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Dear Colleagues,
DIY, do it yourself, is the sound maxim to be followed when you believe in something. And we do believe in our young journal. We have now a different arrangement, another printer, and a postal account of our own which makes easier, and less expensive, sending us the subscription fees, as compared with the very expensive bank account method. This also makes possible to be directly in touch with our subscribers, and renders us optimistic about the future. At present, we are not in a condi-

tion to print more pages or more issues, as some suggest. Until now we have received no help of any kind, apart from a small grant from the Ministry of Heritage, which recognized the journal as of 'particular cultural value'. This grant covered one third of the strict costs for the first two years. But we are determined to preserve our independence, and we are sure that we will succeed with the support of all of you, which we know will not fail us.

Chers collègues,
" Tout faire soi-même " est une

saine maxime à suivre quand vous croyez à quelque chose. Et nous croyons bel et bien à notre périodique tout jeune. Maintenant nous avons une organisation nouvelle, un autre imprimeur, notre propre compte postal, ce qui rend plus facile et moins coûteux l'envoi des abonnements, en comparaison du compte bancaire très onéreux. Cela rend possible aussi le contact direct avec nos abonnés et nous incite à l'optimisme pour l'avenir. A présent, la situation ne nous permet pas de publier davantage de

pages ou de numéros, ce que suggèrent certains. Jusqu'ici, nous n'avons reçu aucune aide d'aucune sorte hormis une petite subvention de notre Ministère de la Culture qui reconnaît à notre périodique une 'particulière valeur culturelle'. Cette subvention a couvert un tiers des coûts précis des deux premières années. Mais nous sommes bien déterminés à préserver notre indépendance, et nous sommes sûrs de réussir, avec le soutien de vous tous, qui en aucun cas ne saurait nous faire défaut.

The Creation of the American Republic Three Lessons for Europe

Introduction

We are living in exciting times. The prospect of the enlargement of the European Union with ten new member states has made many politicians, elder statesmen and intellectuals ask themselves an old question: what is the future Europe we want? The two alternative answers are:

1. We continue to muddle through with the hybrid of intergovernmental cooperation and supranational governance, or
2. We create a European government with a mandate from the people of Europe.

To decide this question a European Convention of 105 delegates is drafting a European Constitution. Robert Orr writes:

In statecraft, the supreme example of a response that is both immediate and remote is the creation of a constitution. A constitution is a temporal device - it is itself an event - made to regulate the sequence of legal and political events.¹

So it will be. The new European constitution will help to shape the future of the European Union. Will it adopt the first or the second alternative?

On February 6 of 2003 the Praesidium of the Convention, chaired by former French president Giscard d'Estaing, sent a draft of the first 16 articles of a European constitution to the delegates. Their proposal imme-

diately appeared on the Internet and in the press.² The 16 articles will be followed by a second and a third installment. They are of great interest. In article (1) we read that the Union³ "shall administer certain common competences on a federal basis."⁴ The Praesidium has received some 1200 amendments from the delegates regarding the 16 articles. The English, predictably, have protested against the use of the term "federal". In article 10, section 4 the drafters make a courageous at-

tempt to define the need for a common policy on security and foreign affairs.⁵ This "competence", however, is neither characterized as an exclusive or a shared one. Article 14 reads like a cry for help:



HOWARD CHANDLER CHRISTIE - Scene at the Signing of the Constitution.

tempt to define the need for a common policy on security and foreign affairs.⁵ This "competence", however, is neither characterized as an exclusive or a shared one. Article 14 reads like a cry for help:

Member States shall actively

and unreservedly support the Union's common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from action contrary to the Union's interests or likely to undermine its effectiveness.

The present controversy raging between member states about the need for a war in Iraq creates little hope for the acceptance of an article that would introduce a *European* foreign policy, unless we should read darker motives in this formulation of a *common* foreign policy, as given in articles 10 section 4 and article 14. The draft defines the respective powers of the European Union and the member states. Some powers the Union holds exclu-

sively, some they share with the member states in differing degrees of commitment. So the Union determines for instance a "common commercial policy". The list of shared powers is impressive. It would create the opportunity of a high level of interference by the Union with the policies of the member states in fields ranging from agriculture to energy. Yet you can also interpret the issue of shared responsibilities in another way. This shared commitment gives the member states the chance of negotiating on these issues on an intergovernmental rather than federal level. What about a *common* foreign policy? Giscard d'Estaing has suggested the institution of a president of the Union who will presumably act as a power broker between national governments. Chirac and Schröder in the name of France and Germany have proposed two presidents to chair a future European Union, the president of the European Commission and a president of the European Council of Ministers. No one has taken this plan seriously, but it may be a stepping stone to a president that will be chosen (presumably a Frenchman or a German) by the European Council of Ministers for a period of 5 years. At present it appears that Giscard has the ambition to realize on paper what Louis XIV and Napoleon could not achieve by conquest: French hegemony, at least in the field of foreign policy. We shall have to wait and see

what subsequent proposals will reveal, but the 16 articles, which have been published, portray the weakness rather than the strength of the idea of a European federal government. No one, it seems, is contemplating the breathtaking step the Americans took in 1787, when they drafted their constitution, and in 1788, when they had it ratified.

The evolution of the confederate European system is a major achievement, but -with a view to the future - the system has its drawbacks. It precludes the formulation of a foreign and defense policy common to the

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member-states. As to the rulings for the internal European market muddling through has engendered a top-heavy bureaucracy in Brussels that has very little credibility among the European public. The European Parliament has stirred little enthusiasm during elections and is commonly regarded as a spineless body.

The argument of this essay is that we must follow in the footsteps of the Americans and choose the second alternative. In doing so the creation of the American Republic and its subsequent history contain three important lessons for us Europeans, two telling us what to do and a third showing us what should be avoided. However, the most important instruction we can derive from their example is this: we should take the bold step at once and create a European constitution for the United States of Europe at this moment in time. Those who have had distinguished careers within the European Union caution against taking such a bold step. They tend to argue that the American colonies were a *tabula rasa* in terms of political history. The Americans could permit themselves such a bold step, because they could start from scratch. Europe, they argue, has a long and complicated history of inter-European relations and a policy of small steps must honour that complicated history. Those distinguished officials are wrong on both counts. The Americans did not start from scratch. Political traditions, slavery, religion and commercial rivalry divided them, and bad communications made it difficult to unite. However, they were conscious that they had to create a new system that transcended their differences. So must Europe. We might say that we as Europeans *must* start from scratch. We need a political system that can deal with the problems of the future. The complicated relations between European nations in the past are a stumbling block for solving these problems, not a positive factor.

Lesson One

We may conveniently close the Founding period in 1803, when a verdict by Chief Justice John Marshall introduced judicial review. It became the capping stone of the American political system. The Founding period is a glorious episode in history. Statecraft, wisdom and moral purpose created a viable democracy. Thomas Jefferson wrote to a friend in 1816:

The introduction of this new principle of representative democracy has rendered useless almost everything written before on the structure of government.⁶

Indeed, Americans introduced the principle of representative democracy as something entirely new and made it a success. The Founding Fathers were conscious of their role in history and saw themselves as the equals of Solon and Lycurgus in the Classical past.

James Madison observed that the House of Representatives symbolizes the *National* and the Senate the *Federal* government.⁷

He made this remark in the famous collection of essays *The Federalist*, which he produced together with John Jay and Alexander Hamilton. The three – while explaining the draft of the new constitution agreed upon in Philadelphia – made an ardent plea to the voters of the State of New York for a *national* government. This meant a central government with a mandate from an all-American *national* congress. That government had its competence limited to certain circumscribed tasks, but in executing these tasks it was to have a direct authority over all the American colonists as citizens. The Founding Fathers stipulated that the national government could tax American citizens without using the separate states as intermediary. This argument for a national government created a fierce opposition and it took the moral authority and the cunning of the Founding Fathers to make the Conventions of the States ratify the Constitution.

The lesson of this example for a united Europe is simple. Anything short of an all-European⁸ *national* government will not create a viable European democratic system. Converting on paper the institutions of the European union into a *national* system is easy. The European Commission could become a European government chosen by a European parliament. That parliament will consist of two houses. The present day European Parliament could become the House of Representatives and its members would be elected by direct vote. The European Council of Ministers could be transformed into the Senate and each member state would send two ministers to this Senate.⁹ The Courts of Justice, The Court of Auditors and the European Central Bank are already in place and so are certain agencies and committees.


The mechanics of the conversion, however, are simple compared to the political will to create a *national* government. Of this political will an observer can only say that – as in the case of the Founding Fathers – the decision is a moral one, which has a practical component. Already in 1776 the delegates of the Convention that declared itself independent from Great Britain were conscious they were creating a moral community. That intention is beautifully expressed in the second sentence of the Declaration of Independence:

We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.¹⁰

It is clear what Jefferson and the other delegates meant by the “unalienable right to the pursuit of happiness”. Each citizen within the American Republic

has the right to pursue his interests, but in order to do so in a peaceful manner and in cooperation with his fellows the citizen has to obey a common code in the pursuit of his own happiness. To emphasize that the American Republic was a moral community the Americans attached the Bill of Rights to the original draft of the constitution during ratification. The practical aspect of constituting a moral community was that only then were Americans able to order their domestic and foreign affairs in an effective manner and that is what Jefferson meant by the pursuit of happiness.

My argument is that only a European *national* government can create the moral community we as Europeans need. In 2001 Jürgen Habermas said in a speech that we must work for a new form of patriotism that is



oriented towards Europe. He added that we could only convince Europeans that they must become European citizens if “the project [of European unification] is liberated from the abstract talks between experts and it so becomes political.”¹¹ Indeed, only when a European government becomes directly accountable to Europe’s citizens and not to the member states can we expect that these citizens will commit themselves to that European government.

It is of some importance to emphasize the notion of Europe as a moral community. David Hume in explaining the origin of justice writes that human beings originally got together to eliminate the inconveniences of the state of nature in which every individual had himself to defend his property and family against the claims and aggression of others. So self-interest was the original motive of justice. However, maintaining the rules of justice and the subsequent establishment of government, individuals started to understand each other’s motives through sympathy.

*Thus self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice: but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation which attends that virtue [of justice].*¹²

This perceptive remark leads to a useful definition of a moral community. As soon as people start to *understand* each other’s motives and start to *like* paying regard to the common good a moral community comes into being. A society defined by the motive of self-interest is a poor

construction; a society defined by the sole regard for the common good is a utopia. However, when self-interest is transcended (not eliminated) by more civilized values we can speak of a moral society. On a theoretical level Hume makes the point that you cannot separate egoistic and altruistic motives. On the practical level this means that no one can effectively pursue his self-interests without a regard for the common good.

The talk about the admission of Turkey makes it clear that Europe regards itself as a moral community. Honouring human rights has become an overriding qualification for admittance as a member state. Perhaps the present hybrid of an intergovernmental confederation and a supranational state is sufficient to prevent the violation of human rights by one of the member states. However,

maintaining human rights is not only a domestic issue within the European Union. Outside that Union violations of human rights are frequent and manifest. These violations are the symptoms of politics that fail to maintain the rule of law. With this failure are connected corruption, oppression of the weak and the spoliation of nature

and so the effects of these failing polities have come to haunt Europe and threaten our civilized ways of life. In fact we as Europeans are culpable ourselves. We export many of the problems, which cause disruptions outside Europe and we refuse the Third World a fair deal in our terms of trade. For selfish reasons we must want to diminish the risks to our comfortable and civilized way of life. For achieving this goal we must perhaps be willing to accept the fact that we will not grow richer, but give the Third World the chance to catch up. I cannot see how we can make this commitment without becoming the citizens of a European state that can act as a moral community.

Lesson Two

Acceptance of the new constitution was made possible by what American historians call “the great compromise”. In 1787 delegates in Philadelphia decided that the House of Representatives would be chosen on the basis of population numbers, while each state would be entitled to send two senators to Congress. This was a highly “undemocratic” compromise. According to the census numbers of 1980 it meant that Alaska with a population of 407.000 and California with 22.000.000 inhabitants both sent two senators.¹³ However, the compromise worked.¹⁴ When Madison referred to the *national* and the *federal* aspects of the constitutional draft he had no quarrel with the opponents of the draft (the “anti-federalists”) that the *federal* principle should come first. Ameri-

cans at that time lived their lives in local communities. If they needed a larger organization to organize their schools and courts and regulate their trade they turned to their State, not to the Union. Yet the Founding Fathers had the vision that America needed a *national* solution for certain problems. So in order to strike a balance between the *national* and the *federal* they hit on a novel and unorthodox idea. They split the sovereign power in two. The *national* and the *federal* governments were responsible to the sovereign American people, the one within the compass of the Union the other to the inhabitants of the respective States.

This compromise would be ideal for Europe in its present state. It would appease the smaller member states that would be represented in the new Senate on equal terms and do away with cumbersome proposals on rotating presidents and a European Commission in which each member state would have a commissioner. I have already suggested that the European Council could become this Senate. We must keep in mind that this Council then would lose its executive functions and would become part of the European legislature consisting of two chambers or houses.

That arrangement can work if we can fulfil two conditions: a strict division of tasks between the European government and the government of the member states and a smooth procedure for amending the future European constitution. In their original draft the Founding Fathers took care to circumscribe the competencies of the national government in strict terms. During ratification the Tenth Amendment was added in which it was declared that

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

This in American parlance is called a “strict construction of the Constitution”. The United States government has to execute certain tasks enumerated in the Constitution and if you want to add to these tasks you must start the procedure of amending that Constitution. The draft of the European Convention I mentioned at the beginning of this essay has no provision such as the Tenth Amendment. In their draft the borderline between the respective powers of the European Union and the member states remains fuzzy. I already explained the disadvantage of this fuzziness.

So the first condition is that the tasks of the European government should be circumscribed as precisely as possible. At the moment the European Union is great in regulating the smaller even insignificant issues and weak in tackling important problems that are vital to all Europeans. This is the moment of assessing the respective *sovereign* powers of the European Union and the member states and I emphasize the term *sovereign* to indicate that the European Union should not meddle with

affairs that do not belong to its sphere of competence.

However we should view this division of sovereign powers as dynamic rather than static. A drawback of the American example is that the division of powers between the States and the Union has been fixed by the Constitution for eternity. Under the influence of the Civil War and industrialization the powers of the United States have grown and those of the separate States have shrunk. A re-assessment of the respective sovereign powers would be practical, but the process of amending the Constitution makes this (almost) impossible. So the conditions for a smooth and regular assessment of sovereign powers should be written into a new European Constitution. As in the case of the American republic we can expect the powers of the European Union to grow over time. The constitutional rules should reflect the real division of sovereign power, not the one cherished on paper. So the second condition for making dual sovereignty a success is a regulation that makes constitutional amendments possible and necessary.

If we regard the division of sovereign power between the European Union and the member states as a ploy we do not understand the lesson that the "Great Compromise" can teach us. The American republic is one of the few examples of a multi-ethnic state that has become successful. The secret of its success is that its political system has the capacity of honouring local minorities. Reaching consensus within that American system is cumbersome, but when consensus is reached it has the merit of creating a solid allegiance to American democracy. We Europeans have such a painful experience with reaching consensus by intergovernmental negotiation that we are apt to forget that becoming a large sovereign state we must pay the price of honouring minorities at all costs.

Lesson III

Montesquieu is reputed to have invented the *trias politica*. In fact he made a plea for the 18th century English model of mixed government in which the King, the Peers and the Commons had a part of the power to take political decisions. It was the Americans who invented the doctrine of the separation of powers. They realized that they were dealing with the separation of offices, not with accommodating privileged classes and persons within the political system. They applied the doctrine of a separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers with dogmatic rigour. Everyone in his right mind will agree that courts of justice should be independent in reaching their verdicts.¹⁵

However, the sharp separation of powers between American Congress and the Presidency creates undesirable problems. The definition of the powers of the president is an indication that we are dealing with an 18th century constitution. The Americans took the British king as their model. That king had certain prerogatives, which meant that in certain cases –

such as foreign policy – he could act alone. Americans made their president an elective king. They severely limited his prerogatives and – more importantly – they forbade him to meddle with the work of Congress. The separation of the executive and the legislative branch of government means that cabinet ministers are responsible to the President and not to Congress. The President cannot be removed except by impeachment and the executive branch cannot table and defend its bills in Congress. The result is that the enactment of a law is the product of a protracted negotiation between Congress and the President.

The enactment of laws is however not the major problem that the American *trias politica* creates. Presidents have little power to effect domestic reforms, and they have too much power in foreign affairs. Scandals such as Watergate or Iran-gate¹⁶ prove that Congress has little control over the executive and that they can only impeach the President to get rid of him. Impeachment, however, is too blunt an instrument to send away an official with whose policy you happen to disagree as a legislature.

So we should stick to the constitutional practice of ministerial responsibility which has become the mark of European parliamentary democracies. The American problems with the executive branch make it ill advised for the European Union to adopt the institution of a president chosen directly by the people. As the French *cohabitation* between President and Prime Minister demonstrates a divided authority within the executive creates problems. Yet the French prime minister is at least responsible to the *Assemblée Nationale* and the American president as sole head of the executive in many cases can only be called to order by impeachment or indirect pressure.

We should adopt a European government styled according to European parliamentary traditions. We should learn from the American example that such a government should get its mandate from the European people and not from the peoples of the member states. Like the Americans we as Europeans face issues common to us all and we should meet these challenges as one people.

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Summary

We are on the threshold of a decision about a constitution for the European Union in an enlarged format. In this essay the author maintains that we can learn three lessons from the work of the Founding Fathers while drafting this European constitution. The first lesson is that only a European government responsible to a European parliament

can satisfy the needs of Europe as a moral community. The second lesson is that the American system of divided sovereignty offers an attractive solution for regulating the relations between the smaller and the larger member states. The third lesson is that we should not opt for the strict interpretation of the *trias politica*, which Americans cherish. In this case we should stick to the European parliamentary tradition of ministerial responsibility. Consequently it is inadvisable to adopt the institution of an elected president of the European Union with full executive powers.

¹ R. Orr, 'The Time Motif in Machiavelli', in Fleischer (ed.) *Machiavelli and the nature of Political Thought* (New York, 1972), p. 191.

² This deliberate policy of (in fact) publishing documents that have no official status has the aim, of course, of sounding out a public wider than the forum of the delegates. It betrays the weakness of the European Convention and it sharply contrasts with the behaviour of the American Convention of 1787. The delegates had made a vow of complete secrecy and when one of the delegates had carelessly left his papers around Washington, the president of the Convention, severely reprimanded him.

³ The drafters do not fill in the name of the future union. Obviously there is no consensus on the name for a united Europe.

⁴ Secretariat European Convention, (Brussels 2003) CONV 528/03, Art. 1, Sect. 1.

⁵ "The Union shall have competence to define and implement a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy."

⁶ Cited by Gordon S Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787* (New York, 1972), 565.

⁷ James Madison, *Federalist XXXIX*, (1788) (Cleveland, 1965), J. E. Cooke ed., 255. Notice the use of the word *Federal*. Today it has become a synonym for *National*. For Madison it meant the *Confederate* aspect of the American political system.

⁸ Restricted of course to present and future member states.

⁹ This is analogous to the American situation in 1788 where the State legislatures chose the senators. In Amendment XVII (1913) the direct vote for the election of senators went to the people of each state. I guess something similar will happen in a European parallel case.

¹⁰ C.L. Becker, *The Declaration of Independence, a Study in the History of Political Ideas*, (1922) (New York 1966), p.142, p.175. Jefferson wrote the draft of the Declaration. Benjamin Franklin and John Adams edited the draft and enhanced the rhetorical power of this famous sentence.

¹¹ J. Habermas, "Warum Braucht Europa eine Verfassung?", *Die Zeit*, no. 27 (28 June 2001); "das Projekt aus der Abstraktion von Expertengespräche gelöst, also politisiert wird."

¹² David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Oxford 1978), P. H. Niddich ed., 499-500.

¹³ In 1980 California sent 43 representatives and Alaska 1 to the House.

¹⁴ See n. 7.

¹⁵ In the American case the Supreme Court has indeed an independent power which often has a considerable political impact. However, the President nominates them. In this sense they are not independent and needless to say the nomination of judges always is a hot political issue. Local judges are in some cases elected on the ballot. A political custom most Europeans probably, and rightly so, will reject. Then there is the system of juries, so dear to Americans, which curtails the power of the judges.

¹⁶ President Reagan was alleged to have sold arms to America's enemy Iran.

L'EUROPE DES FRANCS-MAÇONS AU XVIII^e SIÈCLE

Dans un chapitre de *L'Europe et ses nations* au titre révélateur : "la deuxième unification européenne : la Cour, le salon, les loges"¹, Krzysztof Pomian insiste sur le fait que "la Maçonnerie devient rapidement une institution européenne, la seule institution européenne à côté de l'Église catholique". De fait, la franc-maçonnerie prend dès le premier tiers du XVIII^e siècle une dimension européenne, voire mondiale, si on prend en compte les fondations coloniales, précoces et nombreuses aux Indes, dans la Caraïbe ou en Amérique septentrionale. Cette réussite tient fondamentalement au projet maçonnique des pères fondateurs de l'ordre : ouvrir ou plus exactement rouvrir le chantier de Babel, mythe fondateur par excellence de la République universelle des francs-maçons². La franc-maçonnerie a vocation à réunir l'ensemble des frères dispersés sur les deux hémisphères depuis la chute originelle, l'effondrement de Babel, sanction du Grand Architecte à la désunion des ouvriers, à la démesure de leur orgueil. Pour construire le temple à la gloire du Grand Architecte de l'Univers, les francs-maçons doivent dilater l'espace de concorde et de paix qu'offre le havre de chaque loge jusqu'aux limites du monde connu, car "le Monde Entier n'est qu'une grande République, dont chaque Nation est une famille et chaque particulier un enfant". Le cosmos maçonnique apparaît alors comme la dilatation de cette sphère harmonieuse à l'ensemble de l'*oikoumène*, du monde connu, tandis que se pose aux frères la question de la *koinè* qui leur permettrait de communiquer entre eux. C'est dans cette optique qu'il faut saisir l'effort intellectuel des francs-maçons pour penser leur univers et en définir les bornes géographiques, sociales et religieuses. On peut alors mettre en évidence quatre principaux modèles concurrents d'organisation et de construction de l'espace maçonnique européen, dont on observe aujourd'hui encore la permanence à l'Ouest et la résurgence à l'Est.

Pour les partisans de la Stricte Observance Templière, réforme maçonnique d'essence chevaleresque et chrétienne, le cosmos maçonnique se confond avec l'Europe chrétienne. La carte de l'ordre est celle de l'Europe templière, carte volontairement datée, volontairement anachronique, propice aux utopies ou



contre-utopies. Plusieurs projets sont évoqués en 1782 lors du Convent général de la Stricte Observance. Le prince valaïque Murusi soutenu par les frères russes propose d'établir dans le gouvernement de Saratov, une colonie de chevaliers francs-maçons. Il envisage également de lever dans les principautés danubiennes 50 000 hommes pour reconquérir Jérusalem et les biens des Templiers. Pour maintenir l'ordre, sans quoi le cosmos maçonnique redeven-

draut chaos, les francs-maçons doivent monter la garde aux bornes de la chrétienté, et repousser tous ceux dont l'altérité dissoudrait la cohésion du groupe des élus si on les laissait y pénétrer. Les nombreuses références à Rome relevées dans l'*Histoire, obligations et statuts de la Très Vénérable Confraternité des Francs-Maçons* sont également explicites. Il s'agit d'établir des confins militaires aux marges de l'Europe chrétienne. La Grande Loge de Londres propose quant à elle une organisation de l'Europe maçonnique comparable à celle d'un *Commonwealth* avec des *dominions* bénéficiant d'une réelle autonomie interne. Elle organise l'Europe maçonnique en Grandes Loges Provinciales dont le ressort se confond avec les frontières politiques des Etats, mais se réserve le droit de constituer ou de reconnaître de nouveaux ateliers hors des possessions britanniques. En résultent de nombreux affrontements avec les obédiences françaises notamment à Naples, dans l'aire balte, les Pays-Bas autrichiens ou en Pologne, où interfèrent enjeux strictement maçonniques mais aussi diplomatiques, tant les chargés d'affaires, envoyés et ambassadeurs ont été des vecteurs essentiels du flambeau maçonnique à travers l'Europe et le Levant. A cette thèse anglaise, la Grande Loge puis le Grand Orient de France à partir de 1773-1774 opposent celle d'une Europe maçonnique structurée en obédiences nationales, souveraines, et non autonomes, dans l'étendue d'un ressort borné par les frontières politiques des Etats, c'est-à-dire défini sur des bases profanes. Paris met sur pied une Commission pour les Grands Orient étrangers chargée de négocier des traités d'amitié avec les Grandes Loges nationales (*sic*) de Suède et de Prusse notamment, de favoriser la création d'obédiences souveraines dans les royaumes de Naples et de Pologne. Il s'agit à terme de

contraindre Londres qui revendique une “maternité universelle” sur l’ensemble du corps maçonnique, à s’asseoir à la table des négociations sur un pied d’égalité pour lui faire admettre le principe d’une organisation du corps maçonnique sur des bases nationales. Sentant son hégémonie menacée, la Grande Loge d’Angleterre des Modernes déjà confrontée au schisme des Anciens, réagit en considérant la sphère maçonnique comme irréductible à l’Europe profane. Par nature cosmopolite, elle vise à recréer la chaîne d’union entre les frères dispersés sur les deux hémisphères et transcende les frontières politiques, linguistiques et confessionnelles. L’argument séduit une majorité de francs-maçons des Lumières alors que le modèle national du Grand Orient emporte certes l’adhésion des despotes éclairés soucieux de contrôler les loges de leurs États notamment en Autriche et en Suède, mais ne s’imposera qu’au XIX^e siècle avec la remise en cause du cosmopolitisme politiquement neutre du XVIII^e siècle.

D’autres francs-maçons adoptent une position encore plus tranchée. Refusant toute assimilation de leur République universelle à l’Europe du XVIII^e siècle et à ses prolongements coloniaux, ils considèrent que pour bâtir leur cité idéale, les frères doivent rompre radicalement avec un monde profane voué au chaos. Après avoir imaginé un temps investir les îles de Lampedusa et de Limosa, ils retiennent le continent neuf par excellence, l’Australie, où les ouvriers du temple pourraient jeter les bases d’un État franc-maçon. Le baron de Hundt qui devait fonder la Stricte Observance avait quant à lui initialement jeté son dévolu sur le Labrador, pour en faire une république aristocratique.

Les réseaux de l’Europe maçonnique

Quel que soit le modèle considéré, le projet d’une République des francs-maçons à géographie variable, bornée à l’Europe et à ses dépendances ou véritablement universelle, ne peut se concrétiser sans la mise sur pied de réseaux de correspondance et de loges qui innervent le corps maçonnique, le structurent et le rendent cohérent. Il faut également jeter les bases d’un droit maçonnique international, mettre au point des protocoles d’échanges de visiteurs, des échelles d’équivalence de grades rendues nécessaires par la multiplication rapide des systèmes de hauts grades. C’est ce que les pionniers de l’ordre maçonnique, hommes de réseaux, réseaux académiques, confessionnels, négociants, bancaires, diplomatiques ou artistiques, sans compter les réseaux relationnels mis sur pied par ces gestionnaires hors-pair de la mobilité (Daniel Roche) que sont les aventuriers, ont bien compris³. A Metz, carrefour d’influences maçonniques, le négociant Antoine Meunier de Précourt demande le 24 juin 1760 à la Grande Loge de France, dont il est l’un des officiers les plus actifs, “la liste de toutes les loges qui sont émanées comme nous

de la vôtre, afin d’établir entre elles et vous cette correspondance générale qui doit régner de l’orient à l’occident et du septentrion au midi entre tous les corps réguliers”. Il continuera son œuvre à Hambourg puis en Russie. A l’autre extrémité de l’Europe maçonnique, en Sicile, les francs-maçons de *Saint-Jean d’Ecosse*, orient de Palerme, font également profession de foi cosmopolite. Après avoir tissé de solides liens avec les ateliers installés sur le pourtour méditerranéen, ils incitent les frères de la vallée du Rhône à entrer en correspondance avec eux. Les négociants de cet atelier sicilien, pour beaucoup originaires des Cantons suisses, sont en effet nombreux à se rendre à Beaucaire à l’occasion de la fameuse foire de la Madeleine. Ils retrouvent alors leurs confrères en affaires et frères en Maçonnerie sur les colonnes du temple de la loge locale. Puis le réseau palermitain s’élargit en direction des loges de l’intérieur. Au total, il coïncide presque parfaitement avec celui de la loge *Saint-Jean* de Metz. Les Palermitains se révèlent des correspondants exigeants, y compris avec leur loge mère *Saint-Jean d’Ecosse*, orient de

Marseille. Un visiteur marseillais se voit ainsi interdire l’accès au temple sicilien, parce que sa loge a interrompu sa correspondance. Les relations épistolaires rétablies, les visites mutuelles reprennent normalement. Les rencontres fortuites, les visites escomptées sont autant d’occasions, avidement saisies, d’amorcer de nouveaux échanges, de s’ouvrir par leur intermédiaire à de nouvelles pratiques maçonniques.

Les obédiences nationales prennent rapidement conscience que ces réseaux de correspondance et d’échange permettent aux loges de leur ressort de s’évader, de constituer un espace de relations autonomes, qui transcendent les frontières politiques où elles peuvent jouer un rôle à leur mesure, c’est notamment le cas de Marseille dans le bassin méditerranéen, de Lyon en Europe médiane ou de Strasbourg. Le Grand Orient de France les met en garde : “Une correspondance avec l’étranger entraîne toujours de graves inconvénients. La distance des lieux occasionne des retards dangereux, et il peut même arriver que toute communication soit interrompue, alors une loge reste isolée et languit, privée des avis et des secours dont elle a besoin. Au contraire, une correspondance avec un Grand Orient national n’est exposée à aucun danger et produit les plus grands avantages”.

Pour l’heure, si ces échanges sont activement recherchés, c’est que le projet des pères fondateurs de 1717-1723, n’est autre que de “permettre à des hommes qui sans cela ne se seraient jamais rencontrés” de se découvrir et de s’apprécier. L’ac-

cueil de l’autre en qui l’on reconnaît un frère, de ce voyageur étranger qui apporte la preuve vivante de l’existence d’une Europe maçonnique et fraternelle, revêt dans ces conditions une importance essentielle. “Vous ne serez étrangers en aucun lieu ; partout vous trouverez des frères et des amis ; vous êtes devenus des citoyens du monde entier !” s’exclame le secrétaire de la loge *Saint-Louis des Amis Réunis*, orient de Calais, à la veille de la Révolution. De son côté, le protestant cévenol La Beaumelle, intermédiaire culturel entre la France et le Danemark, contradicteur de Voltaire et admirateur de Montesquieu, confie à son frère Jean, après sa réception à Genève où il parfait son éducation : “Je ne suis plus étranger !” L’appartenance à une fraternité européenne est rassurante pour l’étranger en



voyage. Philippe-Goswyn de Neny en donne également un témoignage précieux : bien né, fils du puissant Patrice-François, Chef et Président du Conseil de l’impératrice-reine Marie-Thérèse, il n’en a pas moins quitté secrètement les Pays-Bas autrichiens, refusant de suivre la voie tracée par son père, pour entamer un périple qui par Liège, Paris et Genève le mène en Italie, en Grèce puis jusqu’à Constantinople où il se rembarque pour la Toscane en 1766. Avant d’atteindre Marseille où il visite le temple de *Saint-Jean d’Ecosse*, il écrit à Marie-Caroline Murray : “J’ai passé quelque temps à Toulon, où quelques lettres de recommandation, et la franche maçonnerie m’eurent bientôt mis en liaison avec tout le corps de la marine”. On a là, à l’évidence, la marque d’une sociabilité en réseau authentiquement cosmopolite et européenne que l’ouverture récente de nombreux fonds d’archives, notamment russes, permet d’étudier de manière approfondie et de cartographier⁴. Dans un contexte autrement plus dramatique, les réfugiés politiques l’ont bien compris. Leur histoire est de fait intimement liée à celle de la Fraternité maçonnique, des jacobins des années 1688-1746 aux Russes blancs et aux mencheviks en passant par les patriotes bataves des années 1785-1787, les libéraux portugais, grecs et espagnols des années 1820-1830. A ces voyageurs, volontaires ou non, la franc-maçonnerie offre un viatique, le certificat, visé par le secrétaire des loges visitées, prémisses du passeport maçonnique que Joseph de Maistre, figure complexe de la franc-ma-

çonnerie “savoisienne” et européenne, rêve d’établir : “La correspondance étroite avec les frères étrangers et nos devoirs envers eux, qui constitue essentiellement la *république universelle* sont encore un objet de la plus grande importance. Il faudra faire sur ce sujet quelques bonnes lois qui puissent établir plus de relation, plus d’union entre les différentes sociétés, et concilier la bienveillance avec la prudence à l’égard des frères voyageurs”.

La sociabilité maçonnique répond aux attentes spécifiques et complémentaires de la *Société des princes* (Lucien Bély), du royaume européen des mœurs (Daniel Roche), des militaires en déplacement, des négociants et des banquiers, des étudiants ou jeunes hommes bien nés effectuant leur tour de formation en compagnie de leurs précepteurs-gouverneurs, en mettant sur pied des structures d’accueil adaptées, dont on ne citera ici que quelques exemples : la *Candeur* strasbourgeoise, loge de l’Université luthérienne de Strasbourg, la *Réunion des Etrangers*, orient de Paris, loge de l’ambassade de Danemark, l’*Irlandaise du Soleil Levant*, loge des étudiants

irlandais de l’Université de Paris, les *Amis Réunis*, loge de la haute finance protestante, des artistes français et étrangers de renom et de leurs mécènes, ou encore l’*Amitié*, ancienne Amitié allemande, loge des grandes maisons de négoce bordelaises originaires de la Baltique. Ces loges sont mentionnées dans les guides de voyages comme le *Guide des amateurs et des étrangers voyageurs à Paris* de Vincent-Luc Thiery.

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Les exclus

Le cosmopolitisme du siècle des Lumières ne se confond cependant pas avec l’universalisme, la République universelle des francs-maçons épouse pour une majorité de frères les contours de l’Europe chrétienne (“le vrai chrétien, voilà le vrai maçon !”), admet la majorité des frères, voire ceux du royaume de la civilité et du bon goût, où l’on peut jouir du plaisir d’être entre soi. *Mutatis mutandis*, elle se définit plutôt comme la réunion des *Kaloikagathoi*, beaux et bons de la Grèce classique, autrement dit les aristocrates, conscients par-delà les frontières politiques de former une communauté de semblables, de pairs qui ont fait leur normes culturelles issues du “procès de civilisation”. Les routes du Grand Tour et leurs étapes obligées, les séjours dans les académies et dans les universités européennes, les précepteurs étrangers, la pratique du français, promu *koinè* de l’Europe des Lumières, la visite des salons et des figures de la République des Lettres, ont contribué à forger cette élite européenne, aux effectifs réduits mais à la surface sociale et à l’influence politique

et culturelle considérables. C’est elle qui fixe les normes sociales et culturelles qui qualifient ou disqualifient. On voit ainsi clairement les frères définir les critères de compatibilité que tout candidat à l’initiation doit posséder préalablement à son introduction dans le temple des amis choisis. A défaut, il risquerait de perturber l’harmonie fraternelle. Lessing reprochera d’ailleurs à ses frères de recevoir trop souvent des profanes en qui ils ont reconnu préalablement aux épreuves initiatiques des semblables. Ce refus d’une altérité trop accusée, d’une différence qui, loin d’être une source d’enrichissement pour la petite communauté, contribuerait au contraire à sa dissolution, a conduit les loges du XVIII^e siècle à borner le cosmos maçonnique, à définir les contours d’une identité maçonnique, largement déterminés par des critères profanes. En bornant le cosmos maçonnique, les frères en sont arrivés à préciser le profil du “franc-maçon né”, contradiction évidente avec le principe de l’initiation et de la mort au monde profane qu’ils assument fort bien, et son corollaire, l’“autre absolu”, par opposition à l’*alter ego*, dont la différence irréductible menace l’intégrité de la communauté fraternelle. Selon les contextes et environnements profanes, ils ont identifié cet autre absolu au juif, au musulman, ou au “sang mêlé” dans les Antilles, qui porte sur son visage les stigmates du chaos indifférenciateur qui menace la société coloniale, si l’on tolère les fruits empoisonnés des unions mixtes. La manière d’aborder la rencontre avec un autre perçu comme un “impossible semblable” révèle la prégnance des préjugés profanes, le poids des fantasmes et de l’imaginaire social.

Au terme de cette exploration rapide de l’Europe des Lumières maçonniques, avec ses astres principaux, ses satellites, ses zones d’ombre et de turbulence, la franc-maçonnerie du XVIII^e siècle apparaît complexe, paradoxale, en un mot plurielle. Ce cosmos parsemé d’archipels maçonniques, cet *oikoumène* à la densité inégale de loges, se révèle non pas un univers en expansion, qui finirait par englober la sphère profane. S’il a vocation universelle, il s’est rapidement trouvé borné par ses promoteurs, à l’instar de l’Empire romain sous le Principat d’Auguste. Or, ces bornes ne sont pas maçonniques, elles sont profanes : linguistiques, politiques, religieuses, culturelles, sociales, voire ethniques. La “Maçonnerie de société” avec ses loges de cour (*Hoflogen*) ou de châteaux (*Schloßlogen*), ses théâtres de société, ses bals, concerts amateurs, ses chasses, donne le ton au sein du royaume européen des mœurs où elle s’épanouit à l’interface entre espace domestique et espace public.

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The French Revolution and Russian Identity*

There are two main types of a modern identity for Russia. From Peter I to Catherine II Russian identity was developing as an European identity. It was an identity of the nation which became a political and cultural part of Europe. In XIX century another type of identity came to dominate. It was world nationality: Russia is "a whole part of the world" (N. Berdiaev), and "a whole word apart" (P. Chaadaev).

These main types of Russian identity were separated by the epoch of the French revolution. Is the historical position of Revolution accidental here? I don't think so. The modern Russian identity was developing as a response to the influence of Europeanization, and the French revolution played a crucial role in the transformation of the European modernity into world modernity.

The political influence of the French Revolution on contemporary Russia is evident. As early as 1790 Catherine II ordered all Russians in France to return home. The decree of February 8, 1793, broke off diplomatic relations with France. Ships under the French flag were barred from the Russian ports. Russian citizens were forbidden to travel to France, and to receive French newspapers. French books were

banned. The literature of Enlightenment, the works of favourite Catherinean philosophers, of Voltaire himself, were to be thrown into fire. It was the spiritual suicide of enlightened absolutism.

Yet Catherine II (1729-1796) had shaped a framework of an enlightened absolutism, as a European identity for Russia. The Empress had intelligently adapted the ideal and the principles of the Enlightenment to the Russian autocracy. Her famous Nakaz (Instruction to the Legislative Commission) was named a *Déclaration des Droits* for the Russian Empire. The Empress wanted to implement the rule of law according to Montesquieu and Beccaria, thus transforming Russia into a European legal monarchy. With the proclamation of civil rights the subjects of the Russian Crown were to become citizens of the Russian Empire.

Still, Catherine II rejected the libertarian principles of Enlightenment as "propres à mettre les choses sans dessus dessous"¹. Her project admitted no separation of powers or even constitutional limitations on the sovereign Russian tsar as autocrat. It rested on "la source de tout pouvoir politique et civil" (art. 19 of Nakaz). But the autocratic character of the Russian power was explained by Catherine II according to the doctrine of Montesquieu and other philosophers of the Enlightenment. It is only the autocratic power "qui puisse agir convenablement à l'étendue d'un Empire aussi vaste" (art. 9).²

The enlightened nativism of Catherine II

The outstanding feature of the mode of thinking of Catherine II was the justification of particular deficiencies of the Russian order by the general principles of the Age of Reason. She tied special lines of the historical development of Russia to geographical conditions. The Catherinean idea of the Russian history served two purposes. First, the Empress has established the proofs of Russia's common destiny with the rest of Europe from which it had departed and became backward under the Mongol yoke and the Time of Troubles of the XVII century. Second, she searched for the historical roots of the Russian autocracy.

In the XVIII century the quest for a national identity was becoming a search for the nation's cultural roots. Catherine II and her entourage contributed something of a kind of a monarchic nativism in this conventional "genealogical" approach. It was the continuum of the monarchic tradition that searched into the Russian past, when the proposed primeval autocracy was forming a core of the Russian identity in the age of Catherine.

The monarchic nativism of Catherine II was a compensatory and defensive nationalism. To overcome a national inferiority complex generated by the forceful Europeanisation of Peter I, one had to reassure the Russians about their standing in Europe and in the world.



CATHERINE II

The deeds of the Russian sovereigns, and especially the military glory, the victories and the conquests, were becoming objects of national reverence. The tzar as the symbol of Russia's strength and greatness was made the exceptional element of a national pride. It is the cult of Peter I as the founder of the



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Empire that has a special meaning for modern Russian autocracy, and particularly for the Empress.

The French revolution added a new defensive sense to the monarchic tradition. This was considered as a spiritual barrier against revolutionary contagion. Was the Russian *élite* really frightened? Why not! The prompt and hard reaction of the Empress to the French events is evidence. She understood that the remoteness of Russia was irrelevant. Only the Russian exceptionalism promised the salvation: "We aren't alike", "Our country isn't same". It was important that the feelings of such exceptionalism became the general and steady opinion of endangered society.

The impetus was given for the elaboration of a set of national values which were to be the opposite of the national features of the French and of the rest of Europeans. The "simple" virtues

on which every people getting in contact with more complex civilization tends to pride itself came to be regarded as "truly Russian", as the features of national character. These were probity, honesty, generosity, etc. The patriarchal type of relations between the sovereign and the subjects, between the gentry and the peasants, were forming a second bloc of defensive values. Last but not least was national morality. "Look for the mores"³: it was the lesson of the French revolution that the Empress drew for Russia.

Until her last day the Empress took care of the education and the enlightenment of Russian society, e.g. modernization of the mores. Russification and the Europeanisation were going hand by hand during the Catherinean times. Her enlightened absolutism engendered, so to say, enlightened nationalism.

The virtuous autocracy of Karamzin

The elaboration of this compensatory and defensive nationalism was continued during the reign of the heirs of Catherine II. A contribution of Nicholas Karamzin (1766-1826) is worthy of special attention. His example is evidence of the more profound influence of the French revolution on more en-



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lightened Russians. The Revolution compelled all enlightened Russians to test the foundation of their national identity and this test was particularly dramatic for Karamzin. As an eyewitness he was frightened by the revolutionary disorder and violence. Nevertheless, the author of the great historical apology of Russian autocracy, Karamzin, remained the republican forever. He also was a cosmopolite who understood the political meaning of a national exceptionalism.

The Revolution struck the mortal blow to Karamzin's illusions about the Age of Reason and to the belief in the universal progress of Enlightenment. "Where is this comforting system now?", Karamzin wrote in 1793. "It has tumbled to ruins in its very foundations".⁴ Karamzin began to elaborate a new system. It was his own system, a political system planned especially for Russia.

The foundations of this system were the order and the slow natural evolution of society. Karamzin believed that the order is a sublime value, the value itself. It was the main lesson of the French revolution which he drew. As early as in 1790 he wrote that "anarchy is worse than any government".⁵ "Every society", he affirmed, "which has existed for centuries, is sacred to good citizens and, even in the last perfect, one cannot but marvel at the wondrous harmony, concord, and order. Utopia will always remain the dream of a good heart, or if realized, it will come about through the gradual working of time, through the slow but true and safe attainments of the mind, enlightenment, education, and good morals".⁶

A firm and stable and, at the same time, enlightened and virtuous power, became the main principle of Karamzin's system. The form of government was conditioned by the fulfillment of these tasks. The crisis of the universal principles of enlightened government was the second lesson of the French revolution for Karamzin. Neither the constitution nor even "the centuries of the civic enlightenment", accordingly, would save from "wild passion's rage". The Russian historian (as the Jacobin leader Saint-Just) believed that only "aversion to evil" can inspire "love toward virtue" about the peoples.⁷

So the main thing was the firm and virtuous character of the government, and its form was of secondary importance. Karamzin supposed that the unity of power and the indivisibility of authority were the basis of a workable government. From this point of view a dictatorship of the Roman (or Jacobin) type and Russian autocracy appeared more relevant. Legal formalities were needless in this framework. The virtuous sovereign can fulfill the rule of law, so to say, *de facto*. The "salutary fear",⁸ once again an echo of Jacobin rule, must help such a sovereign first of all against corrupt officials.

In the autocratic system Karamzin found also a substitute for civil society. It was represented by the nobility as a "brotherhood of outstanding men".⁹ The "ancient covenant between authority and obedience"¹⁰ appeared as a substitute for a social contract for the imperial autocracy. It was supposed to be consent between the crown and the nobility. Karamzin reiterated as the lesson of the French revolution the *dictum* of Montesquieu: "point de Monarch – point de noblesse; point de noblesse – point de Monarch".

Native tradition and the general principles of Enlightenment are interwoven in his system, so that one can think about the dual native-European identity

et réseaux de correspondance dans l'Europe des Lumières (Artois, Presse Université, 2002).

Summary

Eighteenth-century Europe was not a captive market for French or English Freemasonry; instead, it was a meeting-point that was becoming independent, with a solid structure in cross-European networks based on trade, diplomacy, tourism, family and religion. In a cosmopolitan context, the Masonic European élites invented original structures which took account of the high level of demand and taste for sociability and social networking. The rituals and organisation of the higher grades were not simply assimilated but became the objectives of a real cultural appropriation.

¹ Krzysztof Pomian, *L'Europe et ses nations* (Paris : 1990), p. 108.

² Pierre-Yves Beaurepaire, *La République universelle des francs-maçons. De Newton à Metternich* (Rennes : 1999), 210 p.

³ Pierre-Yves Beaurepaire éd., *La Plume et la toile. Pouvoirs et réseaux de correspondance dans l'Europe des Lumières*, actes du colloque international d'Arras, 26-27 octobre 2000, avant-propos de Daniel Roche (Arras : 2002), 346 p.

⁴ Pierre-Yves Beaurepaire, *L'Europe des francs-maçons XVIII^e-XXI^e siècles*, Paris, Belin, *Europe & Histoire*, 2002, 325 p.

Swan-songs of the *Ancien Regime*¹

of the author. Karamzin conceived of the adaptation of the foreign to the native blending thereby “the new with the old” as an ideal system of evolution for Russia.¹¹ Yet this mix was appearing again as a clash of different sets of ideas.

The opposition of native and European became evident in the demarcation of Enlightenment and national dignity, knowledge and native manners, civil virtues and civic virtues. The former must be borrowed without harm for the latter. Karamzin fixed the defensive meaning of the national peculiarities and of exceptionalism. If in 1790 he was the partisan of universal humanism, in 1811 (before the French invasion) he underlined its harm. “Once upon a time we used to call all other Europeans infidels; now we call them brothers. For whom was it easier to conquer Russia, for infidels or for brothers?”, he asked.¹²

The search for national exclusiveness engendered the idea of a special path for Russia, beginning with the request of sovereigns from the Varyags. In “History of the Russian state” Karamzin wrote: “Everywhere else, the sword of the cunning and of the ambitious brought in absolute power... in Russia it was sanctioned by the general consent of the citizens”.¹³

This proposed consent between the autocracy and the people became the cornerstone of Russian exclusiveness. The general history was duplicated: on the one part the accord, harmony, order and the virtuous monarchy, on the other discord, disharmony, disorder, and the revolution. The idea of different lines of evolution of Russia and of the rest of Europe was developed by the Slavophiles and became the foundation of Russian ethnical identity in XIX century.

Imperial nationality of Uvarov's blending

A tradition of monarchic nativism was also developed. It was made in the official nationality (“orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality”) doctrine. Its author, Count Sergei Uvarov (1786-1855), was a partisan of the common history of mankind (including Europe and Asia), and of the universal theory of progress. But, like his predecessors Catherine II and Karamzin, Uvarov saw the exclusiveness of Russia as an “anchor of safety” in a sea of European disturbances.

Uvarov however associated Russian exclusiveness with the young age of the nation. So it was the interpretation of the backwardness of Russia on the general path to modernity. “Providence blessed Russia, having made it last in the assembly of enlightened states”. And the providential concern of power adjusted the nation to the inevitable transition from “youth” to “maturity”.

Uvarov expanded the notion of power. He included in this notion, conjointly with the sovereign, all government, and especially the system of national education. It was the domain of national education in which the Russian government had to fix

on its aim of adapting the Enlightenment to the peculiarities of Russia. At the head of the Ministry of people's enlightenment Uvarov proposed, as its aim, “preserving all the advantages of European Enlightenment, the raising of the intellectual life of Russia to the level of other nations” and, at the same time, “to give it national uniqueness, to base it on its own principles, and to make it conform to the needs of the people and the state”.¹⁴

This aim conformed to the general plan of modernization (or maturation) of Russia. Accordingly Uvarov wrote that “what is needed is a Russian system and a European education”.¹⁵ Uvarov's doctrine of official nationality is correctly named as the last version of enlightened absolutism¹⁶ in Russia.

Uvarov achieved to the highest possible level the adaptation of the principles of the Enlightenment to the autocratic system of Russia. He was born for this cultural synthesis and he was clearly attaining this aim. His tripartite formula of national ideology was a remarkable example of synthesis of native and borrowing, old and new. The opponents of Uvarov have affirmed, that the second part (“autocracy”) dominated his formula. Here it meant however not the autocracy itself but its legitimization. And it is possible to see in the tripartite formula the two opposing themes: so to say “Vive le Roy” and “Vive la Nation”. Uvarov blended implicitly principles of divine right and of national sovereignty.

The monarchic nativism and the enlightened nationalism of Catherine's day were transformed by Uvarov into a state nationalism, in which the loyalty of all the habitants of Russia to the monarch took a central place. Thus Russian nationality was becoming like the classical form of the post-revolutionary nationality in Europe (state-nation). But this framework demanded national unity of the state, and the autocratic system couldn't realize this aim except by forceful uniformity in various parts of the Empire. The official Russian nationality, which included the hegemony of the Russian ethnical confession, language, and cultural tradition, seemed to negate the nationality of non-Russian peoples of Russia.

Faithful to the autocratic system, Uvarov attained an assimilation of Poles, Jews, Lithuanians, in his educational policy. State nationalism was becoming imperial supernationality whilst resting at the same time in Russian ethnicity. The controversial relation of Russian ethnicity to the nationality of Russia created the insoluble problem of and for imperial identity.

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Early opera was dictated to an overwhelming extent by philological motivations, and by theoretical speculations on the nature of poetry and its ‘Orphic’ origin. There was a resurgence of these interests, without their sixteenth-century neo-Platonic trappings, in early eighteenth-century Italy, and with historical debates about the recoverability of Greek music, and about the metrical values of Hebrew poetry—as represented, for instance, by the Psalms. In the years before he assumed the role of poet laureate of the Court of Vienna in 1723, the Venetian journalist, publisher

The peasantry of East (1989); *Saint-Just: Speeches. Treatises* (ed.) (1995).

Summary

The French Revolution exerted a profound influence on the formation of a modern Russian identity. There was an impetus for a ‘Russian idea’ as a spiritual barrier against the contagion of the Revolution. A proposed primeval autocracy was creating a core for a Russian identity, while a proposed primeval consent between autocratic authority and the people was becoming the cornerstone of Russian exclusiveness. So the monarchic tradition of Russia was transformed into an enlightened nativism in the days of Catherine II. Nicolai Karamzin added to the image of autocracy some enlightened virtues, rule of law, meritocracy, general well-being. The tripartite formula of Sergei Uvarov (‘orthodoxy-autocracy-nationality’) achieved a blending of modern ideas with native archetypes, in forming the imperial identity of Russia.

¹ M.Tourneux. *Diderot et Catherine II* (Paris, 1899): 520.

² Ekaterina II. *Nakaz imperatricy Ekateriny II*, ed. by N.D.Chechulin (St. Petersburg, 1907).

³ A.V.Chrapovickii. *Dnevnik...* (Moscow, 1901): 203.

⁴ N.M.Karamzin. *Izbrannye sochinenia* (Moscow; Leningrad, 1964): II-247.

⁵ N.M.Karamzin. *Letters of a Russian traveller* (New York, 1957): 195.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ See: *Essays on Karamzin* (The Hague, 1975): 219. Cf.: Saint-Just. *Les Institutions républicaines*. Fragments: III, 5.

⁸ *Karamzin's Memoir*, ed. by R.Pipes (Cambridge, 1959): 200.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.:135.

¹¹ Ibid.:120.

¹² Ibid.: 123-124.

¹³ See: *Essays on Karamzin*. 206.

¹⁴ M.S.Uvarov. *Desiatiletie Ministerstva narodnogo prosvetsheniia. 1833-1843* (St-Petersburgh, 1864): 75-76.

¹⁵ See in details: C.H.Whittaker. *The origins of modern Russian education* (Dekalb, 1984).

¹⁶ A.Koyré. *La philosophie et le problème national en Russie* (Paris, 1929): 199.

and librettist Apostolo Zeno gave space in the *Giornale de' Letterati d'Italia*² to a number of contributions to this debate, which was a field of study and related enquiry that prospered throughout the century.³

While it is a truism that in the present time ‘Opera’ means the music, and works are routinely identified with their composers, for the larger part of the eighteenth century ‘Opera’ meant the libretto first, with the music taking second place, and valued for its role in serving the poet's intentions. In the mid-century, Metastasio firmly believed his *drammi per musica* could be read as tragedies, their true worth revealed in performance without music by actors rather than singers. Carlo Goldoni, himself a ‘reformer’—both by reputation and intent—of the Italian prose theatre of the mid-to-late century, gives an account in his *Mémoires* of Zeno's and Metastasio's roles in the ongoing reform of the *melodramma*.

Before these two, Goldoni avers, there were only gods and demons, special effects and marvels, and Zeno was the first to assert the possibility of performing a tragedy in verse ‘without debasing it, and to sing it without enfeebling it’. In Zeno's *melodrammi* the

[historical] characters appear as they really were, or at least as the historians describe them. Along with sustained characterization, his innovations embraced sequential plot, episodes connected with respect to unity of action; a style that is ‘manly and robust,’ with the words of the arias suited to the music of the present day. On this foundation, Goldoni asserts that his contemporary Metastasio has brought lyric tragedy to the point of perfection with his pure and elegant style, his nimble and harmonious verse, admirable clarity of feelings, vibrancy in the language of the passions, and with an apparent facility belying an attention to detail. ‘Were I to be so foolhardy as to draw comparisons, I would hazard the opinion that Metastasio emulates Racine for style, while for vigour Zeno emulates Corneille’, Goldoni writes in his *Mémoires* (I: XLI)⁴—even while he professes to regard any text written to be performed in music as ‘servile’. Lorenzo da Ponte similarly regarded his work as a librettist as a species of ‘jobbing’ for a composer, using the metaphor of the fly that alights on the back of the horse en route to the mill. Famously, however, he also as-

serted an entitlement to claim co-authorship of the operas for which he provided librettos. Nor did Goldoni disdain throughout his career to write a number of ‘servile’ works intended for the musical stage, while also revising those of others for the same purpose.

Metastasio and the taste for ‘reform’

Metastasio, on the other hand, never considered his texts ‘servile’. Their attested popularity with a wide readership, even a generation and more after his death in 1782, is close to incomprehensible in present-day terms. Those readers must have responded sympathetically to the contest of ethos and pathos, the *frisson* provoked by the tensions between the private passions and public duty enacted upon the imaginary stage. Yet the first audiences⁵ for the works would have perceived them quite differently: as a kind of civic devotional ritual instilling

lessons on how they must exercise authority and how they must obey it. These were object lessons in the achievement of a kind of morbidly delicate balance between private sentiment and public decorum, the ear attuned to hear the voice of ‘sensitivity’ in the path of the

thundering juggernaut of the absolutist State.

Even after the cycle of wide-ranging seminars and conferences mounted in 1998⁶ to mark the third centenary of the poet's birth, a sense of the modernity of Metastasio in his own day is all but irrecoverable. Eighteenth century serious opera sings the swan-song of the *ancien regime*, comic opera and *intermezzi*, alternatively, celebrate the new order, the new class that Goldoni took as his subject matter for the prose theatre, and which—at a more profound level—the Da Ponte-Mozart team were to take as theirs very soon after the death of the former Poet Laureate in 1782.

Developments in Opera in the early part of the eighteenth century were wrought largely in the name of the program of ‘reform’ and modernization of culture promulgated by Arcadian Academy. This was in effect a national academy *avant la lettre*; at its inception in 1690 the ‘nation’ did not of course exist, except as a notion, a cultural ideal, whose common denominator was the literary vernacular, Tuscan (itself the object of reform by zealous Arcadian modernizers). The Academy's headquarters was (and remains) in Rome, and as



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far as Opera and theatre in general are concerned, Rome was backward in comparison with Florence, Venice, Naples and Bologna. Censorship of the kind that Lione Pascoli, in a proposal for reform of the management of the Papal State, describes as prevailing into the 1730s,⁷ meant that 'modern' opera was banned there during the most intense and vital period of reform and development. Metastasio's first noteworthy successes took place in Naples in the 1720s, with his sung entertainments that were not quite opera; most notable was his *Didone abbandonata* (1724), which indisputably was. Metastasio's destiny in view of his origins is remarkable, not simply because of the fact that he was the child of a small shopkeeper in Via dei Cappellari in Rome, and yet rose, due to talent and good luck, to be 'Caesarean' poet at the court of Charles VI, the Holy Roman Emperor. Rather, he embodies an interestingly contradictory outcome in the history of ideas, given that Metastasio's *oeuvre* is often typified (and not inappropriately) as the signal outcome of the 'Arcadian' movement of the early years of the century, with its dedication to rational and natural simplicity and its adoption of the pastoral mode as the touchstone for a 'reformed' culture founded on reason and nature. The 'reform', it should be specified, was of culture in the first instance, not of the political order: any politics implicit in Arcadian 'reform' was without a revolutionary horizon.

'Taste' and criticism

Reform in the literary culture of eighteenth-century Italy took place under the sign of 'taste', and *buon gusto* is invoked so often in all areas of discourse that nowhere does anyone feel the requirement to say exactly what it is. The debate on taste was sparked by a late-seventeenth century French treatise that is generally credited with having given the spur to a reform of Italian letters. Dominique Bouhours' *Manière de bien penser dans les ouvrages d'esprit* remained a rallying point for Italian 'Arcadians' and 'Moderns' for four decades after its appearance in France in 1687, to the extent that it might be thought to have alone been the cause of the attempt in Italy at a 'cultural renewal'. It became a constant and convenient polemical touchstone for writers in the *Giornale de' Letterati d'Italia*, who tended to assimilate it to a collective foreign enemy referred to as 'i giornalisti oltramontani' or 'i giornalisti trevolziani' (i.e. those contributing to the *Journal de Trevoux*), or with some epithet underscoring the Jesuit affiliations of hostile French critics of Italian letters.

Bouhours' interlocutors are two men of letters with the same education but very different characters and outlooks. 'Eudoxe has very good taste, and can be pleased with nothing in a work of art that is not reasonable and natural; he can admire nothing that is not true, and is at pains to explain the difference between fiction and falsehood'.

He loves the Classical authors. Philanthe, on the other hand, is charmed by all that glitters and is ornamented, preferring Spanish and Italian authors, particularly Tasso, to the Greeks and Romans. Eudoxe's allegation that Tasso was 'mere tinsel' rather than pure gold stung Italians into a defence and an examination of the Italian literary tradition, and led them to take account of a taste lingering at the end of the seventeenth century, for 'mannerism', for the conceit, for the Baroque. The debate is all the more interesting because those who came to the defence of Tasso and of Italian poetry were more than half in agreement with the strictures of the rationalist, neo-Classicalizing 'Eudoxe', spokesman for 'right thinking' in literature. An important figure in the Arcadian culture of reform, one of the founders of the Academy, and a literary historian, the well-known juriconsult Gian Vincenzo Gravina (b. c.1670) was far from accepting the justice of the famous crowning insult from 'Eudoxe' of a 'tinsel Tasso', while there is a certain resemblance between the positions of the two. Curiously, however, *buon gusto* is not a term that Gravina makes use of at all, despite the thorough 'Cartesian' grounding given it by Bouhours, which might be expected to have made it attractive to Gravina, who concludes his major work of criticism with a tribute in 1715 to his Cartesian training at the hands of 'Gregorio Caropreso [Caloprese], mio cugino e maestro'.⁸ Even in places where he implicitly summons up this received idea, the term is absent. In the very few places where Gravina uses the word *gusto* at all, he uses it interchangeably with *giudizio*. At the same time, Gravina's theoretical and critical writings abound in words contributing to the theory of 'taste' in the early eighteenth century. Emergent in his earliest criticism in the vernacular, the *Discorso sopra l'Endimione* (1692), is a Cartesian faith in the 'light of reason' by which things appear 'as they are', and which reveals what Muratori, in his influential *Riflessioni sopra il buon gusto* (1708) called 'la limpida e pura faccia del vero.' For Gravina, an aesthetic of 'truthfulness' ('il verosimile') must correspond to the philosophic value of 'truth'. The truth to which art—as distinct from philosophy—ought to conform is 'nature'.

As many 'Moderns' observed, these works of criticism, going beyond aesthetics to embrace principles of scientific enquiry, provided an alternative to Aristotelian Scholastic method. Though the *querelle* picked by Italian critics in defence of Italian *ingegno* focussed on poetry as the test case for reform in the wide sense, reform was farther-reaching than that might suggest, embracing the entirety of eighteenth-century 'letters'. In this, the effect of Benedictine scholarly practices in historiography, introduced into Italy af-

ter 1685 by Jean Mabillon and his colleagues, should not be overlooked.⁹ The programmatic intent of these anti-scholastic scholars was to 'clean up' historiography—ecclesiastical historiography and hagiography in the first instance, while their methodologies and values were soon applied to secular historiography. There is a line of inheritance from Mabillon to Benedetto (Bernardino) Bacchini to Ludovico Antonio Muratori, who as a youthful and increasingly influential scholar in the early years of the eighteenth century was engaged in the polemics to do with the 'modernization' of both literary taste and of 'erudition'.¹⁰ Apostolo Zeno, whose 'verisimilitude' Goldoni approved in the dramatic characters he took from history for his *libretti*, was influenced by the new Maurine



methodology ventilated by Mabillon and his colleagues.

In relation to Zeno's and Muratori's coeval Gravina, however, it is piquant to speculate on a certain irony inherent in Metastasio's position as one of the acknowledged founders of the modern lyric stage. For Gravina was most severe in his condemnation and unsparing with his contempt of the lyric tradition and its amatory subject matter; along with Muratori, he decried the 'lubriciousness' of the theatre, and certainly had no time for sung drama. (Gravina nevertheless wrote five probably unperformable neo-classical blank verse political tragedies,¹¹ perhaps on the wager that if they alone did not succeed in reforming theatre, at least they would keep people away from it altogether.)

The interest of this is, of course, that Gravina was Metastasio's tutor, mentor and benefactor; he even assumed naming rights when he 'Hellenized' the pre-teen boy's family name Trapassi into Metastasio on taking him into his household in Rome, later to adopt him, and make him his heir. Gravina, a Calabrian, sent him south to his own former tutor, the 'Cartesian' Gregorio Caloprese, to complete his education, and as his letters show, Metastasio took it all in. What, one wonders, would Gravina—who hated opera with its entertainment

values and all its vain spectacle, and who from within the culture of Arcadia scoffed at its pastoral role-playing (making the 'erudite' point that the historical Arcadians engaged in civic and military affairs like the rest of the grown-up civilized world)—have made of the plangent and simplistic pastoral effusions that made his *protégé* famous throughout Europe? We never can know, of course, since Gravina died, prematurely, in 1718, when Metastasio was only twenty and had not yet made his mark.

The meeting of ethos and pathos

Metastasio's dramas, behind a pastoral or a mythological or an exotic 'orientalizing' mask, are all, ultimately, about the overarching imperatives of *raison d'état* on the 'sensible' individual, and the soliciting of consensus in the acceptance of the irreconcilability of the contradiction. It is a contradiction that is all the more touching if the 'sensible' individual is in command of the terrible imperatives of power and subject to them at the same time. It is at such points, both dramatic and lyrical, where ethos and pathos meeting head on, where the public and the private individual come together in a single expression—completed in music—of ambivalence, doubt, divided impulses, torment... that eighteenth century opera comes into its own.¹² The operatic history of *La clemenza di Tito*, a drama combining tyrannicide and the private vicissitudes of the 'affects', is interesting to consider in this regard.

La clemenza di Tito, written by Metastasio in 1734 and first set to music by Antonio Caldara,¹³ was hugely successful in the reign of Charles VI for the manner in which it put an Apollonian glaze on the brutalities of *raison d'état*. In 1791, 11 years after Charles's grandson's succession as Emperor Joseph II, another composer, Mozart, was commissioned to set it to music, to mark the coronation of Joseph as King of Bohemia, and its being the occasion of Mozart's music is arguably why it is Metastasio's best-known libretto now. Yet in between the first and the last setting of this troubled celebration of absolutism in quasi-mythological dress, there has been a real revolution.

With the realization of a psychological verisimilitude in the 'bourgeois' dramas of Mozart-Da Ponte an indisputably radical reform, often styled a 'revolution', had come about in opera with *The Marriage of Figaro*, *Don Giovanni* and *Così fan tutte*, in 1786, 1787 and 1790 respectively.¹⁴ We see these as accommodating, or acknowledging, the social changes and the changes in power relations between the 'Estates' and between individuals that are assimilated, rather too glibly, to the French Revolution of 1789. Given the canonical status now accorded to these works in some notionally 'progressive' history

of opera, it is only when we consider the apparently anachronistic recuperation of *La clemenza di Tito* that we can fully appreciate how anomalous they really were.¹⁵

Written to flatter another Hapsburg Emperor, Leopold's grandfather, Charles VI, Metastasio's drama of 1734 was an apposite propaganda vehicle for the new Emperor Leopold II. On assuming the throne in 1790, and happy to be styled 'the German Titus', he was prompt to affirm his power through a series of coronation ceremonies, first as the Holy Roman Emperor, then as King of Hungary and finally as King of Bohemia. Behind him, he had a quarter of a century's reputation for 'enlightened despotism' as Grand Duke of Tuscany. The Hapsburgs stood in need of the affirmation that could be expected to trickle down from a public and spectacular representation of power. In his final years before his death in 1790, Joseph II, his brother, had embroiled Austria in an unpopular war with the Ottoman Empire, and had made significant reforms that disquieted the nobility and made it distrustful of the possibility of some 'revolution from above.' A mere two years before Leopold's ascent to the throne, the French Revolution had seriously destabilized the monarchical system, to say the very least, incidentally removing his sister, Queen Marie Antoinette. When the Bohemian Estates decided to pay tribute to their new monarch with week-long festivities including a new opera, Hapsburg tradition dictated that it should be an *opera seria* on a libretto by Metastasio, even though he had died in 1782. It was fortunate that one of his enduringly popular dramas should be based on the Emperor Titus, who pardoned the conspirators of an assassination plot against him, as related by the second-century historian Suetonius, Metastasio's chief source for what is otherwise propagandistic fiction.¹⁶ Caterino Mazzolà reworked his predecessor's drama for performance with music by Mozart at the National Theatre in Prague (September 6, 1791).¹⁷ With its dual intention of flattering the monarch and reaffirming its audience's faith in the rightness and virtue of absolutism, it is utterly at one with opera's overarching project throughout the century—essentially, an ideological one of keeping revolution at bay while engaging vigorously in its own reform.

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Summary

While it is a truism that in the present time 'Opera' means the music, and works are identified with their composers, in the eighteenth century 'Opera'

meant the libretto first, the music taking second place, and valued for its role in serving the poet's intentions.

Opera seria, the privileged operatic genre, expressed the increasingly intolerable tensions and contradictions inherent in the principles of 'enlightened despotism', while at the same time it registered the imperatives of a widespread call for the reformation of 'taste'. Scarcely comprehensible to a present-day opera audience is the enduring appeal of Metastasio's *drammi per musica*, as instanced by the utilisation in 1791 of *La clemenza di Tito* for an opera by Mozart, in starkly different circumstances from those obtaining when it was first staged (with music by Hasse) in 1734.

¹ Edited version of a paper presented at the Tenth International Congress on the Enlightenment, Dublin, 25-31 July 1999.

² Along with Scipione Maffei and Antonio Vallisnieri, Zeno was co-editor from the journal's inception in 1710 until his departure from Venice for the Hapsburg Court.

³ Among the contributors was Benedetto Marcello, who set the Old Testament Psalms to music devised on the basis of what was known—or imagined—of ancient Hebrew practice. His much-reprinted satire *Il Teatro alla moda* (1707) is his most lasting contribution to the operatic field.

⁴ In Carlo Goldoni, *Tutte le opere*, ed. Giuseppe Ortolani, 14 vols (Milan: Mondadori, 1935-56).

⁵ Writing in the service of Emperor Charles VI and his heirs, Metastasio's target audience was a courtly one, swelled by the personnel of the State administration. An idea of the cultural and ideological values of the public for his *melodrammi, fêtes théâtrales, oratorios* etc. in Vienna may be adduced from Hubert Ch. Ehalt's *La corte di Vienna tra Sei e Settecento [Ausdrucksformen absolutistischer Herrschaft]*, trans. Marco Meriggi (Rome: Bulzoni, 1984).

⁶ Rome, December 1998-Vienna 1999.

⁷ Lione Pascoli, *Testamento politico [...] per stabilire un ben regolato commercio nello Stato della Chiesa* (Cologne, 1733)

⁸ G.V. Gravina, *Scritti critici e teorici*, ed. Amedeo Quondam (Rome: Laterza, 1973), p. 326; it is a nice further contradiction that the Cartesian rationalist Caloprese wrote an admiring study of Tasso's rhetoric, *La Concione di Marfisa* (1696).

⁹ See Arnaldo Momigliano, 'Mabillon's Italian Disciples,' in *Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography* (London: Blackwell, 1977), 277-93.

¹⁰ Having condemned operatic theatre in the *Riflessioni...*, by the mid-1730s Muratori thought that Metastasio's reforms to the melodrama largely answered his objections; see Walter Binni, *L'Arcadia e il Metastasio* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1961), p.

xxii.

¹¹ *Tragedie cinque*, 1715 (written March-May 1712).

¹² A supreme example of this 'divided self' is the aria 'Agitata da due venti' from Apostolo Zeno's *Griselda*, revised by Goldoni for music by Vivaldi, as performed by Cecilia Bartoli in her 1998 Vicenza recital ('Live in Italy', Decca 455 981-2).

¹³ Since its first performance, with Antonio Caldara's music, Metastasio's *Clemenza di Tito* was set during the 18th century more than forty times by various composers; only Johann Adolph Hasse [1699-1784] set all of Metastasio's libretti.

¹⁴ Da Ponte's meeting with Mozart is recorded as taking place in Vienna in 1783 (the year after Metastasio's death), when the librettist was appointed to the Italian Opera at the Vienna Burgtheater.

¹⁵ The coincidence of the final performance of Mozart's *Clemenza*, in a court production in Prague, with the opening of *The Magic Flute* in a variety theatre (or beer-hall) in the suburbs of Vienna on September 30, 1791, points up the anachronistic nature of the work within Mozart's own developing—though soon to be concluded—oeuvre.

¹⁶ In addition to Suetonius's chronicles, Metastasio drew upon French classical theatre: notably Racine's *Andromaque* (1667) and Corneille's *Cinna, ou la clémence d'Auguste* (1642).

¹⁷ Mazzolà's revision reduced the opera from three to two acts, eliminating c. 700 lines and adding text for ensembles and choruses, which Metastasio habitually eschewed.

Lettre de John Pappas

Monsieur,

Mon article sur <La 'Marâtre M^{me} de Tencin, mère de D'Alembert' a été publié dans votre no. 2, Décembre, de **La Revue Européenne**, sans m'avoir envoyé d'épreuves au préalable. C'est alors que j'ai découvert que vous aviez corrigé mon usage de *D'Alembert* pour y substituer la particule aristocratique sans m'avoir averti de cette <correction>. Quand je m'en suis plaint, vous m'avez demandé de vous envoyer une lettre pour expliquer à vos lecteurs pourquoi <d'Alembert> n'est pas correct. Déjà en 1986, dans le 1^{er} volume de *Recherches sur Diderot et sur l'Encyclopédie* (oct. 1986, p. 70) M^{me} A.-M. Chouillet a annoncé qu'en accord avec moi, <nous avons délibérément abandonné la mode récente d'orthographe *d'Alembert*... 'Alembert' n'est pas un lieu et la particule n'a pas de sens>.

Voici un résumé des arguments que je vous ai envoyés dans ma protestation.

D'Alembert avait été baptisé Jean Le Rond aux Enfants Trouvés par l'église où il avait été abandonné. Plus tard la famille de son père l'a inscrit au Collège des Quatre Nations sous le nom de Chevalier Dairemberg, qu'il garda jusqu'à son départ et le

changea en *Dalembert*, sans doute pour des raisons phonétiques. Sa correspondance est signée ainsi et parfois *D'Alembert*. Cette lettre officielle au Ministère concernant une pension se trouve aux Archives Nationales :

<Monseigneur, J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer mon extrait baptistaire ; vous n'y trouverez point le nom de D'Alembert qui ne m'a été donné que dans mon enfance, & que j'ai toujours porté depuis. Mais je suis connu de plusieurs personnes sous le nom de Le Rond, qui est mon nom véritable> (O⁶66 No. 85, 10 Mars 1779). Une autre, écrite au roi en tant que Secrétaire perpétuel de l'Académie Française, est signée : <À l'Académie, ce 4 avril 1782, D'Alembert, secrétaire> (O⁶11 Pièce 406).

Il y a une tentation de transformer un auteur bourgeois en aristocrate en le dotant d'une particule comme si on lui donnait ainsi plus d'importance. On trouve une résistance exemplaire à cette tendance dans l'*Index Biographique de l'Académie des Sciences*, publié par l'Institut de France. Notre encyclopédiste s'y trouve ainsi : <*Dalembert*, voir *Alembert (D)*>. Mais voici quelques corrections qui révèlent la tendance mentionnée ci-dessus : <Daubenton, alias D'Aubenton ; Dambourney, alias d'Ambournai ; Duvaucel, alias Du Vaucel, etc.>.

L'anoblissement de D'Alembert est dû en particulier à feu Theodore Besterman qui, non satisfait de lui prêter la particule, mais conséquent avec son système, la lui a enlevée dans le texte pour l'appeler <*Alembert*> tout court, comme on fait pour Condorcet (vrai aristocrate). La Voltaire Foundation a reconnu à quel point cela est grotesque et, depuis la mort de Besterman, les membres ont cessé de l'appeler *Alembert* tout court.

Quiconque a lu l'*Essai sur la Société des Gens de lettres et des Grands* comprendra à quel point on insulte la mémoire de D'Alembert en lui prêtant la particule aristocratique après qu'il a montré son dédain pour cette classe en l'accablant dans cet écrit. Puisqu'il a voulu s'appeler *D'Alembert* pourquoi vouloir lui enlever son nom ? Pour conclure, je dirai que toute revue sérieuse devrait envoyer des épreuves à ses contributeurs pour leur éviter le travail supplémentaire que les <corrections> de **La Revue Européenne** m'ont infligées.

John Pappas

Nous sommes heureux de publier cette lettre de John Pappas, qui rectifie ce problème, sans doute essentiel, concernant la biographie de D'Alembert. Néanmoins, en corrigeant d'Alembert, nous nous sommes alignés sur un ouvrage de référence qui fait, en général, autorité, c'est-à-dire, Béatrice Didier, Dictionnaire Universel des Œuvres Littéraires (PUF, 1994).

Il est vrai que nous aurions dû soumettre les épreuves à l'auteur, mais cela n'a pas été possible. L'usage de l'ordinateur n'est pas si avancé dans le monde des sciences humaines, et les lettres parfois se font attendre, et risquent de nous faire aller bien au-delà de notre date limite.

De toute façon, toute erreur est bienvenue, si elle aide à comprendre la vérité historique. Et notre erreur, qui a été celle de ne pas avoir envoyé les épreuves à l'auteur, nous aidera à comprendre mieux la biographie de D'Alembert.

Une autre erreur, qui s'est malheureusement glissée dans le même numéro, est celle concernant le titre de l'essai de Bernard Franco. Dans notre ordinateur, sur le disk dur où nous faisons les corrections, avant de passer les fichiers sur le logiciel que nous donnons à l'imprimeur, il est correctement écrit <Conversation et Hospitalité>. Dans le journal il est devenu <Conservation et Hospitalité>. Nous prions Bernard, et nos lecteurs, de bien vouloir nous excuser de cette erreur.

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