larghetto" in the *B-flat major Piano Concerto*, was writing letters like an unruly and uneducated school boy? Who is he, this Mozart, one is tempted to ask, and many Mozart biographers have asked the same question.

I, too, used to think that Mozart, the composer, and Mozart, the letter writer, were two different beings or at least two sides of a coin, bound together but facing in opposite directions. It was difficult for me to imagine, for instance, that he could have composed his piano sonata in C major, K. 309, with its endearing *Andante un poco adagio* that he himself likened to the character of a fourteen-year old girl (Rosa Cannabich), and during that same time have written two of his most egregious scatological letters to

Bäse, his female cousin in Augsburg. He put the finishing touches on K. 309 between November 8 and 13, 1777, and wrote the two bawdy letters to Bäse on November 5 and 13. How could it be possible, I thought, that anyone can create a musical portrait of such gentleness and innocence and at the same time regress to the level of a six-year old spouting out bathroom babble: "Pardon my poor handwriting, the pen is already old; now I have been shitting for nearly 22 years out of the same old hole and yet it's not torn a whit! — although I used it so often to shit — and then chewed off the muck bit by bit" (Nov. 13, 1777). What dichotomy, I thought, what unbelievable contradiction!

**Mozart's letters are personal, unruly, and part of his creative sensibility.**

My confusion subsided when I began translating Mozart's letters into English.<sup>1</sup> After reading the letters over and over, I came to a better understanding of Mozart as an individual, as a composer, and, most of all, as a letter writer. I understood, first of all, that when we enter into Mozart's epistolary realm, we are entering into a completely private sphere of thought and language. Unlike his father, Mozart did not write his letters with an eye toward publication; they flowed

from his imagination and his vibrant sense of humor, often bypassing the censorship of his mind. Besides, young Wolfgang had no formal education. His only teacher was Leopold, his father, who taught him the fundamentals of music, arithmetic, languages (German, Italian, French, Latin), history, and geography. While Leopold himself had received a rigorous formal education at a Jesuit Gymnasium in Augsburg and knew Gottsched's German grammar (*Deutsche Sprachkunst*) and C. F. Gellert's popular style book for

Mozart's grammar had been consistently regularized, his vocabulary elevated, his sometimes chaotic diction given fluency and literacy. Much of his natural spontaneity and playfulness was drained from his language, dynamic images were often flattened. Let me give just one example: when Mozart writes to his father that he played part of his Singspiel, *Die Entführung aus dem Serail*, for Countess Thun on the piano, he does not write, "I played through my second act for the Countess Thun" (as it has been consistently translated into English), but he writes "I pranced through my 2nd act for Countess Thun" ("Gestern habe ich der gräfin Thun meinen 2. act vorgeritten," May 8, 1782). "Vorreiten" (prancing) instead of "vorspielen" (playing) gives us a much more concrete and visual picture, we can see Mozart sitting on a horse proudly showing off his skills to the countess; we can also detect a certain cockiness in this self-image as well as a bit of self-ridicule; and both, we know, were qualities of Mozart's personality.



MOZART

epistolary writing (*Von dem guten Geschmacke in Briefen*), he chose to tutor Wolfgang at home and during their frequent travels. Young Wolfgang's sensitive ears were, therefore, much more attuned to spoken languages, including his mother's colorful Salzburg dialect, than Gottsched's grammatical rules. Finally and most importantly, I gradually understood that Mozart's written language, so full of spontaneity and creative imagination, is not only a direct expression of his extraordinary humanness, but an integral part of his artistic sensibility. I concluded that Mozart's language derives from the same creative wellspring as his musical art, and the C major sonata and the scatological letters to his cousin do not come from conflicting sides of his personality but from the same innate play instinct that drives his musical art and made him one of the most beloved composers in the world.

The creative component of Mozart's writing has long remained undervalued and even unrecognized. It was not until 1962, only forty years ago, that Wilhelm A. Bauer and Otto Erich Deutsch began their groundbreaking work of publishing Mozart's letters without deletions, corrections, or stylistic improvements, thereby giving us an authentic picture of Mozart's style.<sup>2</sup> Translations into English had fared even worse.

**Mozart as an epistolary dramatist.**

Playing with words is Mozart's most conspicuous and effective element of writing. Sometimes his imagination is fired up by a single word and he will put it through its paces by lining up all the synonyms he can think of: "You write further, indeed, you let it all out, you expose yourself, you let yourself be heard, you give me notice, you declare yourself, you indicate to me, you bring me the news, you state in broad daylight, you demand, you desire, you wish, you want, you like, you command that I, too, should could send you my Portrait." (Nov. 5, 1777). At another time he subjects the verb "to be" to a conjugational exercise that has us wonder whether he was just having fun or whether this verbal mini-drama was his mocking way of expressing an existential crisis: "I am, I was, I were, I have been, I had been, I would have been, oh if I were, oh that I were, I wished to god I were, I would be, if I should be, oh that I would be, I might have been, I shall have been, oh if I had been, oh that I had been, I wished to god I would have been, what? — a numskull." (Feb. 28, 1778). Mozart loves to engage his correspondent in a conversation. In the course of such a dialogue he often stages little scenes, comic scenes with dimensions of sound created by alliterations and internal rhymes. The letters to his sister and his cousin are

rich in this kind of epistolary theater. The following letter provides us not only with an example of his "high-spirited obscenities," as Saul Bellow called Mozart's famous scatology,<sup>3</sup> but with a lively sense of drama. "Ma très chère Cousine! Before I start writing to you, I have to go to the john - - - well now, that's over with! Ah! - - now my heart feels so much lighter again! — it's like a big stone is off my chest — now I can go and indulge myself again! Well, it's true, after you have completely emptied yourself, life is twice as much fun." (Dec. 3, 1777). The passage reads like a scene from a *commedia dell'arte* piece where the main character appears on stage just long enough to announce that he has "to go." It is vintage Mozart; the language is visual, concrete, theatrical; it brings the reader into an almost palpable presence with the writer. Sometimes, Mozart is so close to his correspondent that one thinks reader and writer are sitting side by side in his living room, chatting. In one instance, when an unexpected guest knocks on his door while he is writing to his father, Mozart records his reaction right into his letter — "Come in! — Oh, it's Herr Panzachi! — " (Nov. 22, 1780).

One of the most charming epistolary *scenae* comes toward the end of Mozart's life, in October 1791, when he writes to Constanze who was in Baden, a health spa near Vienna, taking a cure against an infected bone in her foot: "At half past five in the afternoon I went through the Stubenthor — and took my favorite walk along the Glacis to the theater. — But hold on, what do I see — what do I smell? — it's Don Primus with the Cutlets! — che gusto! — I am now eating to your health — the clock is striking 11, — perhaps you are asleep already? — St! St! St! — I don't want to wake you! —" (Oct. 7 and 8, 1791). We can almost smell the cutlets, we hear the striking of the clock, and we can see Mozart tiptoeing through Constanze's bedroom, as he has probably done many times in their married life, filling the letter not only with his loving thoughts but with his presence.

**Mozart's style of writing is simple, natural, imaginative and playful.**

Mozart has no unified system of style, the only thing consistent in his vocabulary or syntax is his inconsistency. Typical eighteenth-century modes of writing, such as the vocabulary of popular philosophy or the gallant style, appear in his letters only in forms of parody. For instance, when the seventeen-year old wants to put a smile on his sister's face, he imitates the vacuous style of his contemporaries: "I hope, my queen, that

without actual sovereign power, we cannot take true political decisions. Sovereignty in our case should belong to a democratic European federal state, and without it so-called political decisions will only have a surrogate flavour.

*Virtù* means the wisdom and courage to grasp opportunities at the right time. Europe's political elites did not even see the opportunity. They were engrossed in spinning webs of negotiation. I am used to being a *vox clamantis in deserto*, though it pleases me to be this time in the august company of Machiavelli. It completely baffles me how anybody can regard the draft as a great achievement. What it shows is that the delegates of the European Convention lacked *virtù*. Their draft — which the political leaders of the Union probably will make even more ramshackle — means that we will proceed to do business as usual and that is not enough. I wish I could offer you a more positive report on the doings of the European Convention, but I cannot in true honesty. Yet we learn from Machiavelli that nothing in life is certain. Perhaps *fortuna* will create a

new *occasione* and the next generation will have the *virtù* to grasp it.

**F. L. van Holthoorn**  
University of Groningen

*Frits L. van Holthoorn is Emeritus Professor of social history and American studies in the University of Groningen. He is the author of a number of publications on European and Dutch social history, and on American constitutional history.*

<sup>1</sup> Paper delivered at the University of Rome 'La Sapienza, Faculty of Political Sciences, on 4 May 2004.

<sup>2</sup> Machiavelli, *De Principatibus*, VI.

<sup>3</sup> A. de Tocqueville, *De la Démocratie en Amérique*, (Geneva 1990: Vrin), E. Nolla ed., vol. 2, 265.

[Above this race of men stands an immense and tutelary power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications and to watch over their fate. That power is absolute, minute, regular, provident and mild. It would be like the authority of a parent if, like that authority, its object was to prepare men for manhood; but it seeks, on the contrary, to keep them in perpetual childhood; it is well content that the people should rejoice, provided that they then think of nothing but rejoicing.]

you are enjoying the highest degree of health and yet now and then or rather once in while or better occasionally or still better qualche volta, as the Italians say, you will sacrifice for me some of your deep and important thoughts which always issue from that reasoning mind of yours which is both pleasant and penetrating and which you possess in addition to your beauty, although you are so tender in years and so little is expected of the aforementioned things from members of your sex.” (Aug. 14, 1773). As so often in his letters, Mozart is having fun at the expense of his correspondent and, as in this case, of the epistolary conventions of his time. In contrast to his contemporaries, Mozart clearly prefers to write what he himself calls a “natural” style (just as he insists that singers should sing “naturally”). Mozart’s “natural” style is not only rich in expressivity but also in diversity, it can range from the simple and succinct to unencumbered verbosity. When he writes about music he tends to be simple, direct, with a minimum of affect and technical jargon. In December 1782, he describes to his father the compositional style and underlying artistic ideas of his new Viennese piano concertos. “These concertos,” he writes, “are a happy medium between what’s too difficult and too easy — they are Brilliant — pleasing to the ear — Natural without becoming vacuous.” He then goes on to say that modern music no longer cultivates this kind of simplicity and balance, the “middle thing — the truth in all things (“das mittelding — das wahre in allen sachen”) is no longer known and appreciated — to earn applause one has to compose things that are so simpleminded that a coachman can sing them after hearing them just once, or so complicated — that they please precisely because no sensible person can understand them.” Mozart’s German is so simple here that translators have had a difficult time in staying with that sim-

licity. Emily Anderson, for instance, translates “das mittelding” as “the golden mean of truth in all things,”<sup>4</sup> which is correct in meaning but too elaborate for Mozart’s utterly plain language. Indeed, I consider it part of Mozart’s uniqueness as a writer that he is able to dash off a letter (the letter begins: “I must write to you in great haste”), use very basic vocabulary, and still make a significant point about his philosophy of music. At the opposite end of his linguistic palette is an incredible verbosity, a verbal overproduction that is part of his epistolary theater and cherished nonsense poetry. Those qualities in his writing are mostly directed toward the women in his life, his sister Nannerl, his mother Anna Maria, his cousin, the Bäsle, and his wife Constanze. To them he presents himself as an indefatigable creator of verbiage and theatrics. The following letter consists of a barrage of mock curses only because Bäsle had neglected to send him her portrait: “Heaven, Hell, and a thousand sacristies, Croats, damnations, devils and witchies, druids, cross-Batallions with no ends, by all the elements, air, water, earth, and fire, Europe, asia, affrica, and America, Jesuits, Augustins, Benedictines, Capucins, Minorites, Franciscans, Dominicans, Carthusians, and dignified Holy-Crucians, Canons regular and irregular, and all hairy brutes and snitches, higgledy-piggledy castrates and bitches, asses, buffaloes, oxen, fools, nitwits, and fops! What sort of manner is this, my dear? 4 soldiers and only 3 gear? — such a Paquet and no Portrait?—” (Nov. 13, 1777). To his stern and critical father in Salzburg he generally tries to

be factual, “straight and serious” (as he himself puts it). But even there he occasionally slips into a humorous pose by scrambling his language: “I sensible things cannot write today, because my track off am I. Hapa not must wrong it pake, this way simply am I today. Help myself I not can. well thee fare. I good a night wish. Well geslaaf. Sensible I write again time nextly.” (Nov. 26, 1777). Mozart wants to sound funny, of course, but when he fractures his language he often feels fractured himself and sounds more forlorn than comical, which was often the case in his relationship with his father.

**Towards the end of life**  
Towards the end of his life verbosity and grandstanding subsided, but verbal theater and


pering something into your ear — — — — now you into mine — — — — more — and more — — finally we are saying; it’s all because of Plumpi-Strumpi — and you can imagine anything you want — that’s just what makes it so much fun.” (June 6, 1791). Mozart creates and recreates language. At times he is serious, depressed, pained (his pleas to Michael Puchberg, a Viennese merchant, for monetary help belong to the most poignant letters ever written by an artist), he can be garrulous, coarse, and even deceptive, but most of all he wants to be funny and entertaining. No composer has written letters that are so consistently and intrinsically personal, dramatic, and playful. Playfulness in all its lightness and profundity is at the core of Mozart’s

being. Mozart’s contemporaries remarked about the playfulness of his performing style, we, today, can hear his playfulness in his letters. Nothing shows Mozart’s natural sense of playfulness better than a description of himself two months before his death. He writes to Constanze in Baden that on the spur of the moment, he decided to play a prank on Emanuel Schikaneder who sang the role of Papageno in *The Magic Flute* when it was first performed at the Theater auf der Wieden. “. . . when Papageno’s aria with the Glockenspiel came on,” Mozart writes, “at that moment I went backstage because today I had a kind of urge to play the Glockenspiel myself. — So I played this joke: just when Schikaneder came to a pause, I played an arpeggio — he was startled — looked into the scenery and saw me — the 2nd time he came to that spot, I didn’t play — and this time he stopped as well and

**Robert Spaethling**  
Cambridge, Massachusetts

**Summary.**  
Mozart’s letters seem to be in odd contrast to his music, they are often coarse in style and subject, while his music is lofty and exquisite. Are there two Mozarts? The author contends that both, music and letters, come from the same creative source: Mozart’s natural sense of drama and his effervescent spirit of playfulness.

*Robert Spaethling is Emeritus Professor of the University of Massachusetts, Boston. He is the author of Music and Mozart in the Life of Goethe (Camden House, 1987), Mozart’s Letters, Mozart’s Life (W.W. Norton, New York; Faber & Faber, London, 2000), and numerous articles on literature and music.*



TAFEL II: Mozart an seinen Vater, Mannheim, 8. November 1777. Letzte Seite des von der Mutter begonnenen Briefes vom gleichen Tag (vgl. Tafel I). Original im Archiv der Internationalen Stiftung Mozarteum, Salzburg, Signatur Meppz 22/280b (= Nr. 366, Seite 110/111, Zeile 75–100).

MOZART LETTER

playfulness remain: “Adieu — my love,” he writes to Constanze at Baden, “ — my one and only! — catch them in the air — 2999 and 1/2 little kisses are flying around, they are all from me and waiting to be snapped up. — Now I’m whis-

pering something into your ear — — — — now you into mine — — — — more — and more — — finally we are saying; it’s all because of Plumpi-Strumpi — and you can imagine anything you want — that’s just what makes it so much fun.” (June 6, 1791).

<sup>1</sup> *Mozart’s Letters, Mozart’s Life* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000; London: Faber and Faber, 2000).  
<sup>2</sup> *Mozart. Briefe und Aufzeichnungen. Gesamtausgabe* (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1962-1975).  
<sup>3</sup> “Bellow on Mozart,” *Bostonia*, Spring 1992, 43-47.  
<sup>4</sup> *The Letters of Mozart and his Family* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985), p. 833.

# XXIV Certamen Ciceronianum Arpinas

In Arpino, South Latium, the town where Cicero was born, the XXIVth Certamen Ciceronianum took place from 7-9 May (Thursday to Saturday). 448 students from 16 European countries -Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Low Countries, Luxemburg, Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland- attended. The Certamen, or competition, involved the translation of a passage from Cicero’s works, on this occasion from the ‘De Republica’, which the students had to render into their respective languages, adding to the translation

a philological and historical commentary. While the Board of Examiners, comprising teachers and translators from several universities, under the chairmanship of Pier Giorgio Parroni, of the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’, were busy marking the scripts, a number of cultural events took place. Among these was the Fifth International Ciceronian Symposium, and a soirée in which Frits L. van Holthoorn, of the University of Groningen, delivered a lecture on ‘Cicero beyond National Diversity’. The lecture was followed by a concert. There were also meetings with the Romanian poet Ioan Flora, with the



MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, CAPITOLINE MUSEUMS, ROME

Polish poet Urszula Koziol, with Dante Marianacci, Giuseppe Bonaviri and many other writers and artists. The participants were taken to

visit, among other things, the citadel of the ancient town, once the homeland of the Volscii, with walls dating back to the 5th century BC, and localities in the neighbouring areas, such as the abbey of Montecassino, founded by St Benedict in the fourth century AD, from which Western Monachism originated. Finally, on the morning of Sunday 10 May, the winners received their awards in a public ceremony in the square of Arpino, where a monument to Cicero has been erected. The highest mark was obtained by Barbara Schellhaas (‘N. Cusanus Gymnasium’, of Bergisch Gladbach, Germany), who re-

ceived an award of 1,100 euros. Runners-up among the non-Italian students included Carmelin Clop (S. Bejus, Romania), Cardula Bachiman (Koupins Kollegium, Berlin), Natalia Jureczko (I. L. Ogolucz, Cracov, Poland), Marien Lieselot (Heiling Hartinstitut- Heverlef, Belgium). The Certamen, which is under the patronage of the President of the Italian Republic and of the European Parliament, takes place every year in the second week of May. In 2005 it will celebrate its XXVth anniversary, and there are great expectations for the event.

V. M.

# Kant, le droit cosmopolitique et la société civile des nations

De l'*Idée d'une histoire universelle du point de vue cosmopolitique* (1784) au *Projet de paix perpétuelle* (1795), Kant s'est attaché à définir un droit cosmopolitique s'appliquant aux nations dans leurs relations respectives, mais aussi aux individus en tant que membres de la *grande famille humaine*. La réflexion de Kant s'insère dans le débat philosophique sur les relations entre les peuples, apparu au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle et qui connaît une phase nouvelle au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, en particulier depuis la paix d'Utrecht en 1713.<sup>1</sup> Voici les questions de ce débat: l'humanité est-elle naturellement vouée à la paix ou la nature de l'homme provoque-t-elle inéluctablement des guerres? Comment concevoir un droit entre les peuples qui puisse pacifier leurs rapports? Est-il possible de définir pratiquement la perspective d'une "société civile des nations", d'une société dans laquelle ce nouveau droit serait un lien éthique et jouerait le même rôle que le droit civil et politique dans les sociétés particulières?

## L'insociable sociabilité et la perspective cosmopolitique

Dès 1784 Kant considère les transformations subies par le genre humain comme des étapes du progrès de l'humanité vers une forme cosmopolitique réalisant les idéaux de la raison. La nature possède un but propre qu'elle réalise dans les actions des hommes, qui sont à la fois libres et déterminés par le sens de l'histoire, elle utilise l'antagonisme des hommes au sein de la société pour mener à bien le développement de ses dispositions. Kant désigne cet antagonisme par la formule de *l'insociable sociabilité* qui réalise la synthèse dialectique de l'opposition entre la *sociabilité naturelle* des jansénistes et la *guerre de tous contre tous* de Hobbes. Cette opposition dialectique est porteuse de progrès car cette "tension" est le moteur des actions humaines. Le dessein de la nature ne peut être réalisé que dans la société. C'est pourquoi le problème essentiel "que la nature contraint l'homme à résoudre, c'est la réalisation d'une société civile administrant le droit de façon universelle".<sup>2</sup> Or ce problème est lié à celui de "l'établissement de relations régulières entre les États, et ne peut pas être résolu indépendamment de ce dernier". La société civile des nations ne peut donc être construite sans un changement radical dans la constitution des sociétés particulières. Si l'idée de paix perpétuelle a été raillée à la suite du projet de l'abbé de Saint-Pierre, c'est parce qu'elle a été envisagée comme une construction immédiate, alors que pour Kant elle est une perspective. L'insociable sociabilité des hommes se retrouve à l'échelle des nations, mais, ruse suprême

de la nature, même les guerres poussent les hommes vers la paix! En effet, en développant leur puissance les États entretiennent des relations permanentes (diplomatie, commerce etc...), ce qui prouve selon Kant, le *dessein secret* de la nature. La paix perpétuelle, conséquence d'une constitution cosmopolitique accomplie, n'est donc pas une "rêverie de visionnaire", mais le mouvement objectif de l'humanité.

Construire cette société civile des nations demande de concevoir un droit nouveau. En effet, en passant de l'état de nature à l'état civil, les hommes acceptent de se soumettre à un droit commun, mais les États sont toujours entre eux dans l'état de nature, c'est-à-dire dans un état non-juridique où règne la force. Le XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle a connu un réveil d'un *droit des gens* — un droit s'appliquant aux relations entre les sociétés humaines et il existe bien un ensemble de traités, de conventions et de coutumes qui règlent les rapports entre les États. Ce corpus du droit des gens s'est construit par le jeu de l'accroissement des relations entre les États et concerne essentiellement la conduite dans la guerre, la forme des traités de paix, les relations commerciales ou les immunités diplomatiques.

Au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle, Grotius insiste sur l'aspect positif du droit des gens sans pour autant le détacher du droit naturel. Hobbes et Pufendorf identifient droit naturel et droit des gens, car les États sont dans l'état de nature du fait de l'inexistence d'un arbitre pour régler les différends entre eux. Locke propose une solution qui exercera une grande influence : le droit des gens est à la fois un droit positif et une perspective éthique à réaliser dans les rapports de peuple à peuple. Le droit des gens est donc une forme particulière du droit naturel, celui qui s'applique entre les sociétés civiles. Montesquieu ou Mably reprennent ce concept et rejettent l'idée grotienne d'un droit des gens essentiellement positif.

Kant, pour sa part, considère que les traités entre les souverains, ou que les règles adoptées entre les nations européennes en matière de droit de la guerre ou de droit de conquête, ne sont pas fondés sur les vrais principes et n'ont pas le caractère d'un véritable droit, mais en temps, il estime que ces règles humanitaires sont l'expression du dessein secret de la nature affleurant dans les textes diplomatiques à l'insu de leurs rédacteurs.

La double nature du droit des gens — droit positif entre les États et droit naturel des individus en tant que membres de l'humanité — pose donc un problème philosophique de

fond. En 1789, Bentham propose un nouveau concept: le *droit international*, conçu comme une *jurisprudence* entre les nations.<sup>3</sup>

Mais ce nouveau concept ne rend pas complètement le sens originel du terme droit des gens. La référence au droit naturel disparaît au profit d'une approche positive et Bentham néglige le concept de citoyenneté universelle. Si le *droit international* est la forme exclusive des relations entre les peuples, l'appartenance à la *grande famille humaine* disparaît en tant que



KANT  
(1724-1804)

catégorie juridique et les États sont les médiateurs exclusifs du droit entre les peuples.

Kant choisit une solution diamétralement opposée: le droit des gens existant doit être complété par la proclamation d'un droit cosmopolitique attaché à chaque individu.

## La société civile des nations et la paix perpétuelle

En 1793, Kant revient sur cette question dans *Sur l'adage: cela est peut-être juste en théorie mais ne vaut pas pour la pratique*. Le chapitre III interroge: la perspective d'une fraternité universelle pratique est-elle politique ou bien doit-elle rester le "rêve d'un homme de bien"? Cette question rejoint, selon nous, celle de Robespierre dans le débat constitutionnel de 1793: les hommes en société sont-ils isolés comme des "troupeaux de créatures humaines parqués sur un coin du globe" ou bien sont-ils une fraction de "l'immense famille"? Existe-t-il des "devoirs de fraternité qui unissent tous les hommes et toutes les nations"?<sup>4</sup> La réponse réside pour Kant dans l'existence de "dispositions qui autorisent à conclure que l'espèce progressera toujours vers le mieux". Cette progression peut être interrompue, non rompue. De même que l'état de guerre initial a poussé les hommes à constituer des sociétés civiles, les guerres continues entre ces sociétés doivent les conduire "même contre leur volonté, dans une constitu-

tion cosmopolitique" qui ait la forme "d'un état juridique de fédération selon un droit des gens dont il a été convenu en commun".<sup>5</sup>

Mais des obstacles se dressent sur cette voie. Le principal est l'exercice du droit de guerre et de paix. Kant se déclare clairement en faveur du contrôle de ce droit par le peuple (faisant écho à la discussion de mai 1790 à l'Assemblée constituante), c'est-à-dire pour une constitution *républicaine*, au sens propre du terme, dans laquelle la guerre et la paix étant une *chose commune* relèvent de la décision du pouvoir législatif.

Ainsi, face au problème de la *constitution conjointe de la polis et de la cosmopolis* (F. Gauthier), Kant répond — comme une partie des révolutionnaires français — par la perspective juridique du droit des gens et par la constitution de sociétés civiles *républicaines*. Le *Projet de paix perpétuelle* couronne cette réflexion et constitue une véritable synthèse du débat philosophique des Lumières sur les relations entre les peuples à la lumière de l'expérience révolutionnaire immédiate.<sup>6</sup> Le *Zum Ewigen Frieden* fait d'ailleurs figure de modèle pour la génération des disciples de Kant et

dans les années qui suivent sa parution, une intense production philosophique répond au maître de Königsberg.

Dans son projet de 1795, Kant prend soin de se démarquer des accusations d'utopisme. La paix perpétuelle est considérée comme une perspective pratique. Le texte se compose de six "articles préliminaires" contenant les conditions politiques de la réalisation de la paix perpétuelle, de "trois articles définitifs" et de deux "suppléments". La forme adoptée par Kant est une parodie des textes diplomatiques de son temps. L'inévitable article secret ne fait pas défaut, mais son contenu est volontairement ironique: il définit justement la transparence nécessaire aux relations entre les peuples!

Les six articles préliminaires constituent une critique en règle de la "politique" des États européens:

"1. Nul traité de paix ne peut être considéré comme tel, si l'on s'y réserve secrètement quelque sujet de recommencer la guerre. 2. Aucun État (petit ou grand, cela ne fait rien ici) ne peut être acquis par un autre, par voie d'héritage, d'échange, d'achat ou de donation. 3. Les armées permanentes doivent entièrement disparaître avec le temps. 4. On ne doit pas contracter de dettes nationales en vue des intérêts extérieurs de l'État. 5. Aucun État ne doit s'immiscer de force dans la constitution et le gouvernement d'un autre État. 6. Nul État ne doit se per-

mettre, dans une guerre avec un autre, des hostilités qui rendraient impossible, au retour à la paix, la confiance réciproque, comme par exemple, l'emploi d'assassins, d'empoisonneurs, la violation d'une capitulation, l'excitation à la trahison dans l'État auquel il fait la guerre, etc."<sup>7</sup>

Le premier article condamne les pratiques "machiavéliques" de la diplomatie d'Ancien Régime, le second la "politique privée" des rois et la guerre de conquête, le troisième fait clairement référence au danger de l'armée permanente, le quatrième est une condamnation du système politico-financier de l'Angleterre, le cinquième reprend l'article 119 de la constitution de 1793, et enfin, le sixième renvoie au droit de la guerre, mais constitue une critique à peine voilée de la conduite de la guerre par la Première coalition.

## Un État n'est pas un patrimoine mais une société d'hommes

Kant précise sa critique de la conquête dans le second article préliminaire. Un État n'est ni un avoir ni une chose mercantile, mais une société d'hommes ayant une personnalité juridique du fait du contrat social primitif. Ce contrat délégitime tout passage au pouvoir d'un autre État, quelle qu'en soit la forme.

Kant distingue *l'État comme personne morale* qui a des racines propres et inaliénables, du *droit de gouverner* qui peut être modifié sans pour autant perdre ses racines. Cette distinction délégitime la prétention d'un gouvernement à la souveraineté, qui demeure un bien commun enraciné dans le terrain vivant d'une société d'hommes. La souveraineté-racine d'une société ouvre ici sur la légitimation de la résistance à l'oppression dans tous les cas où le droit de gouverner cherche à s'approprier la souveraineté.

Dans la *Métaphysique des mœurs* (VI 347), Kant précise le cas de conquête-colonisation comme usurpation de la souveraineté-racine du peuple irlandais. Il énonce l'interdit de la guerre offensive sous les formes de guerre punitive, d'extermination ou d'asservissement. Développant la question du droit qui fait suite à la guerre, Kant condamne explicitement la conquête coloniale en comparant l'exemple passé d'Athènes à celui, actuel, de l'Angleterre en Irlande.

D. Losurdo a attiré l'attention sur la critique kantienne de la question irlandaise. Malgré les concessions de l'Angleterre à l'Irlande en 1782, puis en 1793, *l'État-mère* maintenait *l'État-fille*, selon les termes de Kant, dans "le plus grand despotisme concevable".

La critique de cette forme de conquête donne lieu à un développement concernant les colonies esclavagistes européennes.

De même que la guerre d'asservissement est illégitime, un contrat de soumission ne peut engager quiconque à la perte de ses droits. Si l'homme est une fin en soi, il ne peut servir d'instrument à un autre. Kant compare un contrat dont les clauses de services sont indéterminées à l'esclavage des Africains dans les plantations d'Amérique et réaffirme, avec l'article premier de la Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen de 1789, qu'il est impossible, c'est-à-dire contraire au droit, de naître dans l'asservissement sous prétexte d'hérédité.

Chacun des trois "articles définitifs" correspond à l'un des "niveaux" juridiques nécessaires à la construction de la paix perpétuelle: *droit civil*, *droit des gens* et *droit cosmopolitique*. Leur réalisation est une perspective politique: Kant assigne aux hommes le devoir éthique de réaliser la paix conformément à la raison pure. L'état de paix n'est pas la cessation des hostilités, c'est un état juridique qui doit être *construit*. Pour cela, "la constitution civile de chaque État doit être républicaine" (premier article définitif), et "il faut que le droit des gens soit fondé sur une fédération d'États libres" (deuxième article définitif). Kant rejette expressément l'idée d'un super-État, tel que celui d'Anarchas Cloots (1755-1794). La perspective de la paix


perpétuelle doit se construire sur une fédération de peuples républicains. Un droit des gens entendu dans le sens de droit de guerre, comme chez Grotius ou Pufendorf, ne peut jouer le rôle que lui assigne Kant dans la construction de la paix perpétuelle: en effet, il ne saurait y avoir de droit de la guerre, celle-ci étant contraire à la loi morale. Le droit cosmopolitique, qui complète les deux premiers niveaux, "doit se borner aux conditions d'une hospitalité universelle" (troisième article définitif). Il "considère les hommes et les États, dans leurs relations extérieures et dans leur influence réciproque comme citoyens d'un État universel de l'humanité"<sup>8</sup>: il concerne les hommes en tant que citoyens du monde. Kant insiste sur le fait qu'il ne s'agit pas de philanthropie, mais du droit que possède chaque homme de ne pas être traité en ennemi dans un pays qui n'est pas le sien. Le droit cosmopolitique n'est donc pas de nature "philosophique" comme le lui reprochera G. F. de Martens dans un texte polémique, mais bien de nature juridique.<sup>9</sup>

Ce droit d'hospitalité donne lieu à une critique de la politique des puissances européennes. Ce droit est, en effet, très précisément limité à un droit de visite justifié par deux principes: "le droit qu'à l'étranger, à son arrivée dans le territoire d'autrui, de ne pas y être traité en ennemi", tant qu'il n'offense personne, et "le droit qu'à tout homme de se proposer comme membre de la société, en vertu du droit de commune possession de la surface de la terre sur laquelle, en tant que sphérique, ils ne peuvent se disperser à l'infini; il faut donc qu'ils se

supportent les uns à côté des autres, personne n'ayant originairement le droit de se trouver à un endroit de la terre plutôt qu'à un autre"<sup>10</sup>.

Ce droit de tout homme à la commune possession de la surface de la terre ne saurait être confondu avec une appropriation du sol. Tout d'abord, le droit de visite n'est pas un droit d'accueil, mais une simple demande de visite qui peut être refusée. Les causes de refus envisagées sont liées au droit de se défendre contre des voleurs de biens ou de personnes réduites ensuite en esclavage.

Kant considère qu'une inhospitalité défensive est légitime face à l'agressivité spécifique des "nations commerçantes de l'Europe", qui violent le droit de visite, pensent en conquérants au mépris des pays et des peuples et commettent des crimes menaçant la paix dans le monde.



LE BONNET DE LA LIBERTÉ ENTRE LES DEUX RIVES DE L'ATLANTIQUE, ANONYME, 1794, MUSÉE DE VIZILLE

Dans la *Métaphysique des mœurs* (VI, 353), Kant récuse l'argument spécieux des conquérants qui invoquent la vacuité de territoires pour se les approprier, dans le cas de peuples chasseurs ou pasteurs, ou les justifications d'une conquête sous prétexte d'infériorité culturelle comme le firent les chrétiens en Allemagne, les Russes en Sibérie ou les Européens en Amérique. Ces menaces expliquent que la Chine et le Japon contrôlent étroitement l'entrée des Européens sur leur territoire. La nature du commerce européen ne contribue pas au développement de relations amicales entre les peuples, mais au contraire invite ces derniers à l'éviter pour se protéger.

Kant espérait même que le moment de la disparition de ce commerce conquérant des Européens ne survivrait pas à la crise qu'il traversait alors et brosse un tableau très négatif de sa nature et de ses conséquences, non seulement dans le monde mais en Europe même. En effet, la crise de l'empire colonial en Amérique ouverte par l'indépendance des États-Unis avait entraîné des pertes importantes pour le commerce et les Compagnies des Indes. L'esclavage dans les plantations américaines est considéré par Kant comme une des formes les plus cruelles qui aient existé.

#### L'appartenance au genre humain fonde le droit cosmopolitique

On comprend alors que le droit d'hospitalité soit conçu comme un simple droit de visite dans le but de protéger les peuples des dangers que représentent les conquêtes coloniales et plus particulièrement le commerce

de domination des nations européennes.

Sur ce point, il est intéressant de comparer le projet de constitution présenté par Saint-Just, le 24 avril 1793 à la Convention, en complément du projet de déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen de Robespierre,<sup>11</sup> qui proposaient ensemble une cosmopolitique de la liberté des peuples en vue de la paix en renonçant à toute guerre offensive. Limitons-nous ici à préciser le droit d'hospitalité défini par Saint-Just.

Le chapitre IX consacré aux relations extérieures définit un droit d'asile sélectif puisque la République française l'offre aux "bannis de leur patrie pour la cause de la liberté", mais le refuse "aux homicides et aux tyrans". Ce droit d'asile accompagne une diplomatie fondée sur les négociations avec les pays neutres et une réglementation de la guerre de course.

Saint-Just ajoute un droit de visite des étrangers, dont la République s'engage à respecter les usages, et propose la réciprocité aux pays accueillant des Français: dans les deux sens, l'étranger établi pourra acquérir et hériter, mais ne pourra aliéner ses biens. Saint-Just contribuait à définir un droit d'hospitalité sans le confondre avec une hostilité dissimulée par des pratiques commerciales dont on connaissait bien, à l'époque, les effets destructeurs de la liberté des peuples.

Cette comparaison avec le projet de Saint-Just permet d'avancer dans la compréhension du droit cosmopolitique défini par Kant et restreint aux conditions de l'hospitalité universelle. Les trois niveaux juridiques définis plus haut — droit civil, droit des gens, droit cosmopolitique — sont *essentiellement* nécessaires pour que la paix perpétuelle puisse se matérialiser. Le premier acte de la construction de la paix perpétuelle passe par la constitution d'un noyau d'États républicains ayant renoncé à la guerre de conquête et à la politique de puissance. À ceux qui opposent morale et politique, et qui voudraient limiter leurs devoirs d'humanité à une "simple bienveillance" sans contenu juridique, Kant répond que celle-ci ne peut fonder le droit.

Ainsi, avec le nouveau concept de *droit cosmopolitique* complétant le droit civil et le droit des gens, Kant fournit une réponse théorique achevée à l'interrogation iréniste de l'époque moderne.

**Marc Belissa**  
Université Paris X

**Florence Gauthier**  
Université Paris VII

*Marc Belissa est maître de conférences en histoire moderne à l'Université de Paris X Nanterre. Il a publié notamment Fraternité Universelle et Intérêt National, 1713-1795. Les cosmopolitiques du droit des gens, aux Éditions Kimé, en 1998 et a édité les Principes des Négociations de Gabriel Bonnot de Mably chez le même éditeur en 2001.*

**Florence Gauthier, Maître de conférences et HDR en Histoire moderne à l'université Paris VII-Denis Diderot, a publié :**

*Co-éd. La guerre du blé au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, Ed. de la Passion, 1988);*

*Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en révolution, 1789-1795-1802 (Paris, PUF, 1992);*

*Éd. Périssent les colonies plutôt qu'un principe! Contributions à l'histoire de l'abolition de l'esclavage, 1789-1804 (Paris, 2002).*

#### Summary

Kant's proposal for a cosmopolitical law tries to resolve the question of how to construct the rights of men and of nations simultaneously. Three levels of law are necessary — public law, the law of nations, cosmopolitan law — to construct peace as a juridical state. Kant criticizes the system of political domination over peoples: standing armies, secret diplomacy, etc., and proposes a new right of hospitality belonging to each human being.

Kant, born 1724, died at Königsberg on 12 February 1804.

<sup>1</sup> M. Belissa, *Fraternité universelle et intérêt national. Les cosmopolitiques du droit des gens, 1713-1795* (Paris, 1998).

<sup>2</sup> *Idée d'une histoire universelle du point de vue cosmopolitique*, VIII, 22.

<sup>3</sup> *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789) cité par P. Guggenheim, *Contribution à l'histoire des sources du droit des gens* (Leyde, 1959), p. 5. L'usage courant du néologisme de Bentham date du XIXe siècle.

<sup>4</sup> Robespierre, *Œuvres*, t. 9, 24 avril, Paris, p. 459. Voir F. Gauthier, *Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution* (Paris, 1992), p. 138.

<sup>5</sup> Kant, *Sur l'adage*, op. cit., VIII, 311.

<sup>6</sup> Voir D. Losurdo, *Autocensure et compromis dans la pensée politique de Kant* (Lille, 1993).

<sup>7</sup> Kant, *Projet de paix perpétuelle*, VIII, 344-346.

<sup>8</sup> *Doctrine du droit*, VIII, 349.

<sup>9</sup> G. F. de Martens, *Précis du droit des gens moderne de l'Europe* (Paris, 1864).

<sup>10</sup> Kant, *Projet de paix perpétuelle*, VIII, 358.

<sup>11</sup> Saint-Just, *Théorie politique*.

## DESMOND FENNELL The Revision of European History

Athol Books  
PO Box 339 - BELFAST BT 12 4GQ  
ISBN 0 85034 1043

In this conversational book Desmond Fennell provides three things in one:

- a critique of the standard History of Europe as found in textbooks and works of reference, on the grounds that it is distorted by 'imprecise designation' and 'victor's history' and does not make sense for Europeans in the twenty-first century;
- a manual which enables readers of the 'standard history', wherever encountered, to note the main distortions and make appropriate mental corrections;
- an outlined 'new history of Europe' which would be 'true and clear' and make sense for Europeans living in the twenty-first century.

## Correspondence of Adam Ferguson

Edited by Vincenzo Merolle with an introduction  
by Jane B. Fagg

This edition of Adam Ferguson's correspondence contains over 400 letters, most of which have never before been published. The correspondence includes letters between Ferguson and Adam Smith, David Hume and Alexander Carlyle and many other central figures of the Scottish Enlightenment.

1 85196 140 2: 2 Volume Set: £135/\$195  
608pp: 234x156mm: 1995

## Adam Ferguson, Essays

Edited by Vincenzo Merolle

Introductory essay by Robin Dix, Eugene Heath,  
Vincenzo Merolle

The edition of the essays, which Ferguson wrote in his advancing years. They not only give an exhaustive picture of the thinking of their author, who expounded ideas which built on, and extended, the originality of his earlier work; they also substantially add to our knowledge of the eighteenth century, the underlying motives of which they summarise and reappraise.

Forthcoming

Pickering & Chatto Publishers

21 Bloomsbury way, LONDON WC1A 2TH, UK  
2252 Ridge Road, Brookfield, VT 05036-9704, USA

[www.pickeringchatto.com/Ferguson](http://www.pickeringchatto.com/Ferguson)

# Charles Bonnet

## and the Enlightenment in Scandinavia

### Bonnet and Scandinavia

The Swiss naturalist and philosopher Charles Bonnet (1720-1793) might not be on everybody's lips to day. Nevertheless, like Voltaire, who received admirers at his estate Ferney on the French border with Switzerland, Bonnet did the same at his house in Genthod on the Swiss side. Voltaire was known to the world as *philosophe*, author, and friend of kings and princes.

Bonnet was a severe critic of the French philosophes, a well-known naturalist and savant. To posterity he is most often remembered for the discovery of the parthenogenesis, i. e. reproduction without fertilisation, primarily of plant lice and polyps.

His reproduction theory has been described as incapsulation, a "box within box method".

Bonnet put forward the idea of progressive development in nature, which is an idea about evolution in nature, and he drew up a ladder of natural things from the simple to the complicated. In the natural world it started with the minerals and went on to the herbs and further on to animals crowned by the mammals. Man stood above all.

Bonnet's observations made in his early years impressed a circle of European naturalists. Réaumur was one of them and with him Abraham Trembley, Lyonnet and the Swedish entomologist Charles de Geer.

At the age of fifty Bonnet was struck by partial blindness, which led him to turn to philosophy in place of his scientific studies. Like John Locke he was a sensualist, or empiricist.

Bonnet was also religious and conservative. His increasing dislike for what he saw as irreligious in the writings of the Enlightenment philosophers Voltaire, Rousseau and, worst of all, the materialists, came to occupy his mind more and more during the last decades of his life.

### Bonnet's Scandinavian correspondence

Like Voltaire, he was a great correspondent. At the 'Bibliothèque populaire et universitaire de Genève' ninety-four volumes containing letters to and from him bear witness of an imposing correspondence. Unexpectedly many of these letters were exchanged between Bonnet and Scandinavian correspondents.

The first Scandinavian who called for Bonnet's attention was a Swede, Charles De Geer (1720-1778). In a letter of August 1752 De Geer initiates a correspondence that would last until 1775. De Geer's correspondence with Bonnet is a good example of how networks were created in the eighteenth century.

First came the procedure of in-

troductory, a humble wish from De Geer to correspond with Bonnet. De Geer also gives a signal: He writes: "I have told Réaumur that I want to get in touch with you". Réaumur had already written to Bonnet: "He [De Geer] is a special person in Sweden. At the age of 25-26 he disposes a rent of 50 000 ecus and he has a passion for the insects."

De Geer was indeed a very rich person, owner of blast furnaces and forges which made him a leading producer of bar iron in Europe in the middle of the eighteenth century. He came from a Huguenot family and he had his roots in Holland where he was brought up.

One of his personal tutors was the Dutch physicist and naturalist Pieter van Musschenbroek with whom he corresponded. De Geer like Bonnet was deeply impressed by Reaumur's entomological studies. After having studied his *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire des insectes* in his youth he decided to dedicate a part of his life to the study of the insects. Between 1752 and 1778 he published his own work on the insects which had the same title as Réaumur's.

So when De Geer and Bonnet finally took up correspondence in 1752 it was clear that they had much in common.

It was also their interest for entomology which came to dominate the first years of their correspondence. In his first letter De Geer says he has sent the first part of his *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire des insectes*. The letter and volume were forwarded to Bonnet through Réaumur and Abraham Trembley, Bonnet's close friend. Trembley's impression of De Geer's book, which he sent to Bonnet, was far from flattering. "The book might contain curious facts and I doubt it will interest people with all its details." Nevertheless Bonnet's answer, written in February 1753, was full of enthusiasm and he said he had been aware of De Geer's sagacity through their common master.

The tone of the correspondence is very friendly and polite and at the same time it had from the beginning an intimacy which made it even more problematic to put forward critical aspects.

In 1754 De Geer invited Bonnet to become official corresponding member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. In the year after The Academy subsequently published a letter from Bonnet to De Geer. Soon after he also started to correspond with the secretary of the academy, the astronomer Pehr Wilhelm Wargentin (1717-1783). In 1757 Bonnet sent an article directly to Wargentin, where he proposed a new sys-

tem for the insects based on their metamorphosis, "Essai d'une division générale des insectes". De Geer translated the article into Swedish to be published in the proceedings, but he disliked the contents. It was never published.

By far the best known member of the Academy in Stockholm was Carl Linnaeus, who also was one of the founding fathers of the Academy. Bonnet never wrote any letter to him. De Geer had informed him about Linnaeus's unwillingness to correspond in any other language



CHARLES BONNET

than Latin and Swedish, a fact which probably made Bonnet hesitate. Bonnet, however, confessed his great admiration for the Linnaeus. Linnaeus's system was never favoured in *l'Encyclopédie* while Joseph Pitton de Tournefort's outdated method was lavishly presented. This made De Geer react negatively. Bonnet never objected to what De Geer said in his letters but he gradually started to have doubts about Linnaeus. He was just a "nomenclateur", Bonnet wrote, which made De Geer defend Linnaeus even more.

But not only the natural history was discussed in the letters. Bonnet's metaphysical works *l'Essai analytique sur les facultés de l'âme* and *Palingénésie*, like the rest of Bonnet's works, were sent to De Geer. In spite of Bonnet's expectations for a favourable reaction, these works never appealed to De Geer, who blamed himself for not having patience enough to read them, or simply that he found them too abstract.

### Bonnet warns against dangerous thoughts

In 1758 De Geer asked Bonnet to help him to buy the works of Voltaire published in Geneva by Cramer in 1757. De Geer had already tried to make the Dutch bookseller Luchtmans deliver a copy, which they refused to do, because the books were forbidden in Holland. In his answer of January 1759 Bonnet says he

hopes to be of help and that he will send the books by sea (via Marcella), but he warns De Geer at the same time for Voltaire's shrewdness. The work, he says, is elegantly written, but look up, "Les serpents y dorment sous les fleurs. La Religion est attaquée directement ou indirectement en cents endroits".

In the next letter of August 1759 De Geer says he is aware of the risk and thinks it sad that the great thinkers of the century tend to rely on profane authors instead of on the Bible. But it is interesting to note his comment on reading Voltaire. "His work is written with charm and I have to admit that I have read it with much pleasure."

In August 1762, soon after the publication of Rousseau's *Du Contrat Social* and of *Émile*, Bonnet fiercely attacks the author who, he says, undermines Religion and is a menace which threatens to destroy all forms of government. Again, in his answer, De Geer goes as far as to admit even that the century is totally corrupt and there is far too little faith on earth. He says he had read *Émile* and dislikes the way the Christian religion has been treated, but also that he found many good things in the book. And he adds that

Rousseau was a talented author, full of *esprit*.

The correspondence between the two became less frequent during De Geer's last years. Although he many times expressed a wish to visit Bonnet in Geneva or at Genthod he never did. His second youngest son Emanuel saw Bonnet at Genthod in 1772 during his Grand Tour. The fact that he came to Genthod instead of to Ferney and that he saw Albrecht von Haller instead of Voltaire surely reassured Bonnet.

I have taken De Geer as an example of correspondence which lasted for a long time and which also refers to Bonnet's development as a scientist and philosopher.

De Geer died in 1778 in the same year as Rousseau and Voltaire, who both had been read and discussed by himself and Bonnet.

In 1782 Bonnet took up correspondence with another Swede, count Nils Adam Bielke (1724-1792). Bielke was a courtier. He served as Maréchal de la Cour and as one of the preceptors of the dauphin, the future Gustav III. He also embodied much of the utilitarian spirit, which inspired the members of the Swedish Academy of Sciences. He was engaged in agriculture, in road constructions, and he wrote articles on statistics. His deep engagement in mineralogy and the exploitation of porphyry in Dalecarlia made

him president of the Swedish Royal Collegium for the Mines and for Mineralogy.

The contact between Bonnet and Bielke was mediated through the Genevan woman Jeanne Elisabet Tremblay. Her husband Frans Jennings and her brother in law John Jennings were influential Swedish merchants and industrialists of Irish origin.

It is evident that Bonnet now saw an opportunity to get in touch with the Swedish King Gustaf III. In 1782 he had tried to make Wargentin act as a messenger for this purpose. His collected works were sent to the king.

The *Contemplation de la Nature* was given to the Swedish ambassador in Paris Johan Philip Creutz to be forwarded with a respectful dedication. Bielke could at least inform Bonnet that the king intended to write to Bonnet, but as far as we know no letter was sent. It is obvious that Bonnet like Voltaire, Raynal and MarmonTEL wanted to make the nephew of Frederic the Great read his works, which probably had not happened.

Bonnet in another letter also deplores the fact that the king on his way back from Italy in 1784 never stopped at Genthod. Bielke seems to have been much more open to Bonnet's metaphysical side than De Geer ever had been. His enthusiasm to read *Palingénésie* is immense. He even wants to have a bust of the philosopher and asked Bonnet for permission to let the Swedish sculptor Johann Tobias Sergel use the engraved portrait of Bonnet as a model. Bonnet replied that it was not necessary, as a Swiss artist had recently made a bust. A copy of it was sent to Bielke. Unfortunately, it was badly damaged when it arrived to Stockholm, but not so bad that it could not be mended by Sergel.

Bielke wanted to show his gratitude and to demonstrate the assets of Swedish minerals and sent him a little "ecritoire" in the form of two altars, one for Virtue, the other for Truth, and in between a little bust of Socrates on a piece of porphyry from Dalecarlia.

Also in the criticism of the French *philosophes* Bonnet found an outspoken sympathiser. Bielke even says he does not dare to read Voltaire from sheer fear of being seduced and tempted by unfaithfulness.

D'Holbach's *Système de la Nature* makes Bonnet explode of rage: "fanatisme impiété blasphemies. Code de la Deraison". In Bielke's letters a proudness of the state of Swedish science and art can be noticed. The country in the North was not a quiet recipient of ideas and impulses coming from the south. Apart from Linnaeus, de Geer, the father of obstetrics Nils von Rosenstein is mentioned along-

side with the chemists Karl Wilhelm Schéele and Torbern Bergman. In the arts he regards Johan Tobias Sergel as Europe's best sculptor.

De Geer, Bielke and Wargentin were all scientists and proponents of science. De Geer kept himself informed of the intellectual field as a whole. He read much of the contemporary literature including the French philosophes, but he never accepted atheism or political radicalism in any form. Bielke shared his views.

It has been questioned if there ever was an Enlightenment movement in Sweden. Bonnet's Swedish correspondents were never near forming such a movement, a fact that indicates that there was a general consensus between Charles Bonnet and his Swedish friends, about the need to combat atheism and republicanism.

#### Bonnet and Denmark

Compared to Bonnet's correspondence with Swedes, the one he had with Danes is much more varied.

It was through the French reformed church in Copenhagen and the Swiss living in Denmark that Charles Bonnet could create his Danish network.

The intellectual contacts between Geneva and Copenhagen were close. Paul Henri Mallet (1730-1807) succeeded Laurent Angliviel de la Beaumelle as professor in belles-lettres. Mallet was a protégé of the Danish Statesman count Johan Hartvig Ernst Bernstorff who had corresponded with Bonnet since the end of the 1750's. Their correspondence among many other topics came to deal with the education of the future Christian VII. Bonnet warned Bernstorff for the Encyclopédie, "cet abominable Dictionnaire philosophique... qui n'est qu'un ramas d'impies, de sophismes...". As in the case of the Swedish king Gustaf III it is evident that Bonnet wished to mould the character of the crown prince of Denmark. Nothing could have been less fruitful as the young man from his early years suffered from mental illness. The fact that he later came under the influence of his own physician Johann Friedrich Struense, who for sixteen months in 1771 and 1772 acted as a true enlightened despot, must have filled Bonnet with distrust.


In 1768 Christian VII, guided by Struense, made an educational tour in Europe. In Paris the young king met among others d'Alembert, Condillac, Diderot and Helvétius, those

whom Bonnet loathed as much as Rousseau and Voltaire.

Bonnet also corresponded with the preceptor of the prince, the Swiss Élie-Solomon Réverdil. Their correspondence mostly dealt with Bonnet's wish to spread his own works in Denmark. Bonnet even sent his congratulations for Reverdil's *Lettres sur le Danemarck*.

Bonnet's wish to get in correspondence with the king Frederik V, the father of Christian VII, was however this time crowned with success. The sovereign was hailed by Bonnet as a "zéle éclairé".

The Swiss publisher and bookseller Claude Philibert from Geneva who had settled down in Copenhagen in the 1750 was



useful to Bonnet. Philibert edited and imported French literature for the Scandinavian market. He had close contacts with the main supplier of underground literature in eighteenth century Europe, Société typographique de Neuchâtel, which distributed the kind of books Bonnet disliked. This did not prevent him from using the Swiss-Danish publisher to serve his own purposes. Their correspondence came to deal with the publication of Bonnet's works. Their discussion about how to publish *Faculté des âmes* is interesting. Philibert was afraid it would be blasphemous as it defied the Augsburg Confession and recommended an anonymous edition, which Bonnet fervently opposed. Bonnet also disliked Philibert's wish to send the work to the censor: he complained that it had not yet been reviewed in *Bibliothèque des sciences*.

By far the most appealing correspondence Bonnet had during his last years, was the one with Frederike Luise Stolberg (1746-1824), born Rentlov. She married the poet Count Christian Stolberg who, together with his better known brother Friedrich Leopold, belonged to German-Danish French orien-

tated intellectual circles in Denmark. Frederike Luise Stolberg, who had near contacts with Jens Baggesen, Herder and Klopstock, made her home a meeting place for artists, poets and authors.

Frederike Luise Stolberg was a woman with an open mind, who sent the old Bonnet at Genthod her questions and reflections of all sort. She called him her father and he treated her like his own daughter, whom he would guide into science, philosophy and literature. Was De Geer recommendable reading as an introduction to entomology, she asked?

Charles Bonnet answered no. De Geer was too fixed to the petty details and suggested Réaumur's *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire des insectes* instead

What about Immanuel Kant? Bonnet had his doubts.

What did Bonnet think about the French revolution?

He warned her not to sympathise. Here he saw the consequences of the reading of the French philosophes whose works he repeatedly had warned his young and innocent friend against. Democracy, according to him, only leads to disaster. He suggested reading of Montesquieu's *de l'Esprit des lois*.

Bonnet's doubts about letting her read his own metaphysical writings only led to her intensive study of his *Palingénésie*. Her enthusiasm was immense. She saw Bonnet as the "evangelist of nature" who had been sent by God to teach true morals, harmony and absolute bliss. In Frederike Luise Stolberg Bonnet at last found his best and most enthusiastic reader.

Genthod was also for a time a centre for a group of Danish artists. Bonnet reported in 1779 to the Academy of Art in Copenhagen that these young artists were in sympathy with him. They let his spirit guide them to recreate Nature as it truly is. The best known among them was Jens Juel, who portrayed Bonnet in 1777.

Bonnet was also visited by the Danish poet Jens Baggesen who, like Luise Stolberg, called him father.

Had Bonnet any influence on the Scandinavian science and philosophy?

Evidently he inspired Frederike Luise Stolberg, Baggesen, Juel and the other artists who came to see him.

In Sweden his scientific production was studied carefully and cited primarily by De Geer.

None of his Swedish correspondents was however particularly interested in Bonnet's philosophy although they shared his physico-theologian views.

What fascinated Charles Bonnet's Scandinavian correspondents was the correspondence itself. The opportunity of a dialogue with a well-known scientist and savant appealed to and flattered them. De Geer and Bielke, for instance, found in Bonnet an arguer who shared their scepticism towards unfaithfulness and radicalism. On the other hand, like Bonnet, they showed their curiosity for the current debate, for the new literature, philosophy and science.

**Tomas Anfält**  
Uppsala

*The author is Librarian at Uppsala University Library. He is the Editor of the Correspondence of Carl von Linné.*

#### Summary

Bonnet and Scandinavia  
The eighteenth-century Swiss naturalist and philosopher Charles Bonnet is well known for his correspondence. Among his correspondents were many Scandinavians.

One of them was the Swedish ironmaster Charles De Geer, who was also an accomplished entomologist. It was through their mutual friend and correspondent René-Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur that Bonnet and De Geer got in touch with each other. In their letters they discuss scientific matters and their views on the philosophy and literature of the French Enlightenment. De Geer puts forward his own findings in entomology, Bonnet sends him his anti-materialistic Christian views on science and philosophy. They do not always agree with each other. The French *philosophes*, mainly Voltaire and Rousseau, engage them both. Bonnet warns De Geer about "hidden snakes". De Geer agrees with Bonnet's condemnation of Voltaire and Rousseau, but finds them fascinating to read.

Nils Adam Bielke, courtier and head of the Collegium of Mines, was another Swedish correspondent of Bonnet. Bielke felt no hesitation in his critical views about the French philosophes. Bonnet saw Bielke's position at the Swedish Royal Court as an opportunity to influence King Gustaf III and even wanted him to visit his estate, Genthod, outside Geneva. Bonnet had no success in this respect. He also tried to get in touch with the Danish Royal

house. Through Count J. H. B. Bernstorff he made attempts to influence the education of the future Christian VII, who however suffered from mental illness. Christian VII under the influence of his physician J. F. Struense came to accept the French philosophes more than any other ruler in eighteenth-century Scandinavia. Bonnet corresponded about the distribution of his own works with the Genevan bookseller Claude Philibert, who had promoted him in Copenhagen. By far the most appealing correspondence Bonnet had with Scandinavians was with the young Countess Frederike Luise Stolberg. It is an open discussion between a fatherly old man and a young woman with open mind about contemporary literature and philosophy.

Bonnet had no significant influence on Scandinavian science and literature. His Nordic correspondence however reveals the mentality, ideas and attitudes of his correspondents.

**2000.**

*The European Journal*  
*La Revue Européenne*

*Editor/Directeur:*  
VINCENZO MEROLLE  
Università di Roma  
"La Sapienza"

*Deputy-Editor/Stellvertreter*  
*Direktor:* NORBERT WASZEK  
Université de Rouen

*Board of Editors/Expertenbeirat:*  
VINCENT HOPE (Edinburgh)  
HORST DRESCHER (Mainz)  
PAUL GABRIEL BOUCÉ (Paris III)

*Editorial Associates/ Secrétariat*  
*de Rédaction:* ROBIN DIX  
(Durham), ELIZABETH  
DUROT (Paris III), PEDRO  
JAVIER PARDO (Salamanca)  
HARALD HEPPNER (Graz)

*Consulting Editors/Comité de*  
*Lecture:*

FRANCIS CELORIA (Keele)  
ANNIE COINTRE (Metz)  
DESMOND FENNELL  
(Dublin-Rome)  
FRITS L. VAN HOLTHOON  
(Groningen)  
P. STURE URELAND  
(Mannheim)

<http://www.Europeanjournal.info>  
*Web-Editor:* Kerstin Jorna  
(Perth)

*Direttore Responsabile:*  
RICCARDO CAMPA  
Università di Siena

*Publisher/Verleger:*  
Milton School of Languages  
s.r.l.; *Publisher & Editorial*  
*Offices/ Rédaction:* Viale  
Grande Muraglia 301, 00144  
ROMA;  
E-mail 065291553@iol.it;  
tel/fax 06/5291553

Reg. Tribunale di Roma  
n. 252 del 2/6/2000

*The journal appears twice a year, in June and December. The publisher is the 'Milton School of Languages' srl, Viale Grande Muraglia 301, 00144 ROMA. Cost of each issue € 10, \$ 10, £ 7 The subscription (individuals 25, \$25, £15; institutions and supporting 50, \$50, £35), can be sent to the 'Milton School of Languages', from any post office, in Italy, to our 'conto corrente postale' no. 40792566, with a 'bollettino postale'. From outside Italy it is possible to make direct transfer of money to our postal account IBAN: IT-72-X-07601-03200-000040792566, or, if you prefer, to our bank account, c/o Banco S. Paolo, Viale Grande Muraglia 302, IBAN IT60 Q010 2503 2211 0000 0000 411 (BIC IBS PITTM). We do not have the capacity to accept credit card payments. Please, take out a subscription to the journal. Help us find a subscriber.*

\*\*\* \*\*

*To contributors: essays should not exceed 3000 words, reviews should not exceed 700 words. They can be sent via e-mail, or in hard copy, with diskette in Word for Windows, in one of the more recent versions, to the editor, in Viale Grande Muraglia 301, 00144 ROMA, E-mail 065291553@iol.it.*

Stampato nel mese di maggio 2004  
dalla tipografia Città Nuova  
della P.A.M.O.M.  
Via S. Romano in Garfagnana, 23  
00148 Roma - tel. 066530467  
e-mail: segr.tipografia@cittanuova.it